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Abstract
This thesis examines the relationship that is emerging between the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) and what many international relations scholars refer to as 'global
civil society'. It focuses on the interactions and dialogue that have taken place between
the WTO and representatives of 'global civil society' around one particularly
controversial and widely-debated set of issues:ongoing debates about the WTO'sTrade
Related Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS)and the protection of 'traditional
knowledge' and 'biodiversity'. Drawing on governmentality theory and other elements
of Foucauldian thought, the thesis examines the practices and processesthat 'structure
the possible field of action' (Foucault 1983: 221) of non-state actors who seek to feed
into policy debates at the WTO, and the patterns of inclusion and exclusion that result
from these. The empirical data underpinning the analysis has been generated in a
number of geographical sites - Geneva, Switzerland and Lima, Cusco, Iquitos and Puno
in Peru - using a 'multi-sited' ethnographic approach. The analysis developed
throughout the thesis illuminates some of the processes of filtering and erasure that
occur when differently situated civil society organisations attempt to contribute to the
same policy debate. It also highlights the very different roles played by Northern and
Southern civil society organisations in the governance of traditional knowledge and
biodiversity. The thesis thereby opens up new lines of enquiry into the forms of
restriction and control which operate in and through the social spaces in which civil
society interacts with the WTO, and the implications of these for processes of
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12
Introduction
Global Civil Society and the WTO
This thesis examines the relationship that is emerging between the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) and what many international relations scholars refer to as 'global
civil society', 'transnational civil society' or simply 'civil society' (see e.g. Anheier et al
2001; Fiorini and Simmons 2000; Kaldor 2003a, 2003b; Keane 2003; Lipschutz 200Sa,
200Sb, 2007; Price 1998, 2003; Ramos 2006; Scholte 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b, 2007;
Seckinelgin 2002). Unlike much of the existing literature on the WTO and global civil
society, the analysis developed here does not focus explicitly on issues such as
transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy, or the ways in which these can
be enhanced through the participation of civil society organisations in WTO processes
(see e.g. Charnovitz 2003, 2005; Dunoff 1998, 2003; Smythe and Smith 2006). Neither
does it seek to assess the quality of the relationship between civil society organisations
and the WTO, or the extent to which WTO engagement with different kinds of civil
society organisations is 'meaningful' (see e.g. Wilkinson 2002, 2005; Williams 2005). My
focus, rather, is the way in which interactions between global civil society and the WTO
are governed in the Foucauldian sense of the term. I examine the practices and
processes that 'structure the possible field of action' (Foucault 1983: 221) of non-state
actors who seek to feed into policy debates at the WTO, and the patterns of inclusion
and exclusion that result from these. Debates about transparency, accountability and
the extent to which interactions between civil society and the WTO are 'meaningful'
(Wilkinson 2005: 26) form part of the backdrop to the arguments developed here, but
the thesis opens up new lines of enquiry into the forms of restriction and control which
operate in and through the social spaces in which civil society interacts with the WTO,
and the implications of these for processes of participation and representation in global
governance.
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The thesis is part of an emerging literature on global civil society and its involvement in
global governance which draws on Michel Foucault and others' work on governmentality
(see e.g. Amoore and Langley 2004, 2005; Bryant 2002; Ilcan and Lacey 2006; Jaeger
2007; Lipschutz 200Sa, 200Sb, 2007; Lipschutz with Rowe 2005; Sending and Neumann
2006). Like this literature, I understand global civil society to be both produced by and
(re-)productive of broader global power relations and disciplinary norms, and part of the
structures and rationalities that govern global relations. Rather than conceptualising
global civil society as a relatively autonomous 'sphere of ideas, values, institutions,
organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the
market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities and economies'
(Anheier et al 2001: 17; see also Keane 2003: 8-11), global civil society is thus
understood to be constitutive of global governance processes and structures. Unlike
this emerging literature, however, this study proceeds from a self-consciously
anthropological reading of govern mentality theory, which emphasises the centrality of
practice to processes of meaning creation and transmission (see e.g. Comaroff and
Comaroff 1992: 38; Herbert 2000: 556; Larner and Walters 2004: 11). The term 'global
civil society' is not understood to refer to any kind of natural, pre-determined reality or
domain; the meaning of 'global civil society' is, rather, understood to be stabilised,
negotiated and contested through regular everyday practice. This thesis seeks, then, to
understand what kind of 'global civil society' is being called forward and constructed as
legitimate in and through the interactions that take place between civil society
organisations and the WTO - understood here to comprise the WTO Secretariat as well
as the national delegates who carry out much of the organisation's business. It also
seeks to understand the processes that lead to certain types of civil society
representatives and their perspectives being constructed as legitimate and included in
this 'global civil society', while others are constructed as illegitimate and excluded.
In order to facilitate the development of a detailed, empirically-grounded account of
current civil society-WTO relations, this thesis focuses on the interactions and dialogue
that have taken place around one particularly controversial and widely-debated set of
issues relating to WTO policy: ongoing debates about the WTO's Trade Related
Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) and the protection of 'traditional knowledge'
and 'biodiversity'. These TRIPS-traditional knowledge-biodiversity debates provide an
enlightening focus not only because they have been approached from a variety of
ideological and theoretical perspectives, which has led to much diversity of opinion
within 'global civil society' about the nature of the problem that the TRIPS Agreement
represents, but also because they have involved civil society organisations and
governments around the world, particularly in countries such as India, China, Thailand,
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Ecuador, Brazil and Peru which have high levels of biodiversity and significant indigenous
populations, whose so-called 'traditional knowledge' is the focus of discussion (see e.g.
GRAIN and Kalpavriksh 2002: 13-16; Halbert 2005: 163; May and Sell 2006: 195-197;
Ragavan2001: 54-57). Analysing the interactions and dialogue that have taken place
between civil society organisations and WTO representatives (both Secretariat officials
and national delegates who are responsible for negotiating and decision-making in the
TRIPSCouncil) thus illuminates some of the filtering and translation processesthat occur
when differently situated civil society organisations attempt to contribute to the same
policy debate. It also highlights the very different roles played by Northern and
Southern civil society organisations in the governance of traditional knowledge and
biodiversity.
The empirical data underpinning the analysis has been generated in a number of
geographical sites - Geneva, Switzerland and Lima, Cusco, Iquitos and Puno in Peru -
using a 'multi-sited' ethnographic approach (see e.g. Freidberg 2001; Garsten 2010;
Hannerz 2003; Marcus 1995, 1998, 2010). Geneva is home to both the WTOSecretariat
and scores of mainly international NGOs that seek to monitor and feed into the
negotiations that take place there, as well as several other international organisations
including the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the World Health
Organisation (WHO), the International Labour Office (ILO) and several United Nations
specialist agencies. Geneva is thus the geographical location where most interaction
takes place between representatives of the WTO and 'global civil society', mostly in the
shape of the more or less professionalised NGOsand thinktanks that have established
offices there. Peru is one of the most bio-diverse countries in the world, and is among
the seventeen countries recognised by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)and
Conservation International as 'mega-diverse' becauseof the range and diversity of plant
and animal life that naturally occur there.' It also has a large indigenous population
(around 45% of the population according to Minority Rights Group International) who
live predominantly in the Andean and Amazonian regions of the country,2 whose so-
called 'traditional knowledge' of the ecosystems in these regions is considered valuable
to Western business and science. Both the Peruvian government and organisations and
associations which make up Peruvian 'civil society', including professionalised NGOs,
semi-governmental research institutes, peasant associations and indigenous
associations, have been particularly active and interested in debates around trade
policy, intellectual property policy and the protection of traditional knowledge and
1SeeConservation International (1998), 'Megadiversity: The 17 Biodiversity Superstars', details available
on-line: http://www.conservation.org/documentaries/Pages/megadiversity.aspx, and Convention on
Biological Diversity (no date), 'Country Profile - Peru', available on-line:
http://www.cbd.int/countries/profile.shtmI7country=pe#status.
2 SeeMinority Rights Group International (2007), World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples-
Peru: Overview', available on-line: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4954ceOb2.html.
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biodiversity. The Peruvian government has, for example, made securing more effective
legal recognition and protection of 'traditional knowledge' one of its foreign policy
objectives. Peruvian civil society organisations have also made it as far asGeneva either
to participate in TRIPS Council meetings or sessions of WIPO's Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore (IGC)3in their attempts to monitor and participate in international debates on
intellectual property policy, traditional knowledge and biodiversity.
In total, I spent five months conducting research in Geneva, from July to December
2008, as well as a number of shorter research visits timed to coincide with relevant
workshops and seminars taking place there between 2007 and 2010. I also spent a total
of five months carrying out research in Peru, from February to June 2009, and again
from March to April 2010. During this time, I carried out over 70 in-depth, unstructured
interviews, with WTO Secretariat officials, developed and developing country delegates
to the WTO, and representatives of NGOs and thinktanks in Geneva, government
officials in Lima and Iquitos, and representatives of NGOs, sustainable development
organisations and indigenous associations in Lima, Iquitos, Cusco and Puno.4 I also
attended and participated in a variety of relevant public or semi-public events, including
the annual WTOPublic Forums in Geneva from 2007 to 2010, an International Workshop
on Genetically Modified Organisms and Biopiraey in Cuseo,Peru in April 2009, and the IV
Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities of Abya Yala in Puno, Peru
in May 2009.5 The data generated through interviewing and participant observation has
been supplemented wherever possible with documentary material, such as position
papers submitted to the WTO's TRIPSCouncil, NGOpublications and website contents.
Situating The Analysis: Legal and Historical Context
This study of the relationship between 'global civil society' and the WTO has been
carried out a decade after the so-called 'Battle of Seattle' in 1999 which prompted re-
3 The IGCwas established in 2000 in order to develop an international legal agreement to protect
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, and has been holding bi-annual meetings since
then (for details, see: http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/index.html). WIPO, unlike the WTO, accredits and
funds the participation in these meetings of civil society organisations from around the world.
4 Interviews in Geneva were carried out in English, and interviews in Peru were carried out in Spanish.
Researchparticipants are cited in this thesis in the language in which the interview was conducted, and a
translation is provided wherever necessary. It should be noted that many interviews, including with
indigenous leaders in Peru, were conducted in a language that was not the interviewees' first language,
and that the structures and vocabularies used by interviewees do not always conform to 'international'
norms but follow local usage and patterns.
5 SeeAppendix 1 for full details of the organisations where interviews were carried out and Appendix 2 for
details of the events attended.
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assessment within the WTO about the organisation's mode of relating to the outside
world. The large-scale street protests that accompanied the Seattle Ministerial
Conference, and the broader public criticism of WTO policies that emerged at that time,
took many in the WTO by surprise, and led to something of re-think about the need to
be more transparent about the organisation's activities and to engage more with civil
society. A range of measureswere adopted to increase the flow of information between
the WTO, civil society and the general public, and to generate opportunities for
interaction and dialogue between WTO representatives and members of civil society.
These measures, along with the communicative spacesthey have opened up, have now
become a regular, routinised part of the WTO's activities, and particular patterns of civil
society-WTO interaction have emerged within them.
Formally, however, nothing haschanged since 1996, when the WTOGeneral Council,the
WTO's highest decision-making body, approved a set of guidelines which laid out the
types of interaction and dialogue that should take place between the WTO and civil
society. The legal basis for the WTO's interactions with civil society thus still derives
from the Marrakesh Agreement which established the WTO, signed by member
governments in 1994. Article V:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement provided the WTO
General Council with the authority to 'make appropriate arrangements for consultation
and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related
to those of the WTO.' The guidelines approved by the General Council in June 1996
retain the focus on 'consultation and cooperation', but provide more details about the
rationale and anticipated benefits of increased civil society-WTO contact by framing it as
an opportunity to 'mcrease the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities'
(WT/L/162, II) and thereby 'contribute to the accuracyand richness of the public debate'
(WT/L/162, IV). The guidelines also set out a number of ways in which the WTO
Secretariat and WTO members will take steps to 'Improve transparency and develop
communication with NGOs'(WT/L/162, II). These include measures such asderestricting
WTO documents, publishing these documents on-line, and making efforts to initiate
contact with the NGOs, for example through organising ad hoc 'svmposia on specific
WTO-related issues' and 'responding to requests for general information and briefings
about the WTO' by the Secretariat (WT/L/162, III and IV). The guidelines are clear,
however, that primary responsibility for consulting and taking civil society views into
consideration lies at the national level (WT/L/162, VI), and that NGOs should not be
'directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings' (WT/L/162, VI; see also
Williams 2005: 36).
Although these guidelines were approved in 1996, both the WTO Secretariat and
national delegates remained, on the whole, relatively indifferent to the activities of civil
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society, and slow to initiate or engage in interaction and dialogue, both before and after
the events in Seattle in 1999. According to an interviewee in the Information and
External Relations Division in the WTO Secretariat, the division responsible for
channelling the organisation's interactions with civil society, 'it took them [staff in other
divisions of the Secretariat] a while to figure out that actually we don't work with aliens,
we don't work with people from another planet'. Many Secretariat officials understood
their role to consist of providing support to national governments in their pursuit of
trade liberalisation, and simply did not see civil society as relevant." National delegates,
meanwhile, particularly those from developing countries with little history of positive
relations between government officials and 'civil society, were often suspicious about
increasing the amount and level of contact with NGOs,particularly as the most visible
NGOs were European or North American and known for criticising these same
governments for their environmental or human rights records (see e.g. WTO 2007: 334).
Events in Seattle acted as something of a catalyst to change, however, by making visible
to Secretariat staff and delegates the level of public interest in the WTO's activities, and
the types of concerns and criticisms of the organisation that were prevalent at the time,
including issues relating to labour standards, the environment, unequal North-South
relations within the WTO, the spread of corporate globalisation, and the lack of
transparency in the way that business is conducted in the WTO (see e.g. Bhagwati 2001:
19-20; Gill 2000: 134-135; Halliday 2000: 124; Kaldor 2000: 112; Levi and Murphy 2006:
651; McMichael 2000: 466; Williams 2005: 40-42). In response to calls for greater
transparency (WTO 2007: 335), but also to the perception that much of the opposition
to the WTO was based on incorrect or incomplete information (interviews with
Secretariat staff), the Secretariat and national delegates started to place more emphasis
on opening up channels of communication and information, as set out in the 1996
guidelines. Efforts focused primarily on improving access to information about trade
negotiations and other WTO activities, as the Secretariat started to develop the WTO
website and publish information about the WTO's activities, and members agreed to
derestrict some WTO documents and to publish draft negotiating texts on the WTO
website.
Recent years have seen a further evolution in the WTO's relationship with civil society.
Although the Secretariat are still working within (and according to some accounts
constrained by) the 1996 General Council-approved guidelines, communication and
interactions between the different elements of the WTO and global civil society are no
longer simply premised on improving transparency and access to information.
According to an interviewee in the WTO Secretariat, 'it started off being about
transparency, now it's gone beyond transparency, now it's a real dialogue'. Geneva-
6 This view is still prevalent amongst some national delegates and Secretariat staff. SeeChapter 4 for
details.
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based NGOsin particular are developing ever closer relations with national delegations
based on providing particular expertise and support in preparing negotiating positions
and arguments, and NGOsare increasingly credited with providing Members with useful
technical and political advice (see WTO 2007: 340-341; Lamy 2007). According to the
authors of the WTO-published World Trade Report 2007, '[f]rom a sensitive, one-
dimensional and mostly process-oriented relationship which primarily evolved around
accessto information, the WTO-NGO interaction has matured into a more substance-
based one' (WTO 2007: 342; see also Wilkinson 2005: 27). It is in this context that the
present study has been carried out; there is a widespread expectation that interactions
between representatives of 'civil society' and the WTOshould be 'substance-based', and
significant levels of trust have built up between at least some sections of 'global civil
society' and the WTO, despite the lack of legal status afforded to NGOsand other civil
society organisations by WTOAgreements and guidelines.
Overview of the Thesis
In Chapter One, I review the existing literature on the role played by 'civil society' in
global governance, including accounts which take 'global social movements',
'transnational advocacy networks', 'NGOs' and '(global) civil society' as their objects of
analysis. I identify a number of dominant narrative tropes and analytical conventions in
this literature that limit scholarly understanding of the complex roles that different types
of civil society organisations play in global governance. Existing accounts of the role
played by NGOsand other types of civil society organisation in global governance tend, I
argue, to: (1) research and present conclusions about the role played by 'NGOs',
'transnational social movements' and other constructed objects of analysis as if these
were homogenous units, thus masking important differences and tensions that exist
within them; (2) focus on the ways in which NGOsand civil society more broadly can
enhance global democracy, without considering the ways in which they might also
impede it; and (3) focus on analysing the impact and influence of 'global civil society'
without considering the power dynamics, exclusionary processes and polities of
knowledge and representation that can operate within it. The existing literature on the
role played by 'civil society' in global governance thus over-emphasises the uniformity
and consensual nature of 'global civil society', and renders certain modes of civil society
relationship to global governance structures and processesmore visible than others.
In Chapter Two, I develop an alternative approach to studying the role of 'civil society' in
global governance which avoids reproducing some of the more problematic
assumptions, misrepresentations and erasures that are present in the existing literature.
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This approach enables exploration of the ways in which the power dynamics,
exclusionary processesand politics of representation that can operate within 'global civil
society' impact on the way it relates to global governance. I draw on two main
theoretical sources: governmentality theory, particularly practice-oriented readings of it,
and ethnographic research methodology asdeveloped and applied by cultural and social
anthropologists. From the governmentality literature, I borrow a number of general
orienting assumptions, including the understanding of governing as consisting of 'modes
of action, more or less considered and calculated, which [are] destined to act upon the
possibilities of action of other people' (Foucault 1983: 221), and the understanding that
domains of activity such as 'global civil society' and 'global governance' are not natural
or pre-given, but constituted and negotiated through everyday practice. I also borrow a
number of more specific concepts and conceptualisations, including the notion that
processes of governing always rely on and reproduce particular forms of thought and
rationality, and the idea that subjectivity can act as a terrain of government. From the
anthropological literature I borrow a number of orienting methodological principles,
including the adoption of what scholars have referred to as an 'ethnographic sensibility'
that is sensitive to the ways in which meaning is generated and negotiated in social
interaction, and seeks to capture the inherent complexity and diversity of the social
world (see e.g. Marcus 1998: 14; Schatz 2009: 5; Wedeen 2009: 90). I also borrow the
'multi-sited' approach to collecting and generating research data developed and applied
by a number of cultural and social anthropologists (see e.g. Freidberg 2001; Garsten
2010; Hannerz 2003; Marcus 1995, 1998, 2010). This theoretical and methodological
approach facilitates an examination of the relationship emerging between the WTO and
civil society that is sensitive to the differences and tensions that exist between the
different organisations understood to be part of 'global civil society', and that helps
explore what makes some parts of this 'global civil society' more visible, influential and
thus more involved in this field of global governance than others.
In Chapter Three, I turn my attention to the debates that have been taking place over
the past fifteen years about the relationship and tensions between the WTO's TRIPS
Agreement and the protection of traditional knowledge and biodiversity. I begin by
presenting an overview of the TRIPSAgreement and the philosophical principles and
assumptions that underpin it, then outline the context in which concerns about the links
between TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity first began to emerge. I then
outline the debates and discussions that have been taking place within the WTO on
what have come to be known as the 'TRIPS-CBDissues', and identify the main positions
and perspectives that have been developed and presented in the TRIPSCouncil, the
WTO body charged with overseeing the implementation of the TRIPSAgreement and
negotiating any potential modifications to it. I then, by way of contrast, outline the
discussions that have been taking place around the world on TRIPS-traditional
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knowledge-biodiversity issues,which include several strands of thought and discussion
that challenge many of the assumptions underpinning the debates that have taken place
in the TRIPSCouncil. The chapter thus serves as an orientation and contextualisation of
the three more analytical chapters that follow it. I return to these debates and the ways
in which the issues discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six limit what is sayable and
whose perspectives are considered legitimate in the field of civil society-WTO
interactions in Chapter Seven.
In Chapter Four, I focus on the forms of knowledge of 'global civil society' that have
emerged within the WTO in the past decade, along with ideas about the kind of
relationship 'global civil society' is able to have with the WTO. I identify four basic
discourses that permeate the practices and narratives of those within the WTO (both
Secretariat staff and national delegates) who define and/or enact the WTO's policy
towards civil society: the discourse of 'civil society can contribute'; the discourse of 'civil
society must be informed'; the discourse of 'civil society is confusing'; and the discourse
of 'civil society is not that relevant'. These discourses not only shape WTO
representatives' responses to civil society organisations but also structure the
possibilities of action of civil society organisations that wish to interact with
representatives of the WTO. They generate, I argue, a particular regime of visibility and
invisibility which renders certain kinds of civil society organisations and certain kinds of
perspectives and knowledges more visible and legitimate than others. Visibility and
legitimacy are gained, I suggest, through maintaining a permanent physical presence in
Geneva, contributing what is recognised as technical expertise and using trade-
appropriate vocabularies and frameworks. Organisations outside Geneva and/or whose
contributions to debates are grounded in other types of knowledge and framed using
other vocabularies are rendered invisible and excluded from participation.
In Chapter Five, I focus on the forms of restriction and control that operate in the field of
civil society-WTO interactions, and the forms of and opportunities for resistance
associated with them. I use the concept of governmental technologies (understood as
strategies or mechanisms that manipulate and shape a field of activity) to identify a
number of mechanisms of control that work across the various spacesand contexts in
which interaction takes place between civil society and the WTO, and keep behaviour
and interventions within acceptable, non-challenging limits. I identify and discussfour
technologies of government: (1) the will to inform which constructs civil society-WTO
interactions as neutral exchangesof information; (2) the technology of responsibilisation
which seeks to create an active, self-regulating, participatory civil society that is itself
responsible for ensuring the quality of the civil society-WTO relationship; (3) the logic of
competition which places civil society organisations in competition for space and
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attention from WTO representatives; and (4) the use of trust as a technology of
government in order to keep civil society activities within acceptable limits. These
technologies of government create a space in which civil society actors who wish to
participate in dialogue and interaction with WTO representatives are required to
present their interventions as information exchange, take responsibility for providing
the type of information that national delegates to the WTO find relevant, compete with
other civil society actors for space and attention, and behave in a way which causesno
embarrassment or disturbance to the WTO and its regular activities.
In Chapter Six, I turn my attention to the processes of subjectification that operate
within the field of civil socletv-wto interactions, and to the forms of subjectivity that
are treated and incited as appropriate and legitimate. I identify three mechanisms of
subjectification that work to encourage particular forms of subjectivity: (1) the
normalisation of certain roles, behaviours and practices through repeated interactions
and the emergence of expectations about what constitutes appropriate behaviour; (2)
decisions taken by the WTO Secretariat about which civil society organisations to invite
to meetings and events, which grant space and accessto those who embody acceptable
and desirable forms of subjectivity; and (3) what I call 'disciplinary communicative
norms', which oblige would-be participants in interaction and communication to adopt
certain modes and styles of communication. I then focus on the forms of subjectivity
that these processes promote, identifying six legitimate or desirable subject positions:
'the aide', 'the technical expert', 'the anonymous contributor', 'the pragmatist', 'the
non-challenging interlocutor', and 'the responsible member of the trade community'.
These subject positions represent, I argue, the contours and boundaries of acceptable
subjectivity in the field of activity in which interaction takes place between
representatives of civil society and the WTO. Individuals and organisations that embody
different forms of subjectivity are, like those whose contributions to debates are
grounded in alternative forms of knowledge, excluded from participation.
In Chapter Seven, I draw out some of the implications of the analysis presented in the
previous three chapters, by examining the ways in which the discourses identified in
Chapter Four, the governmental techniques and technologies discussed in Chapter Five,
and the forms of legitimate subjectivity examined in Chapter Six combine to rarefy or
narrow debates over TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity. I identify three
types of 'rarefaction' (Foucault 1981: 56-67): rarefaction of meaning in terms of what is
considered part of the debate on TRIPS, traditional knowledge and biodiversity;
rarefaction of the perspectives and frameworks within which contributions to the
debate can be made; and rarefaction of the legitimate speaking and knowing subjects in
this debate. Indigenous associations and indigenous perspectives, along with other
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more critical perspectives and epistemologies, are, I argue, erased and excluded in this
field of global governance. The analysis developed throughout the thesis thus provides
support for more critical perspectives on 'global civil society' which see it as shaped by
and (re-)productive of particular global power relations and forms of domination.
In the concluding chapter, I explore some of the broader implications of the analysisand
arguments developed throughout the thesis. I comment on the ways in which the
possibilities of action of '(global) civil society' are being structured in the field of civil
society-WTO interactions, and on the role played by certain NGOs in governing the
possibilities of participation of other parts of '(global) civil society'. I also suggest a
number of avenues for future research basedon the analysisdeveloped.
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Chapter One
Researching the Role of Civil Society in
Global Governance: Existing
Approaches and Dilemmas
Scholarly interest in the role played by NGOsand other types of civil society actor in
global governance has grown significantly over the past two decades, as NGOs have
become increasingly recognised actors in global politics, and as global governance and
its implicit multi-actor focus has become an increasingly accepted framework for
examining global patterns of rule. Accounts charting the development and impact of
particular NGOs,'coalitions', 'networks' and 'social movements' have been accompanied
by increasingly sophisticated attempts to theorise what the presence and visibility of
these organisations and groupings mean for contemporary global governance, and to
specify the ways in which NGOs connect and relate to broader global governance
processes. While earlier contributions to these debates tended to focus on making a
case for taking NGOs and other non-state actors seriously as part of a changing
landscape in global politics (e.g. Colas 2002: 1; Price 1998: 613), recent analyses and
accounts are more varied, and also more ambitious and more specific in the conclusions
they draw about the significance and role of NGOsin global governance. NGOsand the
'global civil society' they are typically assumed to be part of have thus been analysed
and depicted as everything from agents in the construction of global social contracts
between Citizens, states and international organisations (He and Murphy 2007), to 'an
expression of a changing logic or rationality of government' at the global level (Sending
and Neumann 2006: 652), to 'a basis for sustaining the dominance of a narrow band of
humanity' in global society (Pasha and Blaney 1998: 419). There now exists a sizeable
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and varied body of literature, diverse in its conceptual vocabularies and its theoretical
assumptions, which in one way or other attempts to identify, analyse and theorise the
ways in which NGOs and other types of civil society organisation are implicated in
present-day global governance.
In this chapter, I present an overview of the accounts and conceptualisations of the role
played by NGOsand other so-called civil society organisations in global governance that
have emerged in the field of international relations in the past fifteen years, and discuss
the ways in which scholars have tended to frame and carry out their enquiries. Although
these accounts and conceptualisations draw on a range of theoretical resources,
including social movement theory, governmentality theory, Gramscian approaches to
power and resistance, and theories of cosmopolitan and/or deliberative democracy,
which give rise to important differences and tensions within this literature, there are, I
suggest, a number of narrative tropes and analytical conventions that are deployed and
reproduced across the different strands of the literature. AsTimothy Mitchell has put it,
'[f]ields of analysis often develop a convention for introducing their object. Suchtropes
come to seem too obvious and straightforward to question' (Mitchell 2002: 210). These
narrative tropes and analytical conventions render, I argue, certain types of civil society
actor and certain modes of relationship to global governance structures and processes
more visible than others, whilst obscuring issues such as the power relations and
hierarchies of knowledge that operate within the field of activity conventionally referred
to as 'global civil society'. These tropes and conventions not only contribute, therefore,
to a broader regime of truth about the role of civil society in global governance which
over-emphasises the uniformity and consensual nature of 'global civil society', but they
also limit scholarly understanding of the role played by civil society in global governance
in potentially problematic ways.
The chapter is organised as follows. I begin with an overview of the different ways in
which scholars interested in the role played by civil society in global governance have
conceptualised and constructed their objects of analysis, and identify the most
important differences and tensions between the different approaches. I then identify
and discussa number of assumptions, conventions and narrative tropes commonly used
to frame accounts of the role played by NGOs and other types of civil society
organisation in global governance that are prevalent across the different strands of
research and theorising. I focus on three broad areas of concern: (1) the tendency to
research and frame accounts of the role played by 'NGOs', 'transnational social
movements' and other constructed objects of analysis as homogenous units, thus
masking important differences within these categories and analytical constructions; (2)
the tendency to focus on the ways in which NGOsand civil society more broadly can
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enhance global democracy, without considering the ways in which they might also
impede it; and (3) the analytical focus on explaining the impact and influence of NGOs
which obscures themes such as the power dynamics, exclusionary processesand politics
of representation that can operate within 'global civil socletv'," I conclude this chapter
with a summary of the ways in which these conventions limit understanding of the role
played by civil society in global governance, and some reflections on the kind of research
that could help overcome these biasesand limitations.
Framing the Object of Analysis: Transnational Social
Movements, Transnational Advocacy Networks, NGOs and
(Global) Civil Society
Scholars interested in the role played by civil society in global governance have
approached the topic from a diverse range of theoretical perspectives. Researchers
working in Marxist and Gramscian traditions, for example, have analysed and/or
developed theories about the relationship between global power or global governance
and global resistance (e.g. Cox 1999; Gill 2003; Ramos2006; Rupert 2003). Others have
applied concepts and models from social movement theory to analyse the emergence of
transnational social movements and the political opportunity structures which allow
them to influence and interact with institutions of global governance (e.g. della Porta
and Tarrow 2005; Klotz 2002; Reimann 2006; Smith 2002; Tarrow 2001, 2002, 2005).
Another significant strand of research and theorising has drawn on governmentality
theory to conceptualise global civil society and/or the actors taken to operate within it
as themselves constitutive of global governance and the particular mentalities of
government it relies on to function (e.g. Amoore and langley 2004, 2005; Bryant 2002;
IIcan and lacey 2006; Jaeger 2007; Lipschutz 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Lipschutz with Rowe
2005; Sending and Neumann 2006). Others have addressed and interrogated the topic
through the lens of concepts such as a 'public sphere' (Nanz and Steffek 2004) or a
'transnational public sphere' (Eckersley 2007), a 'global public domain' (Nelson and
Dorsey 2007; Ruggie 2004) and 'transnational associational life' (Pasha and Blaney
1998).
The concepts and categories that researchers have used to construct their object(s) of
analysis are similarly diverse. Terms such as 'global', 'transnational' or 'international
social movements', 'transnational advocacy networks', 'NGOs' or 'international NGOs'
7 For the purposes of this chapter, which focuses specifically on the role of 'civil society' in global
governance, I do not unpack the different meanings and connotations of the term 'global governance',
although there is certainly an equally detailed and important discussion to be had about these.
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(INGOs)and 'global', 'transnational' or 'international civil society' are all commonly used
to describe and delineate who or what is being examined. Lessfrequently used terms
include 'NGO coalitions' (Yanacopulos2005b); civil society organisations (CSOs)(Steffek
and Ferreti 2009) and 'global knowledge networks' (Stone 2002). Although scholars
offer a variety of arguments about how their chosen terminology differs from other key
concepts, or about why their preferred concept best reflects the phenomenon they
study, the choice of terminology is conn ected more, I suggest, to the political and
ontological commitments of the researcher or research community that has developed
around a particular term than it is to the inherent characteristics of the groups and
organisations they refer to. 'Transnational social movements', 'transnational advocacy
networks', 'NGOs', 'global/transnational/international civil society' as well as the less
frequently used terms such as 'CSOs'and 'coalitions' are all constructed objects; they
are ways of dividing up and classifying the social world that reflect and reproduce
particular assumptions about the nature of the activity or social field they are describing.
Many researchers, particularly those who draw significantly on social movement theory
aswell as others who wish to emphasise that they are interested in non-elite groupings
and purportedly mass mobilisation, use terms such as 'global', (transnational' or
'international' 'social movements' to delineate their objects of study (e.g. Colas 2002;
Dodgson 2000; O'Brien et al 2000; Olesen 2005; Smith 2002). The particular adjective
applied - 'global', 'transnational' or 'international' - makes little difference in overall
meaning, it seems; all are used to emphasise that the social movements in question
operate in some way beyond national borders. According to Robert O'Brien and his co-
authors:
Social movements are a subset of the numerous actors operating in the
realm of civil society. They are groups of people with a common interest
who band together to pursue a far reaching transformation of society ...
[and] are working to forward priorities at odds with the existing organisation
of the system.
(O'Brien et al 2000: 12)
Social movements are thus presented as bringing together the more contestational and
radical elements in civil society, whose activities and objectives run counter to existing
ordering arrangements. Global/transnational/international social movements, are,
furthermore, understood to comprise groups of people who organise, operate or seekto
bring about change on an international or global level, and who perceive and identify
with struggles framed in international or global terms (see for example Colas2002: 76,
O'Brien et al 2000: 13). They are, for Kristen Magis, 'the most complex organisational
form' observable in civil society, 'incorporating all that networks and coalitions do as
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well as building shared ideologies and long-term strategies for action and providing
mutual support' (2010: 319).
Another large group of scholars uses the term 'transnational advocacy network' to
define and delimit their object of analysis (e.g. Asal, Nussbaum and Harrington 2007;
Carpenter 2007a, 2007b; Hertel 2006; Jordan and van Tuijl 2000; Keckand Sikkink 1998).
Transnational advocacy networks are understood to be composed of organisations and
individuals such as research and advocacy organisations, trade unions, intellectuals and
members of national governments and international organisations, who coordinate their
work across and beyond borders to promote particular issues or norms. They are,
according to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 'bound together by shared values, a
common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services' (1998: 2), and
'often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a
rationalist understanding of their "interests" (ibid.: 8-9). Transnational advocacy
networks are not, scholars insist, 'alternatives to social movements or INGOs; on the
contrary, they can contain them - in the loose way that networks can contain anything'
(Tarrow 2001: 13) (note the tension between this and the definition of social
movements offered by Magis mentioned above). Transnational advocacy networks can,
according to those who use the term, incorporate local, national and also regional social
movements, and offer a way for the voices of these non-elite groupings to reach targets
such as governments, corporations or international organisations more successfully.
They are also seen as a way to amplify support for local social movements, through
mobilising resources and generating moral pressure from international allies (Keck and
Sikkink 1998: x).
Other analysts of the role played by civil society in global governance prefer to use the
term 'NGOs' to refer to and construct their object of analysis (e.g. Albin 1999; Beyer
2007; Broome 2009; Gordenker and Weiss 1995; Reimann 2006; Reinalda 2001; Sending
and Neumann 2006; Steele and Amoureux 2005). Many of these scholars use the term
'NGO' as a broad umbrella term, intended to encompass all types of organisations that
are non-governmental in nature, i.e. which are ostensibly independent from state
structures and control. Others use the term in a more specific sense: Jan Aart Scholte,
for example, describes NGOs as 'formally organised, officially registered and
professionally administered' organisations, with a stable bureaucracy and
professionalised approach to their work (2002a: 284). Other analysts find the term
'NGO' too broad and encompassing to be meaningful, and add prefixes to further specify
the kind of organisation examined. The term INGO (international non-governmental
organisation) is now relatively commonly used to refer to a particular subset of the more
general category NGO (see for example Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001; Cooley and
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Ron 2002; Fiorini and Simmons 2000; Colas2002). Other scholars have employed terms
like transnational NGO (Collingwood 2006), NGDO (nongovernmental development
organisation) (Townsend et al 2002), ENGO(environmental NGO)(Mason 2004), GONGO
(government-organised NGO) (Gordenker and Weiss 1995: 360), and DONGO (donor-
organised nongovernmental organisation) (ibid.: 361) to refer to other specific 'mutant
types' (ibid.: 361) of NGO.8
These accounts have been accompanied, nevertheless, by more critical contributions
that draw attention to the ambiguities inherent in the term 'NGO', and the confusion
that can be generated by using it as an analytical category. Kerstin Martens, for
example, has called for greater specification and care when applying and defining the
term: 'despite the increasing interest and the growing literature on the issue,' she
argues, 'NGOs have not yet sufficiently been defined' (2002: 272). Norbert Gatz,
similarly, has argued that 'NGOs,despite the increasing attention directed to them in the
past decade, are not yet adequately recognised or understood' (2008: 233). He
attributes the popularity of the term to the fact that 'IR scholars have simply submitted
to the worldview of governments and diplomats', which casts everything which is not
governmental as non-governmental and therefore less legitimate in the world of
international diplomacy (ibid.: 248).
The final cluster of terms which are commonly used to conceptualise and delineate non-
state actors and their activities in global governance are those which include the concept
'civil society'. Some scholars use the term on its own (see e.g. Ramos 2006; Scholte
2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Seckinelgin 2002). Others add the prefix 'global'
(e.g. Anheier et al 2001; Kaldor 2003a, 2003b; Keane 2003, Lipschutz 2005a, 2005b,
2007), 'international' (e.g. Colas2002) or 'transnational' (e.g. Fiorini and Simmons 2000;
Price 1998, 2003). As with the terms 'global', 'international' or 'transnational' 'social
movements', there is little inherent difference of meaning between these terms.
Richard Price's definition of 'transnational civil society' asa 'set of interactions among an
imagined community to shape collective life that are not confined to the territorial and
institutional spacesof states' (1998: 615) is, for example, very similar to Helmut Anheier
and his co-authors' definition of 'global civil society' as a 'sphere of ideas, values,
institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the
state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities
and economies' (2001: 17). Some researchers use versions of the term 'civil society' in
8 Norbert Gotz lists, only partly tongue-in-cheek it seems, a total of twenty sub-categories of the broader
category NGO in use in the literature, including the 'GRINGO, the government regulated/run and initiated





combination with other concepts such as those discussed above to conceptualise the
sphere or field of activity in which these objects of analysis operate. Thus for Alejandro
Colas, for example, 'international civil society' is the sphere inhabited by 'international
social movements', and for Amitai Etzioni, 'global civil society' is made up of 'three
elements', namely 'INGOs', 'informal transnational networks', and 'social movements'
(2004: 341-342).
There are, however, notable differences in the way in which scholars conceptualise
(global/international/transnational) civil society, and the ways in which it relates and
connects to global governance. There are differences, for example, in the level of
independent agency attributed to actors taken to represent this field of activity. Some
scholars conceptualise (global/international/transnational) civil society as a sphere of
activity characterised by a high degree of independent agency. According to Scholte, for
example, '[c]ivil society exists whenever and wherever voluntary associations - of
whatever kind - try deliberately to mould certain governing rules of society' (2002b:
146). Civil society activity can be defined, he continues, as 'conscious attempts to shape
policies, norms and structures in society at large' (ibid.: 147). Civil society is thus
conceptualised as a sphere of deliberate, conscious activity, which is ostensibly
unrestrained by broader social structures or social forces. Other analysts, however,
conceptualise (global/international/transnational) civil society as a domain of activity
which is strongly shaped by and ultimately dependent on broader social structures.
According to Colas, for instance, 'agents of international civil society are implicated in
almost equal measure with both the reproduction and transformation of the social
structures that make up the international system' (2002: 83).
There are also related differences in the extent to which (global/international
/transnational) civil society is conceptualised as a distinct and independent field of
activity in global order, with its own social structures, norms and interests, and sources
and forms of power. Liberal accounts typically conceive of global civil society as a
relatively autonomous sphere, which operates in parallel to the state and state system,
and can act as an oppositional force or counter-weight to them. John Keane, for
example, defines global civil society as 'a form of society' with 'a marked life or
momentum or power of its own' (2003: 10-11, emphasis added). It is comprised, for
him, of a series of 'non-governmental structures and activities' (ibid.: 8), including profit-
seeking businesses, not-for-profit non-governmental organisations, social movements
and linguistic communities, think-tanks, campaigning and lobby groups (ibid.: 8-9), which
are connected together through a series of 'social relations that stretch across and
underneath state boundaries and other governmental forms' (ibid.: 17, emphasis added).
Such a conceptualisation leads many scholars to posit global civil society as a site of
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oppositional politics in global governance, a so-called 'third force' alongside states and
business (e.g. Fiorini and Simmons 2000), that can act, as Keane puts it, as 'a brake or
potential check upon various forms of government' (2003: 15). Governmentality
scholars, in contrast, conceptualise global civil society as an integral part of global
systems of power and rule. Rather than constituting an autonomous oppositional force
in global governance, global civil society is understood to be both produced by and
(re)productive of global power relations and disciplinary norms. According to Ronnie
Lipschutz:
GCS[global civil society] ought not to be seen as a realm of autonomous
actors outside of the state, whose members are engaged in efforts to
reform, re-regulate, and repoliticise economic activities. Rather, GCS is
complicit in the reproduction of those very structures and relations that
generate their activities in the first place.
(2005a: 55)
In contrast to accounts which treat civil society as somehow outside of or parallel to
global order, governmentality scholars posit the involvement of global civil society in
global governance as 'an expression of a changing logic or rationality of government
(defined as a type of power) by which civil society is redefined from a passiveobject of
government to be acted upon and into an entity that is both an object and a subject of
government' (Sending and Neumann 2006: 652). For governmentality scholars, global
civil society, along with forms of rationality that assign it a role in global governance, is
thus itself constitutive of global governance: it is part of the structures and rationalities
that govern global relations. It thus makes no sense, it is argued, to attempt to discern
the impact or influence of global civil society on global governance, asglobal civil society
is already fully internalised within and constitutive of global governance processesand
structures.
As with the term 'NGOs', the use of the category '(global/international/transnational)
civil society' to delineate and conceptualise an object of analysis is not without its critics.
Even advocates of 'global civil society' (see e.g. Anheier et al 2001) recognise that the
concept is 'fuzzy' and 'contested' (ibid.: 11), and difficult to define. Jens Bartelson has
argued that we now find ourselves in 'a situation in which no one seemsto know exactly
what global civil society is, only that it is', a state of affairs he describes as 'puzzling
given the apparent mismatch between the statist associations of the concept and its
central role in globalist rhetoric' (2006: 372). 'Global civil society seems to have been
studied into existence', he continues, 'by scholars who self-consciously have blended
analytical and normative concerns in order to justify their particular vision of a global
community' (ibid.: 374). Barrie Axford hasdeveloped a different critique of the concept,
focusing on the 'sleight of hand through which GCSis revealed as the boundary-less
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equivalent of civil society, but with all the normative and aesthetic baggageof the latter
still attached' (2004: 251). He argues that using the term to frame accounts and
enquiries 'is detrimental to a critical study of globalisation and, more important, to
understanding the structural and systemic features of global systems' (ibid.: 250).
Nevertheless, variations on the term 'civil society' remain a central, almost taken-for-
granted, element in accounts and conceptualisations of the role played by NGOsand
other types of non-governmental actors in present-day global governance, a situation
which, given the current popularity of these terms, seems unlikely to change.
The Tendency to Homogenise
I now turn my attention to the first of three broad areas of concern that can be observed
acrossthis varied literature: the tendency towards researching and framing accounts of
the role played by 'NGOs', 'transnational social movements', 'transnational advocacy
networks', '(global) civil society' and other constructed objects of analysis as if these
were homogenous units composed of homogenous globol actors. Scholars generally
conceptualise these different analytical categories as inherently heterogeneous and
diverse, and, in many cases, recognise that tensions, conflicts and struggles can emerge
both within and between them (seee.g. Edwards2001: 6; Fiorini 2000: 233; Keane2003:
29; Rupert 2003: 194; Scholte 2000: 119; Sending and Neumann 2006: 659).
Nevertheless, research and analysis have tended to be carried out in ways that mask
such diversity and struggles. Most analytical attention has focused on identifying the
cumulative impact of particular 'transnational advocacy networks' and 'transnational
social movements, or the cumulative significance of 'global civil society' and the
increasing prominence of 'NGOs'. Far lessattention has been devoted to exploring how
different parts of these constructed objects of anafvsts might be implicated in different
ways or to different degrees in global governance, or how struggles between different
elements and perspectives within such objects of analysis might also be relevant. The
unhelpful and inaccurate impression emerges that the field of activity typically referred
to as 'global civil socletv' is homogenous and one-dimensional, and that differences and
struggles within it are not relevant to an analysisof its role in global governance.
Thus scholars writing about '(global) civil society', despite conceptualising 'global civil
society' as a diverse, multi-dimensional field of activity, in which diverse, multi-form
actors interact and pursue their agendas, tend not to analyse how this inherent diversity
plays out when they theorise the role played by civil society in global governance (see
e.g. Etzioni 2004; Kaldor 2003b; Scholte 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b, 2007). Scholte, for
example, in a chapter on the role of civil society in global governance, identifies
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nineteen different kinds of actor that he considers to be part of (global) civil society,
including academic institutions, consumer advocates, environmental movements, ethnic
lobbies, faith-based associations, human rights promoters, labour unions, local
community groups, peace movements, professional bodies, relief organisations, and
think tanks (2002b: 146). He also argues that these different kinds of actor can usefully
be divided into three groups, which he terms 'conformists', 'reformists' and
'transformists' (ibid.: 148), depending on their approach to globalisation and global
governance. His conclusions about the type of impact civil society has in global
governance, however, relate only to civil society in its entirety, and do not even
entertain the possibility that these different types of organisations might be implicated
in global governance in different ways and to different extents. The only distinctions he
does make relate to different elements of global governance - 'discourse, institutional
processes,policy content, and social structure' (ibid.: 153) - where civil society influence
is argued to take place. 'Global governance' is thus to some extent differentiated and
disaggregated in this account, yet 'global civil society' is not. In another chapter on the
relationship between civil society and the WTO (2004a), Scholte does at least build a
version of his three-fold distinction - this time using the terms 'conformers', 'reformers'
and 'rejectionists' - into his analysis of the channels available for civil society
organisations to interact with the WTO (2004a: 150). Numerous questions, however,
remain unanswered, such as whether the type of resources, both financial and
intellectual, that an organisation has at its disposal has an effect on its ability to interact
with the WTO, whether there is any difference between the space made available for
academic institutions, for instance, and for local community groups, and whether
physical presence in Geneva is a prerequisite for interaction. Scholte's analysismaywell
be helpful when trying, as many of the earlier contributions to these debates tended to
do, to make a casefor taking civil society seriously as an agent in global governance, but
it does little to help understand the ways in which different types of civil society
organisation may be implicated in global governance in different ways.
This tendency to draw conclusions about the role of civil society in global governance
without disaggregating or exploring the ways in which different elements within it might
be involved in different ways is also evident in some of the more critical literature on
'global civil society'. Ronnie Lipschutz, for example, writing from a governmentality
perspective, explicitly recognises that 'global civil society' has 'many variants and
alternatives' (2005b: 768). Yet in his book on the ways in which global civil society is
both produced by and productive of global power relations (Lipschutz with Rowe 2005),
he tends to present and discuss his ideas about 'global civil society' in a similarly
homogenising manner. He tends, for example, to draw and present conclusions about
'global civil society' as if it were one unit, or as if the only features worth mentioning
applied to 'global civil society' in its entirety. He argues that 'global civil society (GCS)is
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almost fully internalised within the system of governmentality that constitutes and
subjectifies it, yet which GCSpresumes to contest, regulate, and modify through its
projects' (ibid.: 15), thus positioning 'global civil society' asone homogenous component
in one homogenous system of global rule. Later on in the book, he further elaborates on
his understanding of this 'system of governmentality', arguing that '[w]e live, today, in a
complex and world-girdling system of global governmentality, one whose centre is
almost impossible to pinpoint - there is no "there" there - and there is no single place _
or even places - that can be identified as the originary source of contemporary global
rule' (ibid.: 196). Although this global governmentality is recognised as complex and
lacking an obvious centre, it is also, like the 'global civil society' it produces,
conceptualised as one unit,9 thus reinforcing the impression that 'global civil society' is
one spaceor phenomenon, one object of analysis. Presenting 'global civil society' in this
way, as a single object with a single set of characteristics and features, a correlative of a
single system of global governmentality, generates the unhelpful impression that there
exists one unitary 'global civil society' with a unity of interest, identity and function. It
disregards the possibility that governmentality as it plays out at the global level may
consist of numerous overlapping and competing logics, and underplays the extent to
which global logics may be re-interpreted, translated or contested in local contexts by
local 'civil societies'.
This tendency towards homogenisation in the literature on '(global) civil society' has
been highlighted and problematised by a number of scholars, most notably by scholars
working from a so-called 'post-colonial' perspective, but also by others using a
governmentality approach. Paula Chakravartty, for example, warns against assuming
that the features of 'civil society' are uniform across the world, arguing that 'civil society
is not a homogenous bounded category easily translated across politically and
historically distinct contexts' (2007: 298). Neera Chandhoke raises a number of
questions intended to provoke re-examination of the homogenising assumptions
underpinning some of the liberal accounts of 'global civil society':
Do ... global civil SOcietyactors actually represent people, particularly of the
Third World?... Do these more often than not well-funded and often well-
organised civil SOcietyactors actually speak from below? Or do they claim to
do so in order to gain legitimacy? ... Whatever happens to people who do
not know any language that may have resonance in the world of
international politics?
(2002: 47)
9 It should be noted that not all scholars who use the term 'global governmentality' understand it in this
way. Wendy Larner and William Walters (2004), for example, use the term to refer to systems, in the
plural, of governmentality that operate beyond and across states.
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louise Amoore and Paul langley also seekto prompt reflection on what might be hidden
or unexplored in accounts which portray 'global civil society' as cohesive and
homogenous, arguing that 'the assumption of GCS[global civil society] asa cohesive and
empowered agent masks the contradictions of people's feelings of shared experience,
personal wellbeing and perceptions of risk and reward' (2004: 106).
A similar tendency towards homogenisation is also evident in the literature on
'transnational advocacy networks' and 'transnational/global/international social
movements'. like scholars of '(global) civil society', those who study 'transnational
advocacy' and these different types of 'social movements' typically conceptualise their
objects of analysiS as comprising a multitude of different types of actors and
organisations, and encompassing diverse interests, demands and perspectives. O'Brien
and his co-authors, for example, are careful to highlight the differences and tensions
that can exist within what they call 'global social movements' and the different
manifestations of these 'movements' as they emerge in different settings. As they put
it, '[b]ecause there is no single world state and no single world community, GSMs[global
social movements] are less cohesive than their national counterparts. A GSM's local
characteristics and interests may clashwith other local manifestations of the movement'
(2000: 13). They also stress the need for researchers to be sensitive to the differences
and tensions that the concept of 'global social movement' might mask. 'Analysts of
GSMs', they argue, 'must be particularly aware of making broad statements that assume
an identity of interests or purposes between elements of the movement located in
different parts of the world' (ibid.: 14). Keck and Sikkink, similarly, recognise the
diversity of interests and voices that may be present in what they call 'transnational
advocacy networks', and acknowledge that a network will not necessarily be able to
successfully represent all the interests and voiceswithin it. As they put it:
Transnational networks multiply the voices that are heard in international
and domestic politics. These voices argue, persuade, strategise, document,
lobby, pressure, and complain. The multiplication of voices is imperfect and
selective - for every voice that is amplified, many others are ignored - but in
a world where the voices of states have predominated, networks open
channels for bringing alternative visions and information into international
debate.
(1998: x, emphasis added)
Michael Edwards is more explicit about the types of questions that are worth asking in
order to capture the diversity and tensions that may be present in such networks: 'Who
speaks for whom in a global network? How are differences resolved when participants
vary in strength and resources? ... [H]ow are grassroots voices mediated by institutions
of different kinds - networks and their members, Northern NGOsand Southern NGOs,
Southern NGOs and community groups?' (2001: 6). Transnational advocacy networks
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and so-called global social movements are thus both conceptualised as diverse,
potentially conflictual in their internal relations, and not necessarily cohesive in their
perspectives and interests.
Nevertheless, empirical studies of 'transnational advocacy networks', 'global social
movements' and the particular 'campaigns' they have been involved in tend not to
explore these kinds of tensions, nor do they examine whose interests and perspectives
come to dominate and be taken as representative of the network or movement as a
whole. Rather than examining whose interests or perspectives benefit most from global
social movement activity, or exploring why it is that certain voices are silenced or
excluded within transnational advocacy networks while others are amplified, scholars
have been far more interested in analysing the aggregate impact or influence of these
networks and movements. Thus Richard Dodgson, for example, in his study of 'the
Women's Health Movement (WHM)' and their opposition to 'manifestations of
neoliberal globalisation in the UN's policies on sustainable development and population
control' (Dodgson 2000: 443) recognises that 'the global scope of the WHM means that
differences lnevitablv do exist' within the movement (ibid.: 447), yet only analyses and
draws conclusions about the movement as a whole. He focuses his attention, for
example, on the ways in which '[n]eoliberal globalisation has influenced the WHM's
emergence and development as a GSM' (ibid.: 448); how 'the WHM begins its attack
upon neoliberal globalisation' (ibid.: 450); the 'second strategy of the WHM' (ibid.: 455)
and the 'third strategy of the WHM' (ibid.: 456). At no point does he analyse how the
differences within the movement play out when it came, for instance, to selecting these
different strategies and courses of action; the only relevant unit of analysis for him, in
short, is the 'Women's Health Movement' in its entirety.
A similar or related argument can be made about the work of a number of other
scholars. Price, for example, in his examination of 'the campaign to generate an
international norm prohibiting antipersonnel (AP) landmines' (1998: 613), focuses on
how the movement as a whole generated awareness of issues surrounding the use of
antipersonnel landmines (ibid.: 627), through 'documenting the problem of AP land
mines' in the 1980s and 1990s (ibid.: 621), and encouraging those with 'dissenting'
opinions within the military to make their concerns public (ibid: 633). He concludes that
this 'transnational campaign has challenged and transformed the balance between civil
SOcietyand the state in the constitution of security' (ibid.: 638). His entire analysis thus
seeks to determine how this 'transnational campaign' in its entirety has had an impact
on the use of antipersonnel landmines and on the constellation of actors involved in
determining security policy. He is not interested in any of the internal dynamics and
conflicts that must have existed within the campaign; his analysis thus generates the
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impression that the transnational campaign was a homogenous movement, which
exerted an impact on international security in a straightforward and linear way. Even
O'Brien and his co-authors, despite explicitly warning researchers not to 'assume an
identity of interests' between the different elements that make up a 'global social
movement' (2000: 14), base their analysisand conclusions about the impact of different
'global social movements' on the World Bank, International Monetary Fundand WTOon
the activities of just one sub-set of actors within these movements, i.e. international
NGOs. They are thus unable to explore the sources or consequences of possible
tensions that might exist between different types of organisation in different parts of
the world, and despite their warnings, leave their readers with the impression that these
movements are homogenous in their actions and the perspectives they represent.
This tendency to analyse and draw conclusions about the significance of civil society
actors in global governance in homogenising, non-disaggregated ways is also present in
the literature on 'NGOs'. As mentioned earlier, researchers generally recognise that the
category 'NGO' is very broad and refers to a diverse range of organisations, to the extent
that scholars have identified more than twenty sub-categories of NGO in order to be
able to better specify what they wish to refer to (Gatz 2008: 232-3). Nevertheless,
unless analysts are specifically interested in one of these sub-categories of NGO (e.g.
Mason 2004; Townsend et al 2002), they tend to refer and draw conclusions about
'NGOs' (and sometimes 'INGOs') as a group. Thus Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss,
for example, although acknowledging that NGOsare a diverse and heterogeneous group
(1995: 384), present their arguments and conclusions about 'NGOs' as if they were a
uniform category of analysis. 'NGOs have now become a visible part of the process of
setting agendas for cooperation', they argue (ibid.: 358); 'NGOs employ a variety of
devices to increase the persuasivenessand efficiency of their work in conjunction with
IGOs' (ibid.: 366); and '[w]e are at an early stage in understanding how NGOsadapt to
changing external and internal environments' (ibid: 361). Cornelia Beyer, similarly, takes
and presents 'NGOs' as her ostensibly uniform unit of analysis. 'Through providing
information and knowledge to ... [international] organization[s], NGOs contribute to
cognitive change', she states (Beyer 2007: 515); similarly, 'NGOs have also come under
criticism because it is not clear whom they represent' (Beyer 2007: 530; see also Broome
2009; Jordan and van Tuijl 2000; Matthews 2007). Once again, the desire to draw and
present conclusions about 'NGOs' as an overall category creates an unhelpfully
homogenising effect, in which the important differences and potential tensions between
different types or organisation are obscured and made to seem irrelevant.
It should be noted, of course, that not all the accounts of the role played by civil society
in global governance follow and reproduce the homogenising analytical conventions just
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described. There are scholars who explicitly examine, for example, the relationship
between Northern and Southern organisations in transnational networks (e.g. Doherty
2006), who investigate 'how inequities between the global North and South affect TSMO
[transnational social movement organisation] solidarity' (Smith 2002: 50S), and who
carry out empirical research that allows them to address the concerns raised by Edwards
(2001: 6) about the ways in which the interests of Southern or grassroots organisations
come to be represented in transnational networks (see e.g. Hertel 2006, Townsend et al
2002). There are others who, because of their empirical material, have been prompted
to analyse how certain perspectives have come to dominate particular civil society
'campaigns' (Brassett 2009), and others who have sought to develop models to explain
how certain issues and perspectives can come to dominate within transnational
advocacy networks (Carpenter 2007a; 2007b). There have also been attempts to
reconceptualise categories such as 'global civil society' so as to open up more analytical
space in which to examine the differences and conflicts that exist within it. According to
James Brassett and William Smith, for example, '[g]lobal civil society should ... be
defined not only as a deliberative agent, but also as an affective arena, a space for
critical reflection and affective expression'. This would allow scholars 'to focus on the
critical and ethical content of deliberation that takes place within global civil society,
revealing the differences, dilemmas, ambiguities and contests that pervade its
discourses about global governance' (2010: 414). Nevertheless, such accounts and
attempts to conceptualise 'global civil society' in a less homogenising way are
outnumbered by those which focus on the impact or significance of '(global) civil
society', 'NGOs' and particular 'transnational advocacy networks' or 'social movements'
at an aggregate level, and which fail to analyse the ways in which tensions, differences
and power relations internal to these constructed objects play out in global governance.
The Focus on Democratising Potential
A second set of issues relate to another dominant analytical convention in this literature,
namely the tendency to frame analyses and conclusions about the Significance of civil
society in global governance in terms of the contribution made to global democracy.
Scholars, particularly those working within traditions that draw on liberal political
theory, have defined, presented and analysed civil SOcietyorganisations as actors who
work in the 'public interest' (Price 2003: 580), who perform various types of
democratising function in global governance (Scholte 2004b), and who are creating a
'public sphere' in which 'to act as a discursive interface between international
organisations and a global citizenry' (Nanz and Steffek 2004: 315). Alongside such
analytical framings, a common narrative trope can also be identified in much of the
(particularly liberal) literature, in which civil society actors are cast as fundamentally
virtuous actors who are able to counter-balance the self-interested and immoral
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behaviour of states and business to bring about fairer and more democratic global
governance (e.g. Fiorini and Simmons 2000; Kaldor 2003a, 2003b; Keck and Sikkink 1998;
Willetts 1996). As Brett Bowden has argued:
For some, the emergence of global civil society [is] ... some sort of panacea
for all of humanity's woes. Global civil society is promoted as the vehicle by
which democratic and humanitarian values, human rights, ecological
sustainability, economic development, gender and labour divisions, and
various other concerns might be addressed and remedied.
(2006: 157)
This type of analytical and narrative framing positions NGOs and other members of civil
society carriers of democratic values by definition, and implies that their participation in
global governance has a democratising function, or at the very least should be judged
and evaluated in democratising terms.
The assumption that civil society is a carrier of values and activities that can enhance
global democracy is often built into the definitions that scholars provide of the actors
and groupings they take as their object of analysiS. Price, for example, defines
'transnational civil society' as composed of 'self-organised advocacy groups that
undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem
the wider public interest' (Price 2003: 580, emphasis added). This formulation at least
leaves space for such groups' understanding of the 'wider public interest' to not be
universally shared, but nevertheless suggests that the 'pursuit of ... the wider public
interest' is what motivates all civil society actors. Ann Fiorini and P. Simmons, similarly,
identify shared values as one of the defining features of 'transnational civil society
networks': such networks 'tend to aim', they suggest, 'for broader goals based on their
conception of what constitutes the public good. They are bound together more by
shared values than by self-interest' (2000: 7, emphasis added; see also Keck and Sikkink
1998: 2). Keane, in his definition of 'global civil society', casts NGOs and other civil
society organisations as actors who 'tend to pluralise power and to problematise
violence; consequently, their peaceful or 'civil' effects are felt everywhere, here and
there, far and wide, to and from local areas, through wider regions, to the planetary
level itself' (2003: 8). 'Global civil society' is thus associated with non-violence and
pluralistic power relations, and presented as capable of transmitting these values
around the world, thus civilising and democratising global politics.
More important, however, is the tendency, in evidence across the different strands of
the liberal literature, to analyse and present conclusions about the significance of
'(global) civil society' and the actors that populate it in ways which emphasise its
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inherently democratising potential. The presence of 'NGOs' in global governance has
been analysed and portrayed, for instance, as contributing to a pluralising of the voices
and perspectives that are heard in global governance. Gordenker and Weiss, for
example, argue that NGOshave:
injected unexpected voices into international discourse about numerous
problems of global scope. Especially during the last 20 years, human rights
advocates, gender activists, developmentalists, groups of indigenous peoples
and representatives of other defined interests have become active in
political work once reserved for states.
(1996: 17)
Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl similarly argue that NGOs play a significant role in
'democratising power relations' through 'reveal[ing] truths that are not liked by vested
interests and power holders' (2000: 2053). The involvement of '(global) civil society' in
global governance has also been analysed in terms of its contribution to the
accountability and legitimacy of global governance institutions. Scholte, for example,
suggests that 'civil society associations do indeed offer significant possibilities to
increase democratic accountability in global regulatory arrangements' (2004b: 213),
through improving the 'transparency' (ibid.: 217), the capacity for 'policy monitoring and
review' (ibid.: 219), and the possibilities for 'pursuit of redress' (ibid.: 220) associated
with particular global governance institutions and structures. Patrizia Nanz and Jens
Steffek, similarly, have argued that 'actors from organised civil society play an important
role in the creation of a public sphere', as they have:
the potential to act as a discursive interface between international
organisations and a global citizenry. Their role is to monitor policy-making in
these institutions, to bring citizens' concerns into their deliberations and to
empower marginalised groups so that they too may participate effectively in
global politics.
(2004: 315)
These scholars do acknowledge that '(global) civil society' might not fully achieve the
democratising functions associated with it, or that trends can emerge within '(global)
civil society' which lead to certain perspectives becoming more dominant than others
(Nanz and Steffek 2004: 332). Scholte, in the article just mentioned, explicitly states that
not 'all civil society activities inherently and automatically enhance democratic
accountability in global regimes' (2004b: 213), and elsewhere recognises that 'the
democratic benefits of civil society engagement of global governance do not flow
automatically: they must be actively nurtured' (2002a: 281). Nevertheless, these
democratising functions and potential are what are interpreted and presented as most
significant about civil society activities. The capacity of civil society to democratise
global governance is, in other words, treated as the most relevant axis of analysis. What
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this analytical convention does, moreover, in combination with the broader narrative
trope that casts civil society involvement in global governance as a counter-balance to
the activities of self-interested states and business, is remove several important
considerations from view. It obscures, for example, the ways in which '(global) civil
society' actors may narrow rather than pluralise global governance debates, and the
ways in '(global) civil society' is itself both invested by and part of broader power
relations. It also, asGideon Baker hasargued, leads to 'a blind spot' in many analysesof
'global civil society', which fail to examine 'the potentially deleterious effects of this on
the right of equal sovereignty between states' (2002: 937, italics in original).
Scholars working from governmentality, 'post-colonial' and other critical perspectives
have also challenged the assumption that '(global) civil society' and the activities
understood to take place within it are automatic carriers of democratic values and
democratising potential. Mustapha Kamal Pashaand David Blaney, for example, have
pointed out that what they call 'transnational associational life', although 'a site of
possible challenges to the oligarchical organisation of contemporary global political
economy ... also appears as a basis for sustaining the dominance of a narrow band of
humanity', through 'enacting the "global" values of North American and European
activists' (1998: 419). Other scholars have questioned the extent to which 'global civil
society' should be understood as somehow outside of or separate from the power
relations and hierarchies that permeate global society. Chakravartty, for example, has
argued that 'civil society as the associational aspect of society cannot be conceptualised
as free from or abstracted from power relationships' (2007: 298). Chandhoke, similarly,
has suggested that, 'whereas we can with some legitimacy conceptualise civil society as
a site where people associate in ways that are distinct from the way they associate in
the economy or in the political sphere, we can hardly assume that civil society is either
emancipated or abstracted from the ethos that permeates these two spheres' (2001: 8).
Others have posited a rather different role for 'global civil society' in global affairs.
Rather than containing the potential to democratise global governance, 'global civil
society' should be understood, according to Amoore and Langley, as 'a meansof making
the global political economy governable in particular ways' (2004: 90). SangeetaKamat,
similarly, argues that 'the agentic role prescribed to NGOs is not an innocent one but
one that foretells a reworking of democracy in ways that coalescewith global capitalist
interests' (2004: 156). These more critical voices and perspectives are by no means as
dominant, however, as the trope of virtuous, principled NGOactors in global governance
or the analytical focus on democratising potential discussedabove.
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The Focus on Identifying and Explaining Influence
A third set of issues relate to another analytical convention in the varied literature on
the role of civil society in global governance, namely a tendency to define and analyse
the significance of civil society organisations in terms of the 'influence' or 'impact' they
have on global society as a whole, or on other specified actors within it. This tendency is
particularly notable in accounts which take 'transnational advocacy networks',
'global/international/transnational social movements' and 'NGO coalitions' as their
object of analysis (e.g. Colas 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Olesen 2005; Yanacopulos
2005b), but is also present throughout the literature more broadly (e.g. Broome 2009;
Greenwood 2003; Joachim 2003; Karns and Mingst 2004; Reinalda 2001; Willetts 1996;
Williams 2005). Sometimes this emphasis on 'influence' and 'impact' is part of a
conscious attempt to clear conceptual and analytical space in which to focus on NGOs
and other civil society actors in a discipline which has traditionally focused on states
and/or markets (see e.g. Broome 2009: 59; Colas 2002: 1; Eschle 2005: 17; Reinalda
2001: 15; Reinalda et al 2001: 3; True and Mintrom 2001: 28). At other times, however,
the focus on 'influence' and 'impact' is part of an underlying web of assumptions about
what NGOs do and why they are relevant to the study of global governance (see e.g.
Greenwood 2003: 27; Karns and Mingst 2004: 241; Williams 2005: 38). Irrespective of
scholars' intentions (or lack thereof), the overall image that emerges is that 'global civil
society' is a sphere of activity defined by the influence it can exert over states,
corporations and international organisations, and is worthy of attention only to the
extent to which it produces identifiable change in global politics.
As with the focus on democratising potential, the assumption that what matters about
NGOs, 'transnational advocacy networks' and '(global) civil society' is the 'influence' and
'impact' they try to exert is often present in the definitions that scholars offer of these
objects of analysis, Peter Willetts, for example, when discussing how best to define the
organisations that contributors to his edited volume examine, points out that '[t]here is
no standard name for groups that are trying to influence world politics', before settling
on the term 'NGO' to refer to these influence-seeking groups, as the term used and
preferred in 'the world of diplomacy' (1996: 2, 3). Scholte, similarly, includes an allusion
to influence-seeking in his definition of 'civil society', Civil society, for him, should be
understood as 'a political space where voluntary associations deliberately seek to shape
the rules that govern one or other aspect of social life' (2002b: 146). 'Rules', he further
specifies, 'encompass specific policies, more general norms, and deeper social
structures', such as 'formal directives ..., informal constructs ... and/or the social order
as a whole' (ibid.: 146). Keck and Sikkink place similar emphasis on deliberate attempts
to influence elements of global governance in their definition of transnational advocacy
networks. One of the defining features, for them, of such networks is their capacity 'to
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mobilise information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to
persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organisations and
governments' (1998: 2, emphasis added). Other analysts allude to influence and forms
of influence-seeking more in passing,writing in a way that suggests it can be taken for
granted that 'influencing' is what NGOsand other civil society organisations seek to do.
SusanSell and Aseem Prakash, for example, argue that the 'strategies of business and
NGO networks should be examined through a common lens' which examines 'how
interest groups employ ideas strategically to frame debates, capitalise on policy crisesto
create political opportunities, and graft their preferred goals onto debates assolutions to
pressing problems' (2004: 144, emphasis added). Whether relatively directly or more
indirectly, '(global) civil society' is thus presented as a sphere of activity which is defined
by deliberate attempts to exert influence or bring about change in global order.
Connected to this definitional emphasis on 'influence' and 'influence-seeking' is a
tendency to present NGOs and other elements within civil society as analytically
interesting because of the influence they exert in global governance. As mentioned
earlier, this tendency derives in part from a perceived need to stake out conceptual and
analytical space in which to examine what are presented as 'non-traditional' actors in
international relations. According to Bob Reinalda, for example, 'liNGOs exist, but ..."
seems to be the main reaction in international relations theory. Given the strong focus
on self-interested nation-states as the primary units of international relations, hardly
any room is left for autonomous NGOaction' (2001: 15). He and his co-editors justify
the focus of their edited volume on NGOsby arguing that 'non-state actors do matter in
various ways', including 'their information and expertise', 'their influence on political
discourse, agenda setting, law making and decision making', and 'because they are part
of political, policy and institutional arrangements in the international system' (Reinalda
et al 2001: 3, emphasis added). Colasmakes a similar argument to justify his focus on
'international social movements', framing his book as a case 'for the relevance of
voluntary, non-state, collective social and political agency in international relations'
(Colas2002: 1), on the basis that 'international social movements bring about change in
international relations' (ibid.: 84).
Other analysts frame their enquiries as an exploration of the puzzle that emerges from
the fact that NGOsdo influence global governance, despite lacking material resourcesor
being part of formal state structures. According to Price, for example, '[u]nlike terrorists
and other transnational criminals ... these actors eschew the deployment of armed
violence for their own ends. This makes their influence all the more of a puzzle, and it is
this feature that animates the contemporary research program on transnational civil
society' (2003: 580-1). Thus Jutta Joachim presents her work on NGOs in the United
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Nations as an exploration of '[h]ow, why, and under what conditions ... NGOs[are] able
to influence state's interests', before concluding 'that NGOsattempt to influence states'
interests by framing problems, solutions, and justifications for political action' (2003:
247). Anna Holzscheiter, similarly, frames her discussionofthe discursive power of what
she calls 'non-state actors' as a response to the fact that 'global governance necessarily
brings with it a variety of actors, resources, and modes of interaction' (2005: 724) and
the need to understand 'the power of non-state actors' (ibid.: 725). She therefore 'sets
out to construct an analytical framework for the study of power in global relations
understood as effective social and linguistic practices based on immaterial capabilities'
(ibid.: 726; seealso Olesen 2005: 109).
The analysis and theories developed by scholars of 'NGOs', 'advocacy networks' and
'global social movements' have, similarly, often focused on explaining and/or modelling
this 'influence' and 'impact'. Keck and Sikkink, for example, have developed an
elaborate model to determine the type of influence transnational advocacy networks
exert in global politics, focusing on five different 'types or stages of network influence'
including 'issue creation and agenda setting', 'influence on institutional procedures' and
'influence on state behaviour' (1998: 25). They have also developed a 'typology of
tactics that networks use in their efforts at persuasion, SOcialisation,and pressure' (ibid:
16; see also Karns and Mingst 2004: 241 for another framework for analysing 'nonstate
actor influence' on international institutions). Social movement scholars have also
developed and applied concepts such as 'framing' and 'problem construction' asways of
explaining how actors within 'transnational social movements' are able to generate
influence and impact. According to Thomas Olesen:
Constructing transnational problems is a complex process of making issues
and problems in one locality intelligible and concerning for people in other
and distant localities. The complexity derives from the fact that in a
transnational context distance has many more facets than in a local or
national context.
(2006: 7)
He uses the concept of 'problem construction' to analyse the ways in which
organisations involved in the 'HIV/AIDS medicine access campaign' bridged 'physical,
social and cultural distances' in order to be able to collectively influence states and
international organisations (ibid.: 7). In other work, he uses the concept of 'framing' to
conceptualise and analyse the ways in which social movements generate awareness of
and support for their cause, and thus influence their target publics. As he puts it:
Reality is not objectively given and in modern, democratic and reflexive
societies it is particularly open to interpretation. Social movement frames
thus seek to persuade the public, the media and politicians that their
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interpretations of events and situations are more convincing than those
offered by their opponents.
(2005: 121)
He then sets out to explore 'what makessome frames succeed and others fail', asserting
that 'this question is crucial to understanding the global democratic structure and the
role played by social movements within it' (ibid.: 122, see also 124-128). Andre Broome
also usesthe concept of framing to explain how NGOsinfluenced the international debt
regime, arguing that 'NGOs specifically employed the strategic use of frames to
encourage policy makers to conceptualise the high sovereign debt levels of low-income
countries in moral terms' (2009: 70; see also Shawki 2010). Concepts like 'the exercise
of moral authority' (Broome 2009: 76) and 'agenda-setting' (Yanacopulos 2005b: 261)
have also been used to identify and explain the basesof NGOinfluence over other actors
in global governance.
There are scholars who self-consciously avoid analysing NGOsin terms of the influence
they exert on other actors or processes - Kerstin Martens, for example, '[i]nstead of
focusing on NGO influence on the [UN]', identifies and analyses 'the modes of NGO
incorporation into the UN system' (2001: 388) - as well as scholars who ccnceptualise
the relationship between NGOsand other parts of the global system in more complex,
interconnected ways (see e.g. Jaeger 2007; Martens 2006; Sending and Neumann 2006;
Steele and Amoureux 2005). Nevertheless, the definitional and analytical smphasls on
'influence' permeates and dominates the literature on the role of civil society in global
governance. The emphasis on 'influence' and 'influence-seeking' is present not only in
the definitions that scholars offer of their objects of analvsls, but also in the way they
rationalise their interest in NGOsand other 'non-traditional' actors in global governance,
and in the analytical puzzles they pose and try to address. The overall understanding
and impression of civil society and its role in global governance that emerges from this
literature is that 'influence' is not only what NGOs and other parts of '(global) civil
society' do, but is also what makes these organisations and groupings relevant and
analytically interesting to scholars of international relations and global governance.
Defining and analysing civil society in this way, as primarily if not predominantly
influence-seeking and influence-generating, leads, however, to a number of significant
oversights and limitations in the existing literature. It creates the unhelpful impression
that '(global) civil society' is populated primarily by actors who, firstly, wish to exert
influence over other actors in the global system, and, secondly, are successfulat doing
so. It thus removes from view (and from mainstream scholarly discussion) organisations
and groups of individuals who are either uninterested in or are unsuccessful at
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influencing global actors and global structures, whether through lack of access to the
necessary information and linguistic and/or material resources, or through philosophies
of action that favour constructing alternative power structures and networks to
challenging and seeking to influence existing arrangements. In doing so, it also removes
the potential to examine the dynamics and politics at work between more visible, more
influential elements in global civil society and those less visible, less influential
organisations and groups that either choose not or lack accessto appropriate resources
to attempt to 'influence' policy-makers and policy debates. Defining civil society in
terms of the influence it exerts also disposes scholars to analyse influential organisations
and campaigns, rather than investigate or theorise the factors that might account for
non-influence or non-visibility. Such a focus on influence and impact can thus invisibilise
the. power dynamics, exclusionary processes and politics of representation that can
operate within 'global civil society' and global order more broadly, generating a
distorted and incomplete picture of this 'global civil society' and the ways in which it
connects and intersects with global governance.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented an overview of the different literatures that attempt to
investigate, interpret and theorise the role played by civil society in global governance,
including literatures that have developed around the concepts of 'global social
movements', 'transnational advocacy networks', 'NGOs' and '(global/transnational
/international) civil society'. I have identified a number of tendencies, analytical
conventions and narrative tropes in evidence across these literatures, and have
discussed the ways in which they obscure or impede understanding of 'global civil
society' and the ways in which it is implicated in global governance. Although, as has
also been discussed, not all accounts of the role played by civil society in global
governance reproduce these conventions and tropes, there are marked tendencies in
the literature as a whole towards (1) portraying and researching 'global civil society' as if
it were a homogenous global space populated by homogenous global actors; (2)
focusing on the ways in which civil societv actors can enhance global democracy without
considering the ways in which they can also undermine it; and (3) presenting and
analysing 'global civil society' primarily in terms of the 'influence' it exerts over other
actors and policy debates, removing from view themes such as the power dynamics and
politics of representation at work within 'global civil society'. These tendencies thus
lead to an overall body of knowledge about the role played by civil society in global
governance that overemphasises the degree of cohesion and uniformity within this
sphere, and underestimates the degree of diversity, power dynamics and exclusionary
processesand politics of representation that also characterise global civil society.
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How then should we conceptualise and research the role of civil society in global
governance in a manner which avoids some of these distortions and erasures? How can
we examine civil society involvement in global governance in ways that are sensitive to
the differences between different kinds of organisations and groupings that are
understood to comprise it? How do we research and draw conclusions about the role of
civil society in global governance without reproducing the unhelpful notion that global
civil society is a homogenous space? How do we account for the greater visibility of
some sections of civil society in comparison to others? How do we avoid reproducing
the assumption that global civil society automatically democratises global governance?
How do we conceptualise civil society in a way which allows us to capture types of
relationship between civil society actors and global governance processes other than
'influence' and 'impact'? In the following chapter, I set out a theoretical and
methodological approach to the study of the role played by civil society in global
governance that is sensitive to these types of questions, and that underpins the analysis
developed in later chapters.
47
Chapter Two
Researching the Role of Civil Society in
Global Governance: An Alternative
Approach
In this chapter, I present an approach to studying the role of civil society in global
governance which avoids reproducing some of the more problematic assumptions and
misrepresentations that are present in much of the existing literature, and which
enables exploration of important but under-examined themes. I draw on two main
theoretical sources: governmentality theory, particularly practice-oriented readings of it,
and ethnographic research methodology as developed and applied by cultural and social
anthropologists. This approach is intended to facilitate an examination of the
relationship emerging between the WTO and civil society which is sensitive to the
differences and tensions that exist between the different organisations understood to
be part of 'global civil society', and which helps to explore what makes some parts of
this 'global civil society' more visible, influential and thus more involved in global
governance than others.
The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I outline the overall
theoretical orientation which underpins this study, and informs the line of argument and
analysis developed. I also outline the specific concepts and analytical categories used in
subsequent chapters to develop and structure the analysis. In the second section, I
outline the methodological principles which guided the generation and analysis of the
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empirical data, and show how this methodological approach, in combination with the
theoretical framework, helps overcome some of the problems and erasures noted in the
existing literature. This combination of theoretical and methodological elements is
intended to capture some of the diversity present in the vast field of activity known as
'global civil society', and to enable the development of a theoretically-sophisticated and
nuanced account of the ways in which it connects to the WTD. The chapter concludes
with a summary of the advantages of such an approach, and the important lines of
analysis it opens up.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
The theoretical and conceptual framework underpinning this study is derived primarily
from the growing body of literature on governmentality in disciplines such as
Anthropology, Geography, Sociology, Politics and International Relations, supplemented
by elements from Michel Foucault's earlier work on power and discourse and Pierre
Bourdieu's approach to analysing social structures. The governmentality-inspired
literature, as well as the work drawing on Foucauldian and Bourdieusian approaches, is
vast and diverse, and encompassesa range of applications, uses and interpretations of
the key terms.10 My intention here is not to provide a detailed overview or summary of
these literatures, nor is it to discussthe different ways in which key concepts have been
interpreted and applied.ll My intention, rather, is to present my own anthropologically-
filtered reading of Foucault's discussionof governmentality and the work it has inspired,
discuss how the other Foucauldian and Bourdieusian concepts I make use of intersect
with this, and show how the theoretical approach adopted helps examine the empirical
material explored in this study. This section is divided into a number of sub-sections
which discuss: (1) the understanding of 'government' and 'governing' developed by
governmentality scholars and adopted in this study; (2) the inter-connected notions of
government as the 'conduct of conduct' and resistance to government as 'counter-
conduct(s)'; (3) the understanding that domains of activity and the meaning of
categories are not pre-existing or pre-ordained but are rather constituted in practice; (4)
the understanding that governing always reflects, sustains and generates particular
10 There is, for example, a key distinction made in the govern mentality literature, already present in
Foucault's 'Security, Territory, population' lectures at the College de France in 1977-1978 when he first
started to use and explore the concept of 'govern mentality', between govern mentality as an analytical
framework, and govern mentality as a specific form of government in modern Western liberal societies,
whose emergence Foucault dates to the end of the eighteenth century (see e.g. Brockling et al 2011: 11;
Foucault 2009: 108-109).
11 For an overview of Foucault's discussion of governmentality and the ways in which govern mentality has
been applied as an analytical perspective in disciplines such as Criminology, Education, Media Studies and
Organisational Sociology in Anglophone and non-Anglophone academic settings, see Brockling et al 2011:
1-10.
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'regimes of truth' or 'mentalities of government'; (5) the concepts of 'subjects',
'subjectivity' and the governmental process of 'subjectification'; and (6) the
conceptualisation of the spaces in which interaction takes place between
representatives of civil society .and the WTD as a distinct field of activity in the
Bourdieusian sense of the term. In this way, the discussion moves from a number of
general background and orienting assumptions to the more specific concepts I rely on to
carry out and structure my analysis.
Governing and Government
The terms 'governing' and 'government' are used more or less interchangeably in the
governmentality literature to refer to often complex sets of practices and processesthat
shape behaviours, subjectivities and outcomes by facilitating and constraining particular
models of action. Michel Foucault conceptualised government as 'modes of action,
more or lessconsidered and calculated, which [are] destined to act upon the possibilities
of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of
action of others' (1983: 221). Governmentality scholars have taken up and developed
this conceptualisation of government as a 'more or less calculated activity' which works
through structuring possibilities and models of action, and further developed their
conceptualisations and definitions. Mitchell Dean, for example, has defined government
as 'any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of
authorities and agencies ... that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires,
aspirations, interests and beliefs' (1999: 11). Government is not, governmentality
scholars insist, a form of domination or determination; it relies, rather, on individuals
coming to identify themselves with the logics transmitted and carried by particular
governmental practices. According to Graham Burchell, '[w]hen we are governed, when
our behaviour is managed, directed or conducted by others, we do not become the
passive objects of a physical determination. To govern individuals is to get them to act
and to align their particular wills with ends imposed on them through constraining and
facilitating models of possible actions' (1991: 119). Governing and government, in the
governmentality perspective, are thus understood as modalities of power which, as Rita
Abrahamsen has put it, rely on 'techniques of normalisation and consensus, as opposed
to more overtly coercive forms of power' (2004: 1459).
There is a tension, however, in the governmentality literature between
conceptualisations of government as a 'more or less calculated' activity, and an
emphasis on contingency and the unexpected, 'unpredictable consequences, effects and
outcomes' (Dean 1999: 11) that processes of government can generate. While most
governmentality scholars agree that the process of governing necessarily entails at least
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an element of contingency (see e.g. Burchell 1991: 119; Dean 1999: 29; Merlingen 2003:
367; Walters and Haahr 2005: 12), there is a tendency in this literature to depict the
process of government as a calculated, rational, even programmatic activity. Thus
Mitchell Dean, for example, despite conceptualising what he calls 'regimes of
governmental practices' as 'composed of heterogeneous elements having diverse
historical trajectories', defines government as 'any attempt to shape with some degree
of deliberation aspects of our behaviour according to particular sets of norms and for a
variety of ends' (1999: 9). Government is thus presented as a calculated, conscious
activity with pre-determined ends. Nikolas Roseand Peter Miller, similarly, characterise
government as 'a domain of strategies, techniques and procedures through which
different forces seek to render programmes operable' (1992: 183), also emphasising the
role of intentionality and deliberate calculation in governmental processes.
This 'programmer's view', as it is sometimes referred to (e.g. Huxley 2007: 190; Miller
and Rose2008: 39), although prevalent particularly in some of the attempts to expand
and apply Foucault's notion of government in the early 1990s, is not the understanding
of government that I apply and explore in this study. My own reading of Foucault'swork
on governmentality, shaped by my observations and discussions with officials in the
WTO as well as other scholarly discussions of governmentality (e.g. Rutherford 2007:
300), is one which emphasises the always contingent, contested and incoherent nature
of governmental activities. While there may be an element of intentionality or
deliberate calculation present in the processesand practices of governing, for example
in efforts on the part of would-be 'governors' to mobilise particular governmental
technologies and techniques, these may be contradicted, challenged or undermined by
other programmes, practices and logics. As Nikolas Roseand Peter Miller have put it:
Government is a congenitally failing operation ... Technologies produce
unexpected problems, are utilised for their own ends by those who are
supposed to merely operate them, are hampered by under-funding,
professional rivalries, and the impossibility of producing the technical
conditions that would make them work - reliable statistics, efficient
communication systems, clear lines of command, properly designed
buildings, well framed regulations or whatever. Unplanned outcomes
emerge from the intersection of one technology with another, or from the
unexpected consequencesof putting one technique to work.
(1992: 190)
In the perspective underpinning this study, governing takes place through a complex,
sometimes contradictory set of practices, procedures and rationalisations. In the realm
of everyday practice in which governing is instantiated, articulated and also contested,
governmental techniques, technologies and rationalities can accumulate and combine in
both complementary and contradictory ways. A field of possible action can thus come
51
to be governed in ways which are far removed from any conscious or calculated design.
Governing emerges, in short, through a combination and accumulation of practices
emanating from diverse sources and rationalisations, which combine to structure,
facilitate and constrain possibilities of thought and action in regular and identifiable
ways.
The Conduct a/Conduct and Counter-Conduct(s)
Another phrase frequently used in the governmentality literature to refer to the activity
of governing or government is the 'conduct of conduct'. In alluding to the breadth of
processesthrough which government takes place and to the breadth of targets of these
governmental processes,the phrase 'conduct of conduct' is intended to capture some of
what is distinctive about the understanding of government developed and applied by
governmentality scholar s. Its use stems from Foucault's discussion i n his 'Security,
Territory, Population' lectures of the most appropriate terminology to refer to the ways
in which modern forms of government exercise control over populations. The term
'conduct' is preferred as it can be used, Foucault argued, to refer to a broad range of
governmental processes as well as their targets. As he put it in lecture eight of the
series:
the word 'conduct' refers to two things. Conduct is the activity of
conducting (conduire), of conduction (Ia conduction) if you like, but it is
equally the way in which one conducts oneself (se conduit), lets oneself be
conducted (se laisse conduire), is conducted (est conduit), and finally, in
which one behaves (se comporter) as an effect of a form of conduct (une
conduite) as the action of conducting or of conduction (conduction).
(2009: 193)
Understanding government as 'the conduct of conduct' thus opens up the possibility
that the activity of 'conducting' or directing behaviour may be performed or achieved on
one's own or on another's 'conduct'. In other words, it blurs the conventional
distinction between 'governor' and 'governed', allowing for individuals and groups to be
both governing and governed at the same time. As Dean clarifies:
to define government as 'conduct of conduct' is to open up the examination
of self-government or cases in which governor and governed are two aspects
of the one actor, whether that actor be a human individual or a collective or
corporation. Thus the notion of government extends to cover the way in
which an individual questions his or her own conduct (or problematises it) so
that he or she may be better able to govern it. In other words government
encompasses not only how we exercise authority over others ... but how we
govern ourselves.
(1999: 12, italics in original)
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Using the term 'conduct' also enables scholars to examine a broad range of activities,
processes and fields of behaviour as the sites and targets of particular governmental
strategies, logics and mentalities. The 'conduct' that is 'conducted' or directed through
processes of governing can include particular practices, habits, tendencies and
behaviours, subjectivities (discussed in more detail below), 'action-orientations'
(Sending and Neumann 2006: 657) and 'inward states' (Huxley 2007: 187), as well as
general attitudes and understandings of the self and what constitutes appropriate
behaviour in a given situation. One of the great advantages of the concept 'conduct of
conduct' is thus the range and scope of human and social activity that can be
interrogated as constituent parts and/or targets of governmental techniques and
rationalities.
Related to this conceptualisation of governing as 'the conduct of conduct' is the
conceptualisation of resistance or dissent to governmental processes as 'counter-
conduct' or 'counter-conducts'. Although these phrases have not been adopted within
Anglophone governmentality studies with the same enthusiasm as the term 'conduct of
conduct'/2 they provide a useful way of conceptualising resistance to governmental
logics and processes. Counter-conducts are forms of conduct whose logic contradicts or
challenges dominant governmental mentalities and governmental technologies, forms of
conduct that might otherwise be labelled 'resistance', 'dissidence' or 'revolt'."
According to Foucault, the term 'counter-conduct' allows:
reference to the active senseof the word "conduct" - counter-conduct in the
sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others;
which is why I prefer it to "misconduct (inconduite)", which only refers to the
passivesense of the word, of behaviour: not conducting oneself properly.
(2009: 201)
The term 'counter-conduct' also carries an implicit reference to an understanding of
government and resistance as mutually constitutive processes. As Foucault emphasised
in a later lecture in the 'Security, Territory, Population' series, counter-conducts emerge
in parallel with (and response to) the programmes, practices and calculations that
constitute particular governmental regimes (ibid.: 335). They are not external to
governmental processes, but rather form part of the complex set of negotiations,
revisions and calculations that sustain them. Counter-conducts should not be seen,
therefore, asseparate from government. The analysispresented in subsequent chapters
thus incorporates a sensitivity to and awareness of the counter-conducts that are
emerging in parallel with the governmental processesidentified.
12 For a rare exception see Death 2011 (forthcoming).
13 See Foucault 2009: 200-202 for a more detailed discussion of why he prefers the phrase 'counter-
conduct' to these others ways of conceptual ising resistance.
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The Centrality of Practice
This study, in common with the governmentality literature does not conceptualise 'civil
society', 'global civil society' or any other sphere of human or social activity as a natural,
pre-given domain. 'Civil society' and the communicative spaces that are opening up
between it and the WTO are, rather, understood to be constituted, and their meaning
negotiated and contested, through everyday practice." As Wendy Larner and William
Walters have put it, governmentality studies endeavour (to account for the emergence
of domains at the level of their practices' (2004: 11), rather than attributing or inferring
any pre-given meaning or substance to these domains. The social world, and the fields
of activity we conventionally divided it into, do not exist as pre-formed entities, but are
constituted through an active and ongoing process whereby knowledge-bearing and
knowledge-generating practices come to define their boundaries and the characteristics
attributed to them. As Michael MerJingen has emphasised, governmentality
perspectives assumethat:
The framing of what is to be governed and how ... is an active, technical
process. Inscription devices do not register an already always structured
world but actively act upon the real so as to make it stable, mobile,
comparable and ultimately governable.
(2006: 187)
It is the gradual accumulation of sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory
practices that is understood to generate particular meanings and beliefs about a domain
or field of activity, and to thus constitute it as knowable and governable. Thus rather
than starting from any pre-existing idea about what (civil society' (the term preferred
within the WTO) or (global civil society' (the term preferred in much of the academic
literature) look like, or any fixed idea about the type of communication that takes place
between 'civil society' and the WTO, I approach (civil society' as a category whose
meaning is fixed and determined in practice. To put it another way, practices are, in this
study and the governmentality literature more broadly, understood to be performative
(Sharma and Gupta 2006: 13). They are not simply the outward manifestation of a
particular pre-determined governmental policy or strategy on a pre-given domain;
rather, practices themselves are what constitute and define these policies and
strategies, aswell as the domains on which they are destined to act.
This understanding of practices as constitutive of policy is particularly useful and
relevant in the case of the WTO's relationship with (global civil society', where it is
acknowledged even in official WTO publications that practice has played a central role in
14 The WTO is also understood in this manner, Le. as a bundle of practices whose meaning and content is
not pre-determined but is debated, negotiated and stabilised in practice.
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defining the WTO's overall policy towards NGOsand other civil society organisations. As
outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the WTO's policy towards civil society has
evolved significantly over the past decade and a half, from being characterised by
something approaching indifference on the part of WTO officials and national delegates
to the activities of civil society in the mid-late 1990s, to an emphasis on transparency in
the wake of the Seattle protests in the early 2000s, to what WTOofficials now refer to as
a 'substance-based dialogue'. According to the authors of the WTO-published World
Trade Report 2007, 'the evolution of this relationship is a result of practice rather than
procedural changes and the granting of specific rights' (342, emphasis added). The
formal guidelines governing WTO interactions with civil society have remained
unchanged since 1996, yet the practices that constitute this policy on a day-to-day level
have in many ways been transformed. Practice defines policy to the extent, the same
report suggests, that 'current WTO practices for interacting with NGOsgo far beyond
anything that Members would be able to formally agree upon by consensus. These
practices are solidly anchored in the culture of the WTO and it would be highly
controversial to envisage a roll back' (ibid.: 342). A theoretical perspective which
recognises the centrality of practice and the importance of knowledge-bearing and
knowledge-generating practices is thus particularly appropriate in this empirical context,
where everyday practice plays such a central role in defining and determining what kind
of relationship can exist between 'civil society' and the WTO.
Regimes of Trutn and Mentalities a/Government
Another significant feature of governmentality approaches is the understanding that
governmental processes always reflect, sustain and even generate particular
rationalities or frameworks of knowledge. As Ulrich Brockling and his co-authors have
put it, 'analyses of governmentality are centred on the question of how practices and
thinking about these practices constitute themselves mutually, or more precisely: how
they translate into each other' (2011: 11). Practices and the forms of rationality that
they generate and sustain are thus understood to be mutually constitutive, and to
necessitate concepts and forms of analysis that can capture the ways in which, as Dean
puts it, 'thought operates within our organised ways of doing things, our regimes of
practices, and with its ambitions and effects' (1999: 17-18). Thus for Foucault, for
example, analysing processesof government involves paying attention to 'how forms of
rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they
play within them, because it's true that 'practices' don't exist without a certain regime
of rationality' (1991b: 79). larner and Walters, similarly, emphasise that a
governmentality approach 'entails a move of "bracketing" the world of underlying forces
and causes, and instead examining the different ways in which the real has been
inscribed in thought' (2004: 16).
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Governmentality scholars have developed a variety of terms and concepts intended to
capture the ways in which thought and forms of rationality, as well as the discursive
structures that mediate and transmit them, are implicated in governmental processes.
Foucault, for example, in his 'Security, Territory, Population' lectures, simply uses the
term 'knowledges', and discussesthe ways in which the emergence of 'government' as a
specific modality of power has 'led to the development of a series of specific
governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the
development of a series of knowledges (savoirs)' (2009: 108, brackets and italics in
original). He identified several examples of these 'knowledges', connected, he argued,
to specific governmental regimes that have been dominant in different historical periods
in Western Europe. Modern liberal government, for example, is seen as having 'the
population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument' (ibid.: 108). Other
governmentality scholars have developed and applied more specific concepts to try to
capture the ways in which thought is implicated in government, including the terms
'political rationality' (see e.g. Barry et al 1996; Gordon 1991; Merlingen 2006; Roseand
Miller 1992), 'mentality of government' (Dean 1999; Merlingen 2003; Rose 1991, 2000)
and 'governmental rationality' (e.g. Gordon 1991; Duffield 2001; Hindess 1997; Sending
2006). All of these terms are used more or less interchangeably to capture the idea that
processesof government always rely on and reinforce particular ways of thinking about
the population, domain of activity or issue area that is to be governed. Merlingen, for
example, defines 'mentalities or rationalities of government' as 'discursive formations,
intimately linked to structures of power that produce effects of truth with regard to
specific fields of governance, such as madness or crime' (2003: 366, emphasis added).
Roseand Miller provide a similar definition of 'political rationalities'. As they put it:
political rationalities have what one might term an epistemological
character. That is to say, they are articulated in relation to some conception
of the nature of the objects governed - society, the nation, the population,
the economy. In particular they embody some account of the persons over
whom government is to be exercised.
(1992: 179, italics in original)
According to Dean, political rationalities and the broader forms of truth and knowledge
they incorporate are not always explicitly recognised by those who are implicated in
governmental regimes. 'The idea of mentalities of government', he argues, 'emphasises
the way in which the thought involved in practices of government is relatively taken for
granted, i.e. not usually open to questioning by its practitioners' (1999: 16). Mentalities
of government and political rationalities may thus be seen by those who transmit and
reproduce them as common-sense, self-evident ways of conceptualising domains of
activity or problematising particular behaviours or subjectivities. To borrow Bourdleu's
terminology, political rationalities can be considered part of the doxa, the 'fundamental
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presuppositions of [a] field' (Bourdieu 1990b: 68), which are learnt and acquired through
practical action within it.
Anyone familiar with Foucault's earlier work on power and discourse will no doubt
recognise the logic and assumptions underpinning the concepts of 'knowledges',
'mentalities of government' and 'political rationalities', as well as the ways in which
these discursive formations are seen to connect to practice, through, for example,
generating 'effects of truth' (Merlingen 2003: 366). In this study, I also draw on this
related earlier work, specifically the concept of 'regimes of truth', to better capture the
complex, overlapping, sometimes contradictory ways in which thought and rationality
are involved in governing the field of activity in which interaction takes place between
civil society and the WTO. Concepts like 'political rationalities' and 'mentalities of
government' suggest more uniformity ofform and purpose in the discursive formations
structuring practice than is present in the material examined here. Rather than rely
uniquely on these terms, therefore, I alsomake useof the more fluid, multiform concept
of 'regimes of truth'. According to Foucault:
Eachsociety has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth - that is, the
types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms
and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded
value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those charged with saying
what counts as true.
(Foucault 2000: 131)
The concept of 'regimes of truth' thus helps capture the more subtle and less
programmatic ways in which thought and assumptions about the political and social
world are also implicated in governing the field of civil society-WTD interactions.
Subjects, Subjectivity and Subjectijication
Alongside this attention to the ways in which thought is implicated in governmental
practice, governmentality approaches are also sensitive to the ways in which
governmental logics and rationalities work on and through individuals' senseof identity
and self. Governmentality scholars make frequent use of concepts such as 'subjects',
'subjectivity' and 'subjectification' in order to capture and explore the ways in which
individuals and groups can be absorbed into and (re-)produce the logic of governmental
regimes through their identities and self-understandings. According to Foucault, '[t]here
are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and
dependence, and tied to his [sic] identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both
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meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to' (2000: 331).
The concept of 'subject' thus alludes not only to the ways in which broader power
relations and discursive structures can subjectify and exercise control over individuals
and groups, but also to the ways in which individuals may conduct their own conduct,
through aligning their sense of identity with particular categories, logics and subject-
positions. As Brockling and his co-authors put it, '[t]o become a subject means
actualising certain subject-positions and dispensing with others; it means being
addressed in a certain way as a subject, understanding oneself as a subject, and working
on oneself in alignment with this self-understanding' (2011: 14). For governmentality
and other Foucauldian-inspired scholars, examining how discursive formations create,
encourage and (re)produce certain types of subjects is crucial to understanding
processesof government. According to Foucault, for example:
if we take the question of power, of political power, situating it in the more
general question of governmentality understood as a strategic field of power
relations in the broadest and not merely political sense of the term, if we
understand by governmentality a strategic field of power relations in their
mobility, transformability and reversibility, then I do not think that reflection
on this notion of governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically
and practically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to
self ... an analysis of governmentality - that is of power as a set of reversible
relationships - must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the
relationship of self to self.
(2005: 252; see also Dean 1999: 23, 32; Walters and Haahr 2005: 13)
Some Foucauldian scholars place particular emphasis on understanding the ways in
which discursive formations act differently on different types of subject, as a way of
further unpacking the ways in which power relations play out in and through the
creation or incitation of particular types of subject. For Gavin Kendall and Gary
Wickham, for example, 'attention must be drawn to the ways in which power relations
differentially position subjects in discourse, even when (perhaps especially when) this
produces "contradictory subjectivity'" (2000: 54). My analysis explores the ways in
which discourses create and suggest different responses to different subject-positions,
as a way of capturing some of the diversity, power dynamics and exclusionary processes
that are present in 'global civil society', and the diversity of ways in which this 'global
civil society' interacts with the WTO.
In addition to the concept of 'subject', governmentality scholars also use the term
'subjectivity' to refer to and explore the ways in which discursive formations work on
identities and self-understandings. The term is used in a number of connected ways. It
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can refer, for example, in a general senseto the identities, attitudes, self-understandings
and 'action-orientations' (Sending and Neumann 2006: 657) of individual subjects, and
to indicate that these can be a site and target of governmental processes. 'Subjectivity'
is thus understood as one of the domains in and through which governmental processes
operate, a particular field of governmental activity and analysis (see e.g. Miller and Rose
1998; Rose 1993, 1996). It is also used in a more specific sense, to refer to particular
forms of subjectivity, particular types of identity and self-understanding. Thus William
Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, for example, argue that 'power works in terms of the
ways we govern ourselves; it encourages us to adopt such subjectivities as the active
jobseeker, the empowered citizen, the discerning consumer, the interested stakeholder,
the informed investor, and so on' (2005: 13; seealso Dean 1999: 32). Irrespective ofthe
particular meaning, however, governmentality scholars do not understand subjectivity
or specific forms of subjectivity as fixed or imposed from above on passive,
unquestioning, previously empty subjects. Subjects are, rather, understood to be active
participants in the construction of their subjectivities. According to Dean, 'regimes of
government do not determine forms of subjectivity. They elicit, promote, facilitate,
foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents, ...
[and] are successful to the extent that these agents come to experience themselves
through such capacities' (Dean 1999: 32). The forms of subjectivity elicited and
favoured are, moreover, understood to be context- and governmental regime-specific.
As Burchell has put it:
Governed individuals may be identified by their governors as members of a
flock to be led, as legal subjects with certain rights, as children to be
corrected and educated, as part of a natural resource to be exploited, or as
living beings who are part of a biological population to be managed. In each
case the subjective self-identity presupposed or required by the exercise of
political power will be different.
(1991: 120)
One term that is often used by governmentality scholars to conceptualise the
contingent, context-specific processesthrough which subjects come to adopt particular
forms of subjectivity, and experience themselves in terms of the categories and
characteristics attributed to them by particular discursive formations, is
'subjectification'. 'subjectification', according to Stephen Legg,is:
the process by which one conceives of oneself as a subject, positioned in
various discourses, for instance, of gender, sexuality, age, class, physical
ability, but also of citizens' responsibilities, the need to account for and
calculate, or the urge to reproduce or exercise.
(2005: 145)
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Subjectification takes place not through techniques of domination or control, but
through what Foucault has called the 'government of the self' (2005: 252), in which
subjects' own efforts to conform to the categories and logics inherent in discourses and
in regimes of governmental practices leads them to identify with and enact particular
subject posltlons. Subjectification should thus be understood as an iterative, inherently
social process, which is only ever variably successful, as it works to the extent that
subjects themselves come to experience themselves through and identify themselves
with the relevant forms of subjectivity. Nevertheless, subjectification is one of the
processes that ties individual subjects to particular governmental regimes and
processes. As Brockling and his co-authors put it, '[p]rocesses of subjectification ...
generate themselves performatively, but their performances are bound into orders of
knowledge, lines of force, and power relations. Thus subjectification designates a
potential for action, but always a form of adherence as well' (2011: 14).
Civil SOciety- WTO Interactions as a Bourdieusian Field
The final element of the theoretical and conceptual framework underpinning this study
to be discussed here is the use of Bourdieu's concept of 'field' to conceptualise the
social space in which interaction takes place between representatives of civil society and
the WTO. Although many of the orienting assumptions and specific concepts
underpinning this study are derived from Foucault and others' work on govern mentality,
this literature offers little guidance about how to conceptualise the spaces or zones of
contact in which embodied representatives of 'global civil SOCiety' and embodied
representatives of an institution of global governance meet and interact.
Governmentality approaches to global civil society have focused mainly on theorising
and re-conceptualising global civil society as constitutive of global governance, as 'an
object and a subject of government' (Sending and Neumann 2006: 652) that is already
internalised within global power relations (see e.g. Amoore and Langley 2004, 2005;
Jaeger 2007; Lipschutz 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Lipschutz with Rowe 2005; Sending and
Neumann 2006). Although the concepts and arguments developed in this literature help
theorise the role and place of 'global civil SOciety' in global order, and thus point to
numerous issues that are worth exploring in an analysis of the interactions that take
place between civil society actors and an institute of global governance, they do little to
help conceptualise the concrete social spaces in which such interaction takes place.
Similarly, they do little to help explore how the particular culture, norms and
expectations that emerge within such spaces might (re-)produce, enable or challenge
the broader power relations and mentalities these scholars identify in operation at the
global level.
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In order, then, to analyse the concrete social spaces in which interaction takes place
between representatives of 'civil society' and the WTO, and to open up exploration of
the particular disciplinary norms, culture and social structures that have emerged within
them, I borrow Pierre Bourdieu's concept of 'field' (Bourdieu 1990b: 55-56, 66, 2005: 8-
9; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97-98). I conceptualise the various formal, informal
and virtual spaces in which concrete, embodied 'civil society' actors interact with
concrete, embodied representatives of the 'WTO' as part of a broader social field, which
has its own 'regularities' (Bourdieu 2005: 8), forms of capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant
1992: 98) and 'dispositions acquired through learning processes associated with
protracted dealings' within it (Bourdieu 2005: 8-9). According to Bourdieu and
Wacquant:
the social cosmos is made up of a number of .., social microcosms, l.e. spaces
of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a necessity that are
specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields. For instance, the
artistic field, or the religious field, or the economic field all follow specific
logics.
(1992: 97, italics in original)
The field of civil society-WTO interactions, as I have termed it, extends across,
underneath and through the various spaces in which interaction takes place between
members of 'global civil society' and individuals who are involved in making and/or
implementing WTO policy, i.e. staff in the WTO Secretariat, national delegates to the
WTO, and, dependent on country, trade officials at a government level who determine
national trade policy. This field is unde rstood, following Bourdieu and Wacquant's
formulation, to possess its own logic and regularities, and to work to conduct the
conduct of those who participate in it in ways that are context-specific and not
irreducible to the logics in operation in other fields. Conceptualising the formal,
informal and virtual spaces in which interaction takes place between embodied
representatives of 'global civil society' and the 'WTO' in this way thus opens up space in
which to examine whether and how the particular logics, mentalities and dispositions
(or, to use more Foucauldian language, forms of subjectivity) in this field might challenge
or bolster broader power relations and governmental rationalities.
Methodology
The methodological approach adopted in this study draws significantly on ethnographic
research methodology as developed and applied by social and cultural anthropologists.
Despite growing interest in ethnographic and anthropological approaches to the study of
politics and international relations, the methodological debates and applications of
ethnographic research methodology have not been as developed as those in
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anthropology, and indeed, have tended to cite these anthropological debates as
evidence of a need to carry out more anthropological research in politics and
international relations (see e.g. Beier 2005; Brigg and Bleiker 2008; Cohn 1987, 2006;
Eckl 2008; Hopgood 2006; Mandaville 2002; Neumann 2002; Schatz 2009; Vrasti 2008).
The understanding of ethnography and ethnographic research underpinning this study is
thus derived mainly from the anthropological literature (e.g. Appadurai 1991, 1996,
2002; Burawoy 1998, 2000a, 2001; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 2003; Davies 1999;
Fisher 1997; Geertz 1993, 2000a, 2000b; Hann 1996; Hart 2006; Marcus 1995, 1998,
2010; Scott 1985; Shore and Wright 1997; Wacquant 2003), as well as methodological
debates in related disciplines such as geography (e.g. Crang and Cook 2007; Herbert
2000).
In this section, I outline the specific methodological principles, derived in large part from
engagement with methodological debates in the fields of social and cultural
anthropology, which guided the design and implementation of this study. I also show
how applying these methodological principles, in combination with the theoretical and
conceptual framework discussed in the previous section, can help overcome and remedy
some of the problems and erasures noted in the existing literature. The discussion is
organised into three sub-sections. In the first sub-section, I discuss how approaching
civil society and its role in global governance with an 'ethnographic sensibility' can help
challenge overly neat, generalising theories and models, and thus enhance scholarly
understanding. In the second, I suggest that using a multi-sited ethnographic approach
that enables exploration of the connections and disconnections between different parts
of 'global civil SOCiety'can also open up important lines of analysis. In the third, I discuss
the ethical considerations raised by such a methodological approach, and provide an
overview of the ways in which these considerations have been addressed throughout
the research.
An Ethnographic Sensibility
Although this study is not 'an ethnography' in the traditional sense of the term (see e.g.
Denscombe 2003: 84-85; Willis and Trondman 2002: 394), it does adopt what some
scholars have called an 'ethnographic sensibility' (Marcus 1998: 14; Schatz 2009: 5;
Wedeen 2009: 90) to research and the social world. This ethnographic sensibility, in my
reading of the anthropological literature, entails sensitivity and openness to a number of
issues and possible lines of enquiry when carrying out empirical research. It entails,
firstly, focusing on the processes through which meaning is transmitted, operationalised
and negotiated in concrete social practice. According to Edward Schatz, 'ethnography is
a sensibility that goes beyond face-to-face contact. It is an approach that cares - with
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the possible emotional engagement that implies - to glean the meanings that the
people under study attribute to their social and political reality' (2009: 5). It thus
involves paying attention to the ways in which 'meaning systems are operationalised by
group members' (Herbert 2000: 556), rather than taking meanings of concepts and
categories as fixed or pre-ordained. It also entails being sensitive to the ways in which
meaning is transmitted, generated and negotiated through practice and social
interaction. As Jean and John Comaroff have put it, 'we take meaning to be largely, if
not entirely, implicit in practice' (1992: 38). This attention to the transmission and
negotiation 0 f meaning in practice complements govern mentality approaches which
seek to understand the ways in which thought and rationality are implicated in
governmental practice, and which examine the ways in which domains of activity suchas
'global civil society' acquire meaning through practice (see e.g. larner and Walters 2004:
11). Focusing on meaning-transmission and negotiation also opens up analysis of the
way in which concepts may be interpreted and enacted differently in different locales,
thus providing a means to avoid treating 'global civil society' and the actors within it as
homogenous units of analysis.
Researchingwith an ethnographic sensibility entails, secondly, approaching objects and
fields of enquiry without fixed ideas about what will be found, or what line of reasoning
wi" be developed about them. It requires 'remaining as open as possible to the
unpredictable and the informal in social life' (Coleman and Collins 2006: 12), and
responding to prompts and opportunities to increase understanding encountered 'in the
field', even if these were not part of any initial research plan or schedule. As lisa
Wedeen argues, 'ethnography as sensibility and activity implies the possibilities and
pleasure of serendipitous encounter, the commitments to long-term engagement with
places and inhabitants, and an abiding attention to what people say and do' (2009: 90).
Researchingwith an ethnographic sensibility thus entails being open to exploring topics
and lines of enquiry that may only become evident through contact with and immersion
in the field of enquiry. Thus rather than setting out to examine whether the increasing
involvement of NGOsin global governance enhancesglobal democracy, or to determine
how and whether NGOsinfluence other actors in the global system, researching with an
ethnographic sensibility entails approaching the field of enquiry with a flexible set of
research questions, and an openness to refining them based on understanding gained
through interacting with research participants.
An ethnographic sensibility entails, thirdly, researching 'global' processesand structures
in a way which is sensitive to complexity, diversity and the 'ecologies and politics of
knowledge' (Marcus 2010: 72) that play out acrossand between different geographical
locales. The overall aim of ethnographic research is to 'draw large conclusions from
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small, but very densely textured facts; to support broad assertions about the role of
culture in the construction of collective life by engaging [general concepts and systems
of concepts] exactly with complex specifics' (Geertz 1993 [1973]: 28; see also Fife 2005:
133). It requires a sensitivity to the ways in which situated, context-specific processes
and meanings interact and intersect with more general rationalities and structures, the
ways in which 'Iocal historical trajectories flow into complicated transnational
structures' (Appadurai 1991: 209). It thus has much in common with Michel Foucault's
concept of an 'ascending analysis' (1980: 99), which entails developing models and
theories on the basis of micro-practices and 'micro-physics' (Foucault 1991a: 26) of
power, and from these 'small-scale' practices and processes building larger-scale
concepts and models. An ethnographic approach specifically emphasises, however, the
complexity, silencing and tensions that can emerge in the encounter between situated
knowledges and rationalities and the 'global'.
Through this sensitivity to complexity, diversity and the politics of knowledge,
ethnographic researchers aspire to develop theories and understanding which are
attentive to the complex interplay between differently situated knowledges, rationalities
and processes, and which thus avoids reproducing the generalising models and
narratives produced by other approaches. According to Mike Crang and Ian Cook,
'[e]thnographic research reveals, and is often undertaken to question, the erroneous
neatness of distanced, abstract, theoretical understandings of social, cultural, economic
and other processes' (2007: 13). Approaching 'global civil society', as well as the actors
and groupings of organisations that are understood to be part of it, with this kind of
sensibility thus enables exploration of its role in global governance which is sensitive to
relatively unexplored themes such as the power relations, exclusionary processes and
politics of representation that can operate within this 'global civil society'. Indeed,
anthropologists have long been advocating more ethnographic exploration of the
complex roles and relations enacted by NGOsand other parts of 'civil society. William
Fisher, for example, has argued that:
An enhanced anthropological contribution would enrich a literature the
majority of which is replete with sweeping generations; optlrnlstlc
statements about the potentials of NGOs for delivering welfare services,
implementing development projects, and facilitating democratisation; and
instrumental treatises on building the capacity of NGOs to perform these
functions. Unpacking this literature, much of which obscures its political
stance in simple categories and generalisations, requires attention to three
sets of issuesthat have concerned some anthropologists: (0) how discourses
about NGOs create knowledge, define sets of appropriate practices, and
facilitate and encourage NGO behaviour defined as appropriate; (b) how
complex sets of relationships among various kinds of associations, the
agencies and agents of the state, and individuals and communities have had
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an impact in specific locales at specific times; and (c) how we can avoid
reductionist views of NGOsas fixed and generalisable entities with essential
characteristics and contextualise them within evolving processes of
associating.
(1997: 441-2)
Chris Hann, similarly, has argued in favour of carrying out more ethnographic research
into the different modes and models of associating that might be present within 'civil
society' around the world. As he puts it, there is: 'something inherently unsatisfactory
about the international propagation by Western scholars of an ideal of social
organisation that seems to bear little relation to the current realities of their own
countries; an ideal which, furthermore, developed in historical conditions that cannot be
replicated in any other part of the world today' (1996: 1). Researchingthe role of civil
society in global governance with a sensitivity to local differences, situated knowledges
and ecologies and politics of knowledge also helps open up and complexify scholarly
understanding, and avoid precisely this type of criticism.
A Multi-Sited Approach
In addition to this 'ethnographic sensibilltv', I also borrow a more specific concept and
methodological tool from the anthropological literature on methodology, namely a
'multi-sited' approach to collecting and generating research data (see e.g. Freidberg
2001; Garsten 2010; Hannerz 2003; Marcus 1995, 1998, 2010). According to George
Marcus, one of the anthropologists most closely associatedwith developing the concept
of multi-sited ethnographic research, multi-sited ethnography should be 'designed
around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in which the
ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit,
posited logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines the arguments
of the ethnography' (Marcus 1995: 105). Marcus suggests a number of logics of
association or connection that ethnographic researchers might use to select their 'sites',
including following the movements of particular groups of people (ibid.: 106); tracing the
circulation of commodities, money or intellectual property (ibid:. 106-7), or signs,
symbols and metaphors 'when the thing traced is within the realm of discourse and
modes of thought' (ibid.: 108); and 'following the parties to conflicts' (ibid.: 110). Multi-
sited ethnography, Marcus argues, enables researchers to capture, amongst other
things, the processes of translation of forms of knowledge and cultural formations that
take place between different geographical sites and cultural locations. As he puts it:
what is not lost but remains essential to multi-sited research is the function
of translation from one cultural idiom or language to another. This practice
is enhanced since it is no longer practised in the primary, dualistic "them-us"
frame of conventional ethnography but requires considerably more nuancing
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and shading as the practice of translation connects the several sites that
research explores along unexpected and even dissonant fractures of social
location.
(1995: 100)
More recently, Marcus has written about the concept and practice of multi-sited
ethnography in ways that place more emphasis on the role of knowledge and discourse
in global social life. As he puts it:
I am fascinated by the ethnography of contemporary forms of knowledge or
knowledges, and it is the politics or ecology of such knowledge forms with
which every project of ethnography of the contemporary (the recent past
moving into the near future) begins. This is both the context and the
scaffolding of fieldwork projects'
(2010: 72)
Such 'ethnography of zones of discourses' (ibid.: 72), Marcus argues, is one of the main
ways in which anthropological practice can contribute to understanding contemporary
global life and order.
The methodological approach adopted in this study incorporates two specific elements
of Marcus's conceptualisation of multi-sited ethnography. I have, firstly, collected and
generated data in multiple geographical sites, and, secondly, conceptualise what I am
examining as 'zones of discourses' and the 'politics or ecology' of knowledge (2010: 72).
Empirical data has been collected and generated in Geneva, Switzerland, home to both
the WTOSecretariat and scores of mainly international NGOsthat seek to monitor and
feed into negotiations that take place there, and Lima, Iquitos, Cuscoand Puno in Peru.
These different geographical locations can all, in different ways, be considered centres
of debate over issues relating to intellectual property policy and the protection of
traditional knowledge and biodiversity. The 'explicit, posited logic of association or
connection' (Marcus 1995: 105) between these sites is a logic of juxtaposition intended
to permit exploration of the ways in which different kinds of civil society organisations
are implicated in, or excluded from, this field of global governance. The organisations in
Geneva are mainly international, professionalised NGOsthat also have offices in North
America and Europe, although a few Southern NGOs such as CUTSInternational and
Third World Network and some smaller NGOshave also established a base there. The
organisations in Peru are more varied, and include offices of international NGOssuch as
Oxfam, professionalised Peruvian NGOs, campaigning organisations, sustainable
development organisations, indigenous associations and peasant associations.
Researching across these different geographical locations thus provides an opportunity
to analyse how some of the inherent diversity within 'global civil society' plays out
within and impacts on a specific field of global governance.
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In total, I spent over five months in Geneva, where I interviewed thirty individuals,
including officials working in the WTOSecretariat, national delegates to the WTOwith a
particular interest and involvement in issuesrelating to the TRIPSAgreement, traditional
knowledge and biodiversity, officials working in the South Centre, an intergovernmental
organisation that serves as something of a filter and contact point between civil society
and government officials, and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO),and
NGOdirectors and researchers. I spoke to staff in NGOsthat have been publicly active
on issues relating to intellectual property policy and the protection of traditional
knowledge and biodiversity, as well as staff in a number of NGOs that have not, but
whose organisational briefs and stated field of interest include similar issues,in order to
be able to examine reasons for non-interaction and non-involvement in this field aswell
as experiences of interaction. I also participated, wherever possible, in public events on
relevant themes, including four of the WTO's annual Public Forums (from 2007 to 2010),
a workshop on Intellectual Property (IP) enforcement in July 2008, and the Geneva
Trade and Development Symposium, a three-day event organised alongside the Seventh
WTOMinisterial Conference held in Geneva in 2009.
I spent another five months in Peru, and interviewed forty individuals in four different
locations: Lima, Iquitos in the Peruvian Amazon, and Cusco and Puno in the Peruvian
Andes. These included government officials working in the Ministries of External Trade
(MINCETUR)and Foreign Affairs and the Institutes for Intellectual Property (INDECOPI)
and Indigenous, Amazonian and Afroperuvian Peoples (INDEPA),government officials
and NGO representatives involved in a government-sponsored project against
'bloplracv', freelance researchers, and directors and researchers in different types of
NGO, indigenous associations and other civil society organisations. I also attended an
International Workshop on Genetically Modified Organismsand Biopiracy in Cusco,Peru
in April 2009, and the IV Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities of
Abya Yala in Puno, Peru in May 2009. I identified potential interviewees in each location
using internet searches and snowballing, and continued interviewing and contacting
new research participants until what Mike Crang and Ian Cook call 'theoretical
saturation' was reached. As they put it, '[w]ithin any interest group, only a relatively
small number of discourses may be used, in various combinations, to explain certain
events, attitudes and so on' (2007: 15). I thus continued seeking out and contacting
additional participants until empirical details and patterns of discourse had been
repeated by a number of interviewees, and consequent interviews had failed to yield
new details or narratives.
The 'zones of discourses' and 'politics and ecologies of knowledge' I sought to explore
throughout this fieldwork were those that relate to the sphere of activity that many
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refer to as 'global civil society', and to global debates about trade, intellectual property
policy, traditional knowledge and biodiversity. Paying attention to the knowledges,
rationalities and competing perspectives on these zones of discourses in different
locations makes it possible to examine how frameworks of meaning extend or do not
extend acrossdifferent parts of 'global civil society'. It also makes it possible to analyse
the translations and tensions, connections and disconnections that exist between
different geographical and social locations. This multi-sited approach thus also allows
data to be generated and analysis to be conducted that captures more of the complexity
and diversity of 'global civil society' and the role it plays in global governance than many
of the existing accounts discussed in Chapter One.
Ethical Considerations
Although the use of ethnographic research methodology is motivated in part by ethical
consideratlcns, as it represents an approach to studying the social world which values
and can bring to light perspectives and voices that can otherwise be marginalised in
policy debates and academic discourse, it also generates its own set of ethical concerns.
The more sustained, face-to-face interaction that ethnographic research entails places
ethnographic researchers in a position where they have accessto much more potentially
sensitive information and build more personalised relationships with research
participants than in other types of social research. Ethnographic researchers thus need
to take particular care to ensure that research participants always have sufficient
information about the research project in which they are involved, to enable them to
decide whether they wish to participate or not, and to ensure that potentially sensitive
information is not used in a harmful way.
Like the American Anthropological Association (AAA), I understand a researcher's
primary ethical responsibility to be to the individuals and communities who participate
in the research (AAA 1998: 2; see also Madison 2005: 111). Throughout the process of
making contact with research participants and carrying out interviews and observation, I
was thus open and transparent about the purposes of the study, my plans for
publication and dissemination, and the sources of funding that support it (Madison
2005: 111). I was also willing to discuss my research aims and objectives and my
emerging theories and impressions with research participants in as much detail as they
wished, and prepared to have these theories and impressions challenged and
questioned. In this way, I sought to enact an anthropological understanding of informed
consent as a dynamic and continuous process (AAA 1998: 3), achieved through ongoing
discussion with research participants about the nature and purposes of the research.
Although these steps cannot completely neutralise the power dynamics that underlie all
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research encounters, they can at least ensure that research participants are given space
and sufficient information to decide how and whether they wish to participate in the
research, and to challenge and question my assumptions and theories if they feel this is
appropriate. I also gave research participants the opportunity to tell me whether they
wish their involvement in the research to be acknowledged or not (ibid.: 3), and to veto
the inclusion of specific details or information if they felt this was necessary. Research
participants have thus not been identified directly in this thesis, as a number of
individuals requested anonymity. When I include direct quotations and examples
provided by interviewees, I have given enough background information for readers to
situate and make senseof the comments, but not enough to identify specific individuals.
Other ethical considerations emerge in the processof analysing, developing theories and
writing about the impressions, accounts and perspectives shared in the course of
ethnographic research. As D. Soyini Madison has put it, 'what we say and write about
others has material effects ... as ethnographers, our acts and our words have
implications beyond ourselves and are part of a larger web of human connections'
(2005: 90-91). It is here that questions of power and representation most come into
play, and the ethnographic researcher must take particular care to acknowledge the
processes and rationale that led to the development and presentation of particular
arguments and lines of analysis. It is thus important to recognise that the theories,
analysis and arguments developed in this thesis are based on my interpretations of the
accounts, perspectives and opinions that research participants have shared with me, and
thus 'filtered through [my] own experience' (O'Reilly 2005: 223). They are grounded in
research participants' experiences, but are ultimately shaped by my own interpretations,
theoretical orientation and decisions I have made about which material to incorporate
into my analysis and how best to interpret it. AsJulian Ecklhas noted:
The demand for engagement in a dialogue with 'the field' not only requires
the researcher to be willing to learn from the people studied and possibly
even to question his/her research project; it also confronts him/her with the
difficult task of deciding what voices to listen to; for there is obviously no
such thing as 'the field' in the sense that the researcher would face a
homogeneous group with common interests.
(2008: 190)
The arguments developed and the emphasis placed on particular processes and their
implications are a result of my own engagement with the issues raised and experiences
shared in the research interviews, and will not necessarily be shared by all those who
participated in this research. I am thus not claiming to 'represent' the views or
experiences of my research participants; what I present, rather, is a theoretically-driven
account of the field of civil society-WTO interactions which is grounded in the concrete,
situated experiences and perspectives of those who have participated in this enquiry.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed and presented a theoretical and methodological
approach to studying the role of civil society in global governance which seeks to
overcome some of the limitations and erasures present in existing theories and accounts
of the role played by civil society in global governance. Drawing mainly on practice-
oriented readings of governmentality theory and ethnographic research methodology as
developed and applied by cultural and social anthropologists, I have presented an
approach which, in conceptualising the spaces in which interaction takes place between
civil society and the WTO as a Bourdieusian field, produced in practice and governed by
its own rationalities and technologies, is able to capture some of the ways in which
power is implicated in civil society's involvement in global governance. I have also
argued in favour of researching this field of civil society-WTO interaction using a multi-
sited ethnographic methodological approach, which is sensitive to local differences,
situated knowledges and the ecologies and politics of knowledge as they manifest
themselves and play out across this field, and which, through juxtaposing geographical
and social locations, can capture the diversity of ways in which civil society organisations
are implicated in or excluded from this field of global governance. The theoretical and
methodological approach developed is thus intended to facilitate an examination of the
relationship emerging between the WTO and civil society that is sensitive to the
differences and tensions that exist between the different organisations understood to
be part of 'global civil society', and that helps explore what makes some parts of this




TRIPS, Traditional Knowledge and
Biodiversity: Overview of the Issues
In this chapter, I present an overview of the WTO'sTRIPSAgreement, the concerns it has
provoked regarding the ways in which so-called 'traditional knowledge' and
'biodiversity' have been incorporated into the agreement, and the debates that have
been taking place both inside and outside the WTO around these issues. Thesedebates
encompass themes such as the balance of rights and obligations that should be present
in intellectual property law, the most appropriate way to conceptualise the relationship
between humans and the natural world, and the nature of knowledge and intellectual
endeavour. These issues are complex and multi-faceted, and have been examined by
individuals and organisations around the world, including government officials,
journalists, academics and civil society organisations in the Global North and South, as
well as other international organisations (see e.g. GRAINand Kalpavriksh 2002: 13-16;
Halbert 2005: 163; May and Sell 2006: 195-197; Ragavan2001: 54-57; Sahai 2004: 61).
What we might call the 'TRIPS-traditional knowledge-biodiversity debates' are
embedded in a broader transnational conversation about intellectual property,
traditional knowledge and biodiversity and moves to incorporate them into structures of
global governance."
15 There are, for example, debates taking place on these issues in a number of other international
organisations, including the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) and the Andean community (CAN). The issues have also appeared in bilateral trade
agreements, such as the Peru-US Free Trade Agreement signed in 2006.
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The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I present an overview of the TRIPS
Agreement, the contested assumptions and principles underpinning it, and explain what
is meant by 'tradltional knowledge' and 'biodiversltv'. In the second, I outline the work
that has been carried out by the TRIPS Council, the WTO body charged with
administering and consider negotiating modifications to the TRIPSAgreement, on the
subject of traditional knowledge and biodiversity, and highlight some of the points of
tension and disagreement between WTO members on these issues. In the third, I
identify what can be considered the main strands of 'civil SOciety' debate on issues
relating to intellectual property, traditional knowledge and biodiversity. These issues
have been approached from a variety of theoretical, ideological and practical
perspectives, some of which accept the underlying assumptions of Western intellectual
property law, while others challenge them.
TRIPS, Traditional Knowledge and Biodiversity
The TRIPSAgreement is one of sixty agreements and decisions that were signed at the
end of the so-called Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations that took place
between 1986 and 1994,16 the result, according to Bernard Hoekman and Michel
Kostecki, of 'a trade-off made between IPRs[intellectual property rights] and the rest of
the Uruguay Round agenda' (2001: 298). The agreement came into force along with the
WTO itself on 1 January 1995, and is, according to the WTO, Ito date the most
comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property'_17 All WTO members
are required to ensure their intellectual property regimes conform to a number 0 f
standards set out in the agreement, although so-called 'Least Developed' countries have
been granted a transition period of up to 20 years to set up appropriate systems and
procedures." The agreement specifies the minimum standards of protection that
member governments are required to provide to different types of intellectual property,
including patents, copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs,
trade secrets and test data (Articles 9-40), as well as the enforcement procedures that
are expected to be in place {Articles 41-61).19 It also establishes that any concerns about
non-fulfilment of TRIPSobligations byWTO members can be pursued through the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Articles 63-64).
16 WTO (no date), 'WTO LegalTexts', available on-line:
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/legale.htm.
17 WTO (no date), 'Overview: the TRIPSAgreement', available on-line:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/inteI2e.htm.
18 For a list of 'Least Developed Countries' that are currently members or seeking membership of the
WTO, see: http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/org7e.htm.
19 The text of the TRIPSAgreement is available on-line: http://www.wto.org!english/docs e/legal e/27-
trips.pdf.
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The TRIPSAgreement is underpinned by a number of principles and assumptions, some
of them explicitly recognised and presented asevidence of fairness and good practice by
the WTO, some of them more implicit. The WTO tends to present TRIPSas embodying
the core WTO principles of 'national treatment' (the obligation to treat nationals of any
country in the same way as nationals of the country) and 'most favoured nation
treatment' (the obligation to treat nationals of all WTOmember states equally aswell as
nationals of a hypothetical 'most favoured nation'), as the agreement requires member
governments to offer the same level of protection to the 'intellectual property' of both
nationals and non-nanonals." TRIPSis also presented as part of a package of WTO
measures that ensure fairness and openness in international trade, through enforcing
the 'reduction of distortions and impediments to international trade', and 'ensuring that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade'.2l
This presentation of TRIPSas reducing 'distortions' and 'impediments' to legitimate
trade relies 0 n a number of more implicit assumptions, suc h as th e idea that free
international trade is always desirable, and that differences in the type and level of
intellectual property protection provided by WTO members distort and discourage free
trade. This discursive linking of intellectual property protection and free trade is
regarded by many as one of the most significant and troubling aspects of the TRIPS
Agreement (e.g. Drahos with Braithwaite 2002: 36; Barwa and Rai 2003: 96). Other
lrnpllclt assumptions include the similarly contested notion that ideas, innovations and
discoveries can be understood and treated as the private property of individuals or legal
entities such as corporations and research institutes (see e.g. May and Sell 2006: 175),
and the belief that elements of the natural world such as genes and seed varieties can
also be registered and treated as private property.
TRIPShas always been a particularly controversial trade agreement, and has attracted
significant scholarly, journalistic, NGO as well as government attention and criticism
since it came into force in 1995 (see e.g. Drahos 2004: 6; May 2006: 92; Wolfe 2004:
585). It has been described, for example, as the trade agreement which has caused the
South most acute 'collective loss' (Khor 2000), and presented as evidence that the WTO
'favours corporate profit over saving human lives' (Global Exchange2008: 2). It hasalso
been interpreted as evidence of underlying problems in the decision-making processes
in the GATTand WTO, and used by civil society actors and other critics, as one of my
interviewees, the director of a Geneva-basedNGO,put it, as 'a lever for a larger issue',
20 WTO (no date), 'Overview: the TRIPSAgreement',
http://www.wto.org!english/tratope/tripse/inteI2e.htm. Seealso May 2006: 95.
21 ibid.
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which was 'to show how opaque and secretive these GATI negotiations are and how ...
the right constituencies are not getting totally informed'. According to the director of
another Geneva-based NGO, 'it's one of these things that in retrospect I think was a
serious mistake. I think it undermined the political acceptance of the WTO in a very bad
way. And it really is a sort of neoliberal thinking at its worst. And so I think that TRIPS
was very unfortunate for the trading system'.
Alongside general concerns about the lack of transparency surrounding the GATI
negotiations, the logic of private ownership that TRIPSembodies and the balance of
rights it therefore protects, more specific sets of concerns have also emerged, including
the TRIPS-traditional knowledge-biodiversity debates.22 Traditional knowledge, in this
context, refers to the 'outcomes' of 'the practices of indigenous groups' (Drahos 2004:
6), particularly those that relate in some way to the natural world. Other terms used to
describe this category of knowledge include 'indigenous knowledge', 'folklore',
'indigenous intellectual property' and 'traditional ecological knowledge' (ibid.: 6).23
Concerns about the impact of Western intellectual property regimes on traditional
knowledge were already being expressed in the South in the early 1990s (interviews
with an Indian delegate to the WTO and a representative of Third World Network; see
also Outfield 2000: 278). Northern interest in these issuesgrew in the late 1990s, as a
number of cases of 'misappropriation' of traditional knowledge by North American,
European and Japanese companies came to light, such as the granting of a patent on
basmati rice to the Texan company RiceTecby the United States Patent Office in 1997
(see e.g. May and Sell 2006: 193), and other casesinvolving turmeric and neem (see e.g.
GRAINand Kalpavriksh 2002: 22; May and Sell 2006: 195; Ragavan2001: 11-12). Critical
legal scholars began to analyse and criticise the TRIPSAgreement for its bias against
non-Western forms of knowledge (e.g. Correa 2001, Outfield 2000, Gervais 2003). Other
commentators began to develop and use the concepts of 'biopiracy' and 'biocolonialism'
to refer to this patenting of Southern genetic resources by Northern corporations or
research institutes (see e.g. Halbert 2005: 139), and to critique Western intellectual
property law for its blindness to traditional knowledge and biodiversity. According to
Vandana Shiva, a scholar-activist from India:
22 Others include debates about TRIPSand public health, which culminated in an amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement in 2003 which permits WTO members to issue compulsory licences so as to be able to produce
generic versions of patented drugs for export to countries who declare 'public health emergencies' (see
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/implempara6e.htm). and more recently, debates about
TRIPSand food sovereignty (see e.g. Rajotte 2008), and IPRsand climate change (see e.g. Abbott 2009).
23 According to SaskiaVermeylen and her co-authors, using the term 'traditional knowledge' can also carry
'particular political messages, including criticizing Western approaches to development, protecting the
environment of a particular group, and highlighting an exploitative Western stance toward nature' (2008:
204).
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[T]he old colonial assumption of "Terra Nullius" or the empty earth has been
replaced by empty life - plants, animals, micro-organisms and humans
become "inventions" when their knowledge is discovered by Western
science or Western commercial interests, even if this knowledge has existed
for centuries in indigenous cultures.
(2000: 503; see also Kihwelo 2005: 349)
Interest in these themes reached something of a peak in 2002 to 2003, particularly in
Geneva, where regular strategy and discussion meetings took place involving NGOs such
as QUNO, CIEL and Oxfam, inter-governmental organisations such as the South Centre,
national delegates to the WTO and other invited experts (see also Matthews 2007:
1385). During this period, detailed research papers were commissioned from academics
and thinktanks around the world, and Southern delegates in particular worked on
developing joint negotiating strategies and positions in response to concerns about the
impact of TRIPS on Southern genetic resources (interviews with national delegates to
the WTO and representatives of Geneva-based NGOs). Debates have quietened down
considerably in Geneva since then, as discussions in the TRIPSCouncil on the issues have
reached something of an impasse, and NGOs and national delegates have focused more
on the ways in which TRIPS is being enforced globally (see e.g. ICTSO2009; Seuba 2009,
2010), and on analysing developments in WIPO's Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC).24
In Peru, however, civil society organisations are still examining the links between
Western intellectual property policy, traditional knowledge and biodiversity, and
developing projects and proposals that seek to protect traditional forms of knowledge in
the face of so-called biocolonialism or misappropriation by Western scientists and
corporations.
TRIPS Council Work on Traditional Knowledge and
Biodiversity
The TRIPS Council, the WTO body charged with monitoring and discussing potential
modifications to the TRIPSAgreement, has been discussing issues relating to traditional
knowledge and biodiversity since the late 1990s. A mandate to examine some of these
issues is built into one of the clauses of the agreement, Article 27.3(b). Article 27.3(b)
24 Various events have taken place on these issues in the past two years, including a workshop on
'Foresight into the Future of WIPO'sDevelopment Agenda', March 18-202010, in Nyon, Switzerland (see
http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/716681l and a dialogue on 'IP Offices and the Implementation of the
WIPO Development Agenda: Challenges and Opportunities, 18 September 2009, in Geneva (see
http:Uwww.iprsonline.org/ictsd/Dialogues/2009-09-18/Fina1%20document%20IP%200ffice%20event.pdf)
75
requires WTD members to provide some form of intellectual property protection to
plant varieties, either through patents or a so-called sui generis system, which has led to
it being described as 'the most controversial clause of the entire WTD agreement' (Sahai
2004: 60). The article itself states that '[tjhe provisions of this subparagraph shall be
reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTD Agreement,.25 TRIPS
came into force in 1995, and the review consequently began in 199926with the
submission of reports of national experiences and proposals about how and whether to
modify Article 27.3(b) from WTD membersY Topics and concerns raised in the course
of the review process have included the issue of whether TRIPSshould oblige members
to provide patents on forms of plant and animal life, the extent to which invented life-
forms should be patentable, concerns about Northern corporations and research
institutes applying for patents on traditional knowledge and genetic resources from the
South, and the potential conflict between TRIPSand the CBD.28The review of Article
27.3(b) has never been completed, and is still formally part of the ongoing business of
the TRIPSCouncil.
Further instructions to examine issues relating to Article 27.3(b) and what have come to
be known as the 'TRIPS-CBDissues' came in the shape of the 2001 Doha Ministerial
Declaration. During the Fourth WTD Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in 2001, a
number of trade ministers raised concerns about TRIPS,its treatment of traditional
knowledge, plant and human life, and about conflicts between the agreement and the
UN's Convention on Biological Diversity. These concerns were incorporated into the
Doha Ministerial Declaration, which serves as a framework for subsequent work and
negotiations in the WTD. Paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration29 instructs the TRIPS
Council:
in pursuing its work programme under the review of Article 27.3(b) ... to
examine inter alia the relationship between the TRIPSAgreement and the
CBD,the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore and other relevant
new developments raised by members pursuant to 71.1.30
25 The full text is available here: http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/legale.htm#TRIPs
26 WTO (no date), 'TRIPS:Reviews, Article 27.3(b) and Related Issues. Background and the Current
Situation', http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/art273bbackgrounde.htm.
27 seeWTOSecretariat note IP/C/W/368/Rev.1/Corr.1 for a list of documents submitted by members.
Available on-line: http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/art273be.htm.
28 SeeWTO (no date), 'TRIPS:Reviews, Article 27.3(b) and Related Issues. Background and the Current
Situation', http://www.wto.org!english/tratop e/trips e/art27 3b background e.htm for further details.
29 The full text of the Doha Ministerial Declaration is available here:
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min01e/mindecle.htm.
30 71.1 is another article of the TRIPSAgreement which mandates the TRIPSCouncil to review the
implementation of the whole TRIPSAgreement after a transitional period of indeterminate length has
passed.
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Paragraph 19 also reminds the TRIPSCouncil that the review of Article 27.3(b) should 'be
guided by the objectives and principles set out in articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement', which state that intellectual property rights should contribute to the
technology transfer and social and economic welfare (TRIPSArticle 7), and should 'fully
take into account the development dimension' (TRIPSArticle 8). Paragraph 12 of the
Doha Declaration also provides a mandate for discussion of the relationship between
TRIPSand the CSO,by instructing the various WTO Councils to continue working on all
remaining 'implementation-related issues and concerns raised by members', which
includes the TRIPS-CSOissues. With the Doha Declaration, examination of the
relationship between TRIPSand the CBDand the protection of traditional knowledge
and folklore thus became part of the TRIPSCouncil's formal work programme, with a
special mandate or instruction to ensure that the so-called 'development dimension', as
well as social and economic welfare more broadly, are considered in any discussions. At
the time of writing (May 2011), discussions in the TRIPSCouncil on the relationship
between TRIPSand the CSDand the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore
have still not reached a conclusion, and the issues remain part of the formal ongoing
work of the Council (seee.g. ICTSO2011a).
The TRIPSCouncil is formally composed of representatives of all WTO member states."
and chaired on a rotating basis by one of these representatives (the current chairperson
is from Paraguay). Meetings of the TRIPSCouncil are attended by national delegates to
the WTO and, on occasion, other experts in intellectual property or related matters
invited to attend as part of national delegations (interview with the director of a
Peruvian NGO), as well as staff from the WTO's Intellectual Property Division and other
international organisations that have been granted observer status, such as the World
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO),the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Work in the
TRIPSCouncil proceeds through WTO members submitting position papers and reports
on matters of concern, and negotiations taking place in line with the instructions and
mandate provided by formal agreements (in this case, Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS
Agreement and Paragraphs 12 and 19 of the Doha Declaration). Submissions to the
TRIPSCouncil relating to traditional knowledge and biodiversity and the so-called TRIPS-
CSDissuesover the past decade can be grouped into three broad categories: those that
contest the notion that TRIPSshould require member states to award and recognise
patents over any form of life; those that advocate modifying TRIPSso as to better
protect traditional knowledge and biodiversity; and those that argue that no changesto
the agreement are currently necessary.
31 see WTO (no date), 'The Work of the TRIPSCouncil'
(http://www.wto.org!english!tratope!tripse!inteI6e.htm) for further details.
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Member submissions that contest the idea that TRIPSshould require states to award
and respect patents on forms of life make up the smallest of these three categories. It is
mainly countries that make up the African Group in the WTO that have contested the
requirement to award patents on forms of life, although an earlier proposal from India
also contains elements of this position (see for example IP/C/W/161 para. 7),32 as does
the most recent submission from Bolivia, circulated in February 2010 (IP/C/W/545). The
main argument, in its strongest form, is that '[p]atents on life forms are unethical' and
'contrary to the moral and cultural norms of many societies in Members of the WTO',
and, as such, should not be required by the TRIPSAgreement (African Group 2003,
IP/C/W/404). This position, although very similar to many of the viewpoints expressed
within civil society debates in the early 2000s, has not been taken particularly seriously
in the TRIPSCouncil, and has never really been part of the formal debate. The African
Group now formally support the second category of submissions, which advocate
modifying TRIPSso as to better protect traditional knowledge and genetic resources as
forms of intellectual property.
Submissions advocating modifications to the TRIPSAgreement have been made by the
highest overall number of countries, including Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.
These countries have worked in increasingly close collaboration to develop arguments
and evidence in support of modifications. From an Indian submission in 1999 which first
raised the possibility of requiring 'disclosure of the country of origin of the biological
resource and associated knowledge' and 'equitable sharing of benefits' (IP/C/W/161
para. 7), to the draft modalities for ministerial negotiations drawn up in July 2008 in an
attempt to move Doha Round negotiations forward (TN/C/W/52),33 proposals in this
category have increasingly coalesced around the idea that TRIPS, in order to help
prevent misappropriation of traditional knowledge and genetic resources, needs to be
reformed in three ways. It is argued that TRIPSshould require patent applicants to,
firstly, disclose the origin of any traditional knowledge or genetic resources used in the
process of developing a new product to enable national patent offices to determine
32 These codes are the document identification codes allocated by the WTOSecretariat to position papers
and other formal submissions to the various WTO Councils, and can be used to search for the documents
in the WTO's on-line document library: http:Udocsonline.wto.orglgen search.asp?searchmode=simple.
The code 'IP', for example, indicates that the submission relates to 'Intellectual Property'; 'TN'-coded
documents relate to 'Trade Negotiations'.
33 The sponsors were: Albania, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, the European Communities, Iceland,
India, mdcnesie, the Kyrgyz Republic, liechtenstein, the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia, Pakistan,
Peru, Sri lanka, SWitzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the ACP[African, Caribbean and Pacific] Group and the
African Group. The ACPGroup is comprised of 79 countries
(http:Uwww.wto.org/english/newse/pres03e/pr358e.htm). and the African Group of 41 countries
(http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news05e/cotton19apriIOSe.htm). although some countries are
members of both the ACPand African groups.
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whether misappropriation of knowledge and resources or has taken place; to, secondly,
obtain and demonstrate 'prior informed consent' from the relevant authorities in the
country of origin to export and use the traditional knowledge and genetic resources in
question; and to, thirdly, demonstrate that fair and equitable benefit-sharing
arrangements have been put in place so that source communities receive a share of any
profits accrued on the basis of their knowledge.34 According to national delegates I
interviewed, over 110 countries (out of a total membership of 153) now formally
support modifying TRIPSso that it requires disclosure of origin and includes reference to
prior-informed consent and benefit sharing, making it the dominant position in the
TRIPSCouncil at present.
Submissions that dispute the need to modify the TRIPSAgreement have been made by
countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. Key
ideas presented include the argument that there is no inherent conflict between TRIPS
and the CBD;35that there is little evidence that national intellectual property systems
are ineffective at preventing and dealing with misappropriation of traditional knowledge
and genetic resources; and that until there is better understanding and evidence of the
problems, introducing additional international legislation is inappropriate.
36
It has also
been argued that other mechanisms, such as increased cooperation and information-
sharing between national patent offices or the creation of databases, are a more
effective way of preventing and dealing with misappropriation of traditional knowledge
and genetic resources than modifying the TRIPSAgreement."
Apart from the first category of submissions, members' proposals and positions in the
TRIPSCouncil, unlike some of the strands of the civil society debates discussed in the
34 See IP/C/M/24 para. 81, IP/C/M/25 paras. 78 and 87, IP/C/M/27 paras. 122 and 132, IP/C/M/28, paras.
135, 144 and 165, IP/C/M/29 paras. 146 and 148, IP/C/M/30 para. 169, IP/C/M/32 paras. 128 and 136,
IP/C/M/33 para. 121, IP/C/M/36/Add.1 paras. 203 208, 211, 212, 214, 217, 219, 227, 228 and 233,
IP/C/M/37/Add.1 paras. 231,229,237 and 239, IP/C/M/38 paras. 230 and 239, IP/C/M/39 para. 126,
IP/C/M/40 paras. 76-79, 81, 82, 84, 102, 107 and 121, IP/C/M/42 paras. 101, lOS, 113, 114 and 119,
IP/C/M/45 para. 25, IP/C/M/46 paras. 57, 67 and 81, IP/C/M/47 paras. 49, 51, 57, 63, 68,79 and 80,
IP/C/M/49 paras. 86-90,134-146,154, and 159, IP/C/W/163, IP/C/W/195, IP/C/W/198, IP/C/W/206,
IP/C/W/228, IP/C/W/356, IP/C/W/403, IP/C/W/404, IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, TN/C/W/52 para. 4.
35 See TRIPSCouncil Communications IP/C/M/25 para. 93, IP/C/M/26 para. 77, IP/C/M/36/Add.1 para.
222, IP/C/M/37/Add.1, para. 232, IP/C/M/38 para. 236, IP/C/M/39 para. 137, IP/C/M/40 paras. 100, 101
and 115, IP/C/M/42 paras. 104 and 109, IP/C/M/43 para. 55, IP/C/M/46 paras. 52, 53, 61 and 62,
IP/C/M/47 paras. 55, 66 and 69, IP/C/M/48 paras. 84 and 86 and Secretariat Report IP/C/W/368/Rev.1
paras. 8 and 11.
36 See TRIPSCouncil Communications IP/C/M/40 para. 101 and 115, IP/C/M/46 paras. 55, 61 and 65,
IP/C/M/47 paras. 54 and 66 and Secretariat Report IP/C/W/368/Rev.1 para. 11.
37 See TRIPSCouncil Communications IP/C/M/40 paras.101 and 115 Secretariat Report IP/C/W/368/Rev.1
para. 11.
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following section, largely take Western intellectual property concepts and assumptions
as a framework for discussion. The main source of tension and disagreement within the
TRIPSCouncil relates to the question of whether modifications that also work within the
logic of Western intellectual property regimes are necessary. At the time of writing,
countries that support modifications to TRIPSare still trying to gather additional
evidence and strategic support in an attempt to convince their opponents to accept the
suggested changes. The outcome of discussions on TRIPS,traditional knowledge and
biodiversity in the WTO is not simply dependent on convincing opponents in the TRIPS
Council of the benefits or necessity of any particular position, however. The so-called
TRIPS-CBDissues are just one of over 20 issues that are being discussed as part of the
Doha Round negotiations, and all members must agree on all issues as a 'single
undertaking' for the round to be concluded." The outcome of this work on traditional
knowledge and biodiversity is thus also dependent on the outcome of other discussions,
as member governments seek to optimise the benefits gained and minimise the
concessionsmade across the whole packageof negotiating issues.
Main Strands of Civil Society Debate
While discussions in the TRIPSCouncil on TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity
have focused increasingly narrowly on proposals to modify TRIPSso as to require
disclosure of origin, prior informed consent and benefit-sharing, civil society debates on
these issueshave been much broader and more complex. This is particularly true in so-
called 'mega-diverse' countries with large indigenous populations who identify
themselves as targets of biopiracy or misappropriation of knowledge, such as Brazil,
India and Peru (see Halbert 2005: 153-161). Although some strands of these civil society
debates overlap with and feed into discussions in the TRIPSCouncil, others challenge
and question many of the assumptions that have come to be taken for granted by
national delegations to the WTO, including those who consider themselves to be
representing the interests oftheir national 'civil societies'.
One of the strands of debate that most challenges the discussionsand work taking place
in the TRIPSCouncil centres around the notion that neither traditional knowledge nor
biodiversity are things that, from a moral perspective, can be privately owned, and as
such, have no place in Western intellectual property systems. The argument has taken a
variety of forms and has been approached from a variety of ideological and
epistemological perspectives. In its simplest form, the argument states that patents on
38 Many commentators think this is looking increasingly unlikely to happen soon (see e.g. ICTSD 2011a,
2011b, 2011c).
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forms of life are morally wrong, and that the TRIPSAgreement should not oblige
member states to award and recognise patents on any form of life (this mirrors the
position presented by the African Group, India and, more recently, Bolivia in the TRIPS
Council). As a representative of an international NGOwith a base in Genevaexplained:
We take a position that there should be a limit to what you can patent and
what you cannot patent. So we have a position, animals, plants, even
microorganisms, we campaign to amend the TRIPSAgreement to say, why
should you allow microorganisms to be patented .., in fact we're talking to
some of our NGOfriends about the need to actually revive the campaign on
no patents on life.
More complex versions of the argument have been articulated from Marxist, post-
colonial, environmentalist and indigenous perspectives, of which there are many - as
Deborah Halbert has noted, 'it is a grave mistake to believe that Indigenous groups
speakwith a single voice and thus there is a politics to who is recognised as representing
a specific Indigenous group for the purposes of negotiation' (2005: 144). Marxist
versions of the argument, for example, read recent moves to incorporate traditional
knowledge and biodiversity into Western intellectual property regimes as an attempt to
commoditise new objects and arenas, as part of a larger project to facilitate the
expansion of global capitalism.39 Bronwyn Parry, for example, characterises the TRIPS
Agreement as a 'most effective instrument for disciplining and monopolising objects and
phenomena that have, until now, remained outside the grasp of global capital' (2002:
699), and views the agreement as one of a number of global regulatory regimes that
'facilitate the pursuit of particular interests and sustain relations of domination' (ibid.:
698). David Harvey takes the argument a stage further: he seesTRIPSasa mechanismof
'accumulation by dispossession' (2005: 147), which feeds global capitalism by opening
up new areas and possibilities for capitalist accumulation through dispossessing
communities of their existing rights and property. As he argues:
The emphasis upon intellectual property rights in the WTO negotiations (the
so-called TRIPSAgreement) points to ways in which the patenting and
licensing of genetic material, seed plasma, and all manner of other products
can now be used against populations whose practices had played a crucial
role in the development of those materials. Biopiracy is rampant and the
pillaging of the world's stockpile of genetic resources is well under way to
the benefit of a few large pharmaceutical companies.
(2005: 147-8)
Discussions in the TRIPSCouncil which focus on proposals to modify TRIPSso as to
require patent applicants to disclose the origin of traditional knowledge and genetic
39 It has also been argued that the types of IPRs enshrined in TRIPSare themselves a product of the history
of capitalist expansion In Europe (May 2007: 2).
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resources used in the development of an invention, or to demonstrate that prior
informed consent has been sought and suitable benefit-sharing arrangements have been
established, are seen, from this perspective, as unhelpful and in fact further contributing
to commoditisation and dispossession. As an interviewee in another Geneva-basedNGO
put it, 'even if the WTO miraculously listens to all these well-meaning proposals, and
adds all these different amendments into the TRIPSAgreement, you'll end up with
something that simply legalises the system. Yes,ok, it makes the terms a bit better. But
at the same time it's still commodifying, essentially, biodiversity and knowledge.'
Post-colonial versions of the argument share many of the concerns of the Marxist
critiques, but focus particularly on the ways in which TRIPS permits practices and
behaviours which benefit Western scientists and corporations to the disadvantage of
communities and countries in the Global South. They explore the ways, for example, in
which TRIPS and Western intellectual property models permit and facilitate the
misappropriation or theft of Southern resources and knowledge by Northern capital and
interests. Vandana Shiva has argued that Western intellectual property regimes
'facilitate piracy of the indigenous knowledge and biodiversity of Third World countries',
and 'make northern countries into the monopoly owners of knowledge, including
knowledge that has evolved cumulatively and collectively in indigenous cultures' (2000:
501). She regards patents and intellectual property rights more generally as
'instruments of conquest' (ibid.: SOl), where '[t]he cloak of reward to inventiveness
hides the real object-the control over the global economy' (ibid.: 502). P.-F. Kihwelo
similarly argues that the TRIPSAgreement 'significantly benefits the multinational
companies of the rich North at the expense of indigenous communities of the poor
South' (2005: 357), as it fails to recognise traditional forms of knowledge as legitimate,
despite them being 'sought after by hook and by crook and stolen to be stored in the
citadels of Western European institutions of higher learning and scientific research'
(ibid.: 347). Interviewees in Peruvian civil society organisations gave numerous
examples of traditional knowledge and genetic resources they feel have been stolen or
misappropriated by Northern interests. The president of one NGOtold me:
Por ejemplo el Peru, todo el mundo sabe que es el centro de origen de la
papa. Eso esta conocido ahora por todo el mundo. lQue pasarla si el
0.001%de toda la producclon de papas a nivel mundial sea proporcionado al
pais? Este pais no tendrfa la pobreza que tiene en los Andes, donde se ha
domesticado estas papas, y de donde provienen todas esas variedades que
actualmente existen al nivel mundial.
Peru, for example, everybody knows that Peru is the centre of origin of the
potato. Everybody recognises this now. What would happen if 0.001% of
the production of potatoes globally was sent to this country? This country
would not have the poverty that it has in the Andes, where these potatoes
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were domesticated, and where all these varieties come from that now exist
around the world.
He also told me about a Scandinaviancompany that was reportedly granted a patent on
a product developed from the breast milk of a woman living in the Amazon region of
Peru, and has been able to market and sell the product, without any benefits flowing
back to the woman or community where she lives. There is dearly a perception that
Western patent systems are unjust and work against the interests of individuals and
communities in Peru, based on the profits made by Northern scientists, companies and
interests on the basis of communities' knowledge and genetic resources. The
assumption that Western intellectual property mechanisms and models are the only way
to register and 'protect' traditional knowledge and biodiversity, present in discussionsin
the TRIPSCouncil, has also been criticised as reflecting a colonialist mentality and
worldview. As Halbert has noted, fit is important to recognise that Indigenous peoples
have developed alternative property models and that, by refusing to recognise
alternative and pre-existing property models, Western interests are again engaged in a
colonising property grab' (2005: 139).
Indigenous versions of the argument against patents on traditional knowledge and
biodiversity tend to be rooted in indigenous cosmology and philosophy, and reflect
understandings of nature, knowledge and the role of human beings in relation to the
natural world that are radically different to those underpinning Western intellectual
property law. Indigenous associations contest, for example, the way in which Western
intellectual property law conceptualises knowledge as a series of disconnected units
which can be attributed to the intellectual efforts of one individual or legal entity. This
conceptualisation does not reflect, they argue, the way in which knowledge is created
and transmitted collectively, in connection and collaboration with other individuals,
communities and the natural world itself. As Halbert puts it, '[i]ndigenous leaders argue
that knowledge is not divided into discrete packagesor individual rights, but represents
the knowledge of the group as a whole and their connection to the larger world around
them' (2005: 159). The way in which Western intellectual property law treats
knowledge as an object that can be transferred between owners and thus alienated
from its original setting and creators is also seen to be at odds with indigenous customs
and traditions (ibid: 160). As the director of an indigenous association in the Peruvian
Andes explained to me:
Nosotros aca trabajamos con una visi6n no-patentes, sobre formas de vida.
Porque pensamos que, es un argumento tamblen conocido, nosotros
pensamos que es correcto, de que el conocimiento tradicional y los recursos
asociados con recursos genetlcos y biol6gicos forman una unidad que tu no
puedes separar... Esoesta en total contradicci6n 0 confusi6n a las patentes
de invenciones.
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We work here from a 'no patents on forms of life' perspective. Becausewe
think that, it's a well-known argument in fact, we think that the traditional
knowledge and resources associated with genetic and biological resources
are a unit that can't be separated... It completely contradicts the idea of
patents on inventions.
Patents, and the possibility of 'owning' traditional knowledge and elements of the
natural world, are thus seen to be completely at odds with traditional ways of
conceptual ising, creating and sharing knowledge in indigenous communities, and
grounds for suspicion about government efforts to protect traditional knowledge and
biodiversity through the patent system.
Indigenous opposition to patents and Western intellectual property law more generally
also has a strong spiritual element. What Western intellectual property law terms
'traditional knowledge' is frequently understood by the communities or individuals who
possessit or use it as something sacred and part of their spiritual and cultural heritage.
Indigenous communities in Peru tend to understand their knowledge of the natural
world as something which is shared by and itself part of the pacha mama, the spiritual
entity which represents the Earth. As one NGOprogramme director explained to me:
En la Amazonia, en la selva, especialmente 0 basicarnente el conocimiento
de muchas plantas medicinales esta asociado principalmente con la
espiritualidad, con su cosmovisi6n. Entonces el tema de la pacha mama, la
identidad esta tamblen vinculada con varios elementos.
In the Amazon, in the jungle, especially or basically the knowledge of many
medicinal plants is mainly associated with spirituality, with their
cosmovislon.f So the theme of the pacha mama, the theme of identity is
also linked with various elements.
Interviewees in Peru frequently talked about the importance of their Andean
cosmovision or worldview ('cosmovisi6n andina') to their way of understanding and
being in the world, and how patents and the Western understandings of nature and
property they invoke contradict and violate this cosmovision. In Andean cosmovision,
the natural world is considered to be a living entity, with its own spirits and rhythms,
which human beings should respect, value and nurture as part of a reciprocal
relationship. As the same interviewee put it:
La naturaleza se ve como una cosa viva. Dicen esta es la tierra, pues esta es
la pacha mama. Esta es nuestra pacha mama, nuestra madre. Esta es la que
40 This is sometimes translated as 'worldview' (e.g. Vidal 2011), but more commonly as 'cosmovision',
particularly in anthropological literature on the Andean region aswell as in the activist literature (e.g.
Gonzalesand Gonzalez 2010; Gonzales, Chambi and Machaca 1998; Ishizawa 2006; Marglin 1995).
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nos da comida. Nos da vida, nos protege. Entonces por 10tanto hay que
reciprocar, hay que saludar, hay que dar algunos rituales, hay que darle para
que ella nos siga dando mayor produccion ... 5e ve con carlfio la naturaleza,
la tierra. As; se comportan ellos, con mucho caritio.
They see nature as a living thing. They say this is the earth, this is the pacha
mama. This is our pacha mama, our mother. This is what gives us food. It
gives us life, it protects us. 50 we have to reciprocate, we have to pay
homage to it, we have to follow our rituals, we have to give something back
so it keeps producing well for us .., They have a lot of affection for nature, for
the earth. This is how they act, with a lot of affection.
Knowledge relating to the use or care of biodiversity is regarded as part of this
respectful, caring and reciprocal relationship with the natural world, and is closely
bound up with particular rituals and other cultural and spiritual practices. Terms like
'traditional knowledge' and 'genetic resources' do little to reflect the way in which
indigenous communities understand the practices and customs which carry and transmit
their knowledge. The director of a rural development association told me, for example,
that the association's primary goal is to: 'fortalecer la cosrnovislon andina de los
criadores de agrobiodiversidad y los saberesde crianza dedmos nosotros, 10que lIaman
pues este conocimiento tradicional' (to strengthen the Andean cosmovision of those
who nurture agro-biodiversity and the know-how relating to these nurturing processes,
as we say, what they [legal experts, government officials, international organisations]
refer to as traditional knowledge). The vocabulary used reflects an entirely different
conception of nature and knowledge to that underpinning Western intellectual property
systems. The noun 'crianza', for example, and the associatedverb 'criar', are not usually
applied to plants, but to animals and children, in the sense of 'raising' or 'nurturing' an
animal or child. As another interviewee, a non-indigenous journalist and consultant
working on issuesrelating to biodiversity and indigenous rights, told me:
Ellos hablan de la crianza de la naturaleza. No hablan de recursos, sino
hablan de crianzas. Cuando te hablan de una planta, te dicen las crianzas.
Entonces yo intentaba entender porque se llama crianza. Y clare, crianza
lrnpllca respeto, carifio, acompanamiento. Hay una vision holistlca que yo
creo que es parte de esto.
They [indigenous communities] talk about nurturing nature. They don't talk
about resources, but they talk about crianzas. When they talk to you about
a plant, they say crianzas. And so I was trying to understand why is it called
a crianza? And of course, crianza implies respect, affection, companionship.
There's a holistic vision that I think is part of this.
These debates about spirituality, culture and identity, and the ways in which patents on
forms of life and Western intellectual property regimes more generally conflict with
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indigenous cosmologies and philosophy, scarcely feature in the TRIPSCouncil discussions
outlined in the previous section, and do not seem to feed into the Peruvian
government's position and discussions on traditional knowledge and biodiversity either.
This strand of the civil society debate, although prominent amongst indigenous and
peasant associations in Peru, has not reverberated in official discourse and debate.
Alongside these strands of thinking that in one way or another challenge the idea that
TRIPSshould permit private ownership of traditional knowledge and biodiversity,
another cluster of debates has focused on questions such as what it means to protect
traditional knowledge, what exactly requires protection and what the rationale for this
protection is. These debates have focused on a broader array of issues, concerns and
possible solutions than the increasingly narrow debates in the TRIPSCouncil, and have
been approached from a greater variety of perspectives and understandings of what
protection might entail and what the object of protection should be. A strand of the
critical academic debate, for example, has focused on what makes traditional knowledge
distinctive as a category of knowledge, and whether patents and Western-style
intellectual property regimes can ever be an appropriate instrument with which to
protect it. According to Matthias Leistner, Western intellectual property law has a 'built-
in bias that protects individual inventions rather than collective developments or even
"traditions of innovation'" (2004: 58; see also Outfield 2000: 274; Vermeylen et al 2008:
202). Traditional knowledge thus tends to fall outside the field of visibility of Western
intellectual property regimes, as it is typically generated and shared within and between
communities in a collective, fluid and open manner. Scholars have also focused on the
tendency in Western intellectual property regimes to conceptualise and treat knowledge
as either patentable private property, or part of the intellectual commons and thus
freely available (Outfield 2000: 285), a distinction which leaves traditional knowledge
vulnerable, as neither option provides suitable protection to forms of knowledge which
are collectively produced but not freely circulated beyond the communities which
produce them. The narrow focus of Western intellectual property law has also been
criticised for failing to recognise and provide mechanisms to protect many forms of
traditional knowledge, including 'spiritual beliefs, methods of governance, languages,
human remains and biological and genetic resources in their natural state' (Gervais
2003: 407). These types of concerns, like the spiritual and cultural elements discussed
above, have also not been raised or addressed in the TRIPSCouncil, where discussions
have generally proceeded in a way which takes Western intellectual property concepts
and frameworks for granted.
Other strands of debate, as well as work carried out by civil society associations and
other international organisations, have conceptualised issues relating to the protection
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of traditional knowledge and biodiversity in a more complex way than the discussionsin
the TRIPSCouncil. While discussions in the TRIPSCouncil have focused on traditional
knowledge relating to biodiversity and so-called genetic resources, and attempts to
modify the way in which patents are awarded on this type of traditional knowledge,
discussions in WIPO and elsewhere have been much broader in scope. As the director of
a Geneva-basedNGOput it:
In the TRIPSAgreement what is being sought is very narrow and specific, it's
to address the questions around erroneous patents being granted, and to
address questions where patents are granted, benefit-sharing, questions
around prior informed consent. So it's only in the case where patents are
involved. While the larger traditional knowledge question is a larger
question about protecting traditional knowledge, where in fact the
protection might have nothing to do with patents, it might be a new system
of protection, or several types of protection.
Discussions in WIPO have, for example, have included consideration of so-called
'traditional cultural expressions' (TCEs)or 'expressions of folklore' as well as traditional
knowledge relating to genetiC resources, and official descriptions of the work being
carried out in WIPO refer to traditional forms of knowledge as 'cultural assets of
indigenous and local communities and their countries,.41 Indeed, the committee in
WIPOcharged with examining issuesrelating to intellectual property law and traditional
knowledge is called the 'Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore' (commonly shortened to IGC),
reflecting this broader conceptualisation of what it is exactly that needs protecting.
Some legal scholars have also framed debates about intellectual property, traditional
knowledge and biodiversity as a cultural protection issue. P.-F. Kihwelo, for example,
categorises the protection of what he calls 'indigenous knowledge' as 'a cultural heritage
property right which we must correspondingly protect and share equitably in the
interest of all humankind' (2005: 348). Craig Borowiak, similarly, characterises the
expansion of intellectual property rights into domains such as plant and seedvarieties as
'a threat to [the] autonomy and established ways of life' of farmers in developing
countries (2004: 512) and 'a major blow to food security and cultural autonomy' (ibid.:
520). Concerns about the lack of consideration or recognition of cultural issuesin official
debates have also been part of indigenous debates in Peru: asone interviewee put it, 'se
habla de la Amazonia, de sus recursos, de su gran biodiversidad, pero no se habla nunca
de la biodiversidad cultural ni de los conocimientos que tienen esos pueblos' {they talk
about the Amazon, about its resources, about its great biodiversity, but they never talk
41 SeeWIPO (no date), 'Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resourcesand Traditional Cultural
Expressions/Folklore', http://www.wipo.int/tk/en.
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about cultural biodiversity or the knowledge these peoples have). Suchcomplaints have
much in common with the debates about the way in which patents conflict with
indigenous culture and spirituality discussedabove, as both sets of concerns stem from
a sense that cultural difference is not recognised or valued in official discourse and
policy relating to indigenous populations.
Given indigenous associations' concerns about the assumptions underpinning Western
intellectual property systems, and the value placed on indigenous values, culture and
cosmologies in their work on traditional knowledge and biodiversity, it is not surprising
that indigenous associations and organisations working with them have developed very
different understandings of what it means to protect traditional knowledge and
biodiversity than those being discussed in the TRIPSCouncil. Generally speaking,
representatives of these indigenous associations understand protection to mean much
more than simply developing and applying appropriate intellectual property instruments
(although they are not necessarily opposed to this being part of a broader project to
protect knowledge). Protection is understood to involve, for example, activities such as
recuperating and revalorising traditional practices, customs and ways of seeing and
understanding the world, and ensuring that indigenous forms of knowledge are taught
and presented as equally valid as Western forms of knowledge in Peruvian schools and
colleges. When I asked one NGO programme director about indigenous communities'
concerns about traditional knowledge, he told me that:
Ensus agendas sf esta presente, justamente se habla en sus agendas, en sus
reuniones, de nuestros conocimientos, nuestra sabldurla, nuestras plantas
medicinales, hay que recuperar todo 10 que son los conocimientos en la
salud, por ejemplo. Hay muchas experiencias que por 10 menos sl estan
recuperando, por 10 menos en cuanto a la salud, incluso de plantas. Hay
medicos, parteras, hay pequefios hospitales, promovido de manera
autonoma por ellos. Por ejemplo en Ecuador, hay farmacias de esta
naturaleza, hay pequefias cHnicas, en convenio con el estado pues por
ejemplo.
It is part of their agenda, in their meetings they do talk about our knowledge,
our Wisdom, our medicinal plants, we have to recover all our knowledge
relating to health, for example. There are many practices they are trying to
recover, at least with regards to health and medicinal plants. There are
doctors and midwives, there are little hospitals that they've promoted
autonomously. For example in Ecuador, there are pharmacies like this, there
are small clinics, in agreement with the state.
Protection and defence of traditional knowledge is clearly associated, for this individual
and the communities he describes, with practical projects and practices that ensure
traditional ways of knowing and using biodiversity are kept alive, and transmitted and
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made available to future generations. The president of another indigenous association,
when asked about activities being carried out to protect traditional knowledge, told me
about projects designed to 'rescatar' (recover) traditional knowledge relating to the use
of plants in traditional medicine. The director of a peasants' association in the Peruvian
Andes told me about efforts to record traditional agricultural practices and rituals using
digital video recorders to ensure this knowledge remains available to future generations.
For many indigenous associations, the debate is thus not so much about developing
intellectual property mechanisms that can better protect traditional knowledge, but
about broader efforts to ensure cultural recognition and validation. As the director of
another indigenous association put it, 'esa parte de la cosmovisi6n indigena tiene que
ser legitim ada dentro de un sistema legal jurfdicamente reconocido' (this indigenous
cosmovision must be legitimated within a legal system which is legally recognised): the
focus, for her, should not be on trying to incorporate traditional knowledge into the logic
of Western intellectual property systems, but on adapting Western intellectual property
systems such as TRIPSso that they recognise, value and protect the logics and practices
of indigenous cultures.
Conclusion
Debates about traditional knowledge, biodiversity and the WTO's Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)Agreement are, as this chapter has tried to show,
complex, messy and multifaceted. They have emerged and evolved across multiple
settings and venues, including the formal, institutional setting of the WTO's TRIPS
Council, as well as countless civil society workshops, meetings and publications,
academic publications and government discussions in both the Global North and South.
While discussions in the TRIPSCouncil have focused increasingly narrowly on the
question of whether and how the TRIPSAgreement should be modified to require
patent applicants to reveal the origin of any traditional knowledge or biodiversity used
in their inventions and ensure prior informed consent and benefit-sharing have been
arranged, discussions elsewhere have been much broader in scope, and have
conceptualised the issues at stake in a number of alternative ways. Key strands of
debate have included consideration of how desirable or appropriate it is to allow and
encourage patents on forms of life and traditional forms of knowledge, and the negative
consequences of making knowledge and biodiversity subject to private property law;
discussion of what it means to protect traditional knowledge and biodiversity; and
consideration of whether intellectual property law offers the most suitable instruments
to protect these collectives forms of knowledge and associated genetic resources. It is
worth bearing in mind that the perspectives of indigenous communities and indigenous
associations are those that diverge the most from official discourse and discussions in
the TRIPSCouncil. Although not all indigenous representatives are completely opposed
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to efforts to modify the TRIPSAgreement so as to require disclosure of origin, prior
informed consent and benefit-sharing, indigenous understandings of the issues
surrounding traditional knowledge are the most challenging to the assumptions
underpinning TRIPSand the most absent from official discussions.
In the following three chapters, I turn my attention to the field of activity in which
interactions take place between representatives of 'global civil societv' and the WTO. I
analyse, in turn, the regime of truth and visibility, technologies of government, and
preferred forms of subjectivity that work to govern the field of possible of action within
it. I return to these debates about TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity in
Chapter 7, and examine the ways in which the forms of rationality, technologies of
government and preferred subjectivity limit what is sayable and the kinds of
perspectives that are considered legitimate in the field of civil society-WTO interaction.
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Chapter Four
Knowing Global Civil Society: A
Regime of Truth and Visibility
In this chapter, I focus on the forms of knowledge and visibility that have emerged
within the WTO in relation to 'global civil society', and to the kind of interaction that is
understood to be possible and/or desirable between this 'global civil society' and the
WTO. These forms of knowledge and visibility underpin and are (re)produced by the
various practices and procedures that constitute and structure the field of civil society-
WTO interactions. They permit, support and feed into the techniques and technologies
of government that work to keep activity in this social field within acceptable limits
(examined in Chapter Five), and the processesof subjectification and preferred forms of
subjectivity that are considered legitimate and appropriate within it (examined in
Chapter Six). They shape WTO representatives' responses to civil society organisations,
and, in doing so, are part of a broader 'regime of government' (Dean 1999: 32; Gottweis
2003: 252) that structures the possibilities of action of individuals and organisations that
seekto interact with the WTO.
The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first, I identify and discuss four basic
discourses that permeate and shape Secretariat and delegates' responses to 'global civil
society': the discourse of 'civil society can contribute'; the discourse of 'civil society must
be informed'; the discourse of 'civil society is confusing'; and the discourse of 'global civil
society is not that relevant'. Although there are traces of older discourses present
within the WTO, such asa 'civil society is dangerous' discourse which feeds on memories
of the 1999 Seattle protests and positions 'global civil society' as violent and unruly,
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these four basic discourses have come, I argue, to dominate both Secretariat staff and
national delegates' understandings of the role 'global civil society' can play in the WTO/s
activities. In the second section, I reflect on the particular regime of visibility and
invisibility that emerges through the combination and intersection of these discourses. I
argue that certain kinds of organisation, namely those that maintain a permanent
physical presence in Geneva, contribute what is recognised as technical expertise and
use trade-friendly vocabularies and frameworks, are rendered more visible and
perceived asmore legitimate participants in dialogue than others.
Knowing Global Civil Society: The Four Basic Discourses
WTO Secretariat officials and national delegates who define and enact the WTO/s
relationship with global civil society tend to conceptualise 'global civil society' and the
kind of relationship it can and/or should have with the WTO in a number of relatively
systematic and coherent ways. Interviewees' accounts a nd rationalisations of their
dealings with civil society organtsattons, as well as official WTO documentation and
speeches made by Pascal LamYI WTO Director-General, emphasise several common
elements, ideas and loglcs, such as the notion that civil SOciety organisations can
contribute to the WTO/s work and activities. There are now, I argue, four basic
discourses that underpin and are reproduced through Secretariat officials' and
delegates' responses to civil society organisations (with little difference between
Secretariat offlclals' and delegates' accounts): what I have called the discourse of 'civil
society can contribute': the discourse of 'civil society must be informed'; the discourse
of 'civil society is confusing': and the discourse of 'global civil society is not that
relevant'. Some of these discourses incorporate elements and ideas that are present in
the scholarly literature on 'global civil society and its role in global governance
discussed in Chapter One; others rely more on practical experience and accumulated
practical knowledge.42 There are also traces of older discourses present, such as what
we might call a 'civil SOciety is dangerous' discourse, which draws on memories of
protests such as those that accompanied the WTO Ministerial meetings in Geneva in
1998 and Seattle in 19991 and positions 'global civil societv' as violent and irresponsible.
According to an interviewee in the Secretariat's Information and External Relations
Dlvislon, it took officials in other divisions 'a while to figure out that actually we don't
work with aliens, we don't work with people from another planet.' As the same
interviewee put tt, 'a lot has changed' in the past five years in the field of civil society-
42 TheWTOSecretariat provides no formal training or guidance about 'civil society' to its staff, and
national delegates are often left to use their own judgement about the kind of relationship to have with
civil society organisations in Geneva, with little instruction about this from their governments. Practical,
individually generated and accumulated knowledge is thus relatively important in the generation and
maintenance of these ways of thinking.
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WTO interactions, as both WTO and civil society representatives and have become ever
more accustomed to interacting with each other, and the 'civil society is dangerous'
discourse has mostly been supplanted by the other four discourses. These four
discourses place the question of how to interact with representatives of 'global civil
society' within a particular 'interpretive optic' (Hansen 2006: 6), which shapes WTO
responses to civil society organisations and makes some of these organisations more
visible and prominent than others.
Civil Society Can Contribute
The first dominant way of thinking about 'global civil society' and its relationship to the
WTO focuses on the contribution that civil society organisations can make to the WTO's
work and overall mission. This discourse of 'civil society can contribute' permeates WTO
documentation and sections of the WTO website which deal with the organisation's
external relations, and is frequently invoked by WTO Secretariat officials at events
involving civil society organisations and other members of the public. Coverageof the
annual Public Forums on the WTOwebsite, for example, often alludes to the idea that
NGOs and other kinds of civil society organisations can and should contribute to the
work carried out within the WTO. In the introduction to the section of the website
dedicated to the 2010 Public Forum, for instance, Pascal Lamy presents the Public
Forums as an opportunity for representatives of civil society organisations to contribute
to the work of the WTO. As he puts it:
An increasing number of stakeholders are having their say in shaping the
world's economic and political environment. The three days of the WTO
Public Forum are dedicated to them. Representatives of civil society
organizations, business groups, trade unions, academics and many others
will have an opportunity to engage in open discussions, raise issues of
interest to them and contribute towards the work of the WTO.
43
He concludes the introduction by urging participants at the Forum to make the most of
this opportunity to contribute: 'I am confident that, through your active engagement
and participation, this year's discussion will prove to be both stimulating and thought-
provoking.' Similarly, in the introduction to the pages on the 2009 Public Forum, Lamy
positions civil society as an active and needed contributor to the ongoing work and
negotiating agenda of the WTO:
As in previous years, the Public Forum provides you with the opportunity to
voice your opinions on any aspect of the multilateral trading system. And
43 WTO (no date), 'WTO Public Forum 2010: liThe ForcesShapingWorld Trade",
http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/publicforum10e/publicforum10e.htm.
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this year, at a time of economic crisis, your contribution is needed more than
ever aswe come together to seek global solutions to global problems."
lamy's opening speeches at previous Public Forums draw on similar ideas and
constructions. At the 2007 Public Forum, for example, he told the audience of NGO
representatives, academics, students and staff at other international institutions to 'let
me be clear, the WTO is looking for your contribution, it needs you to help shape its
agenda'," before mentioning a number of issueswhere civil society can be seen to have
contributed positively to the WTO's work, including the 2003 amendment to TRIPS
designed to improve access to medicines, negotiations on fisheries subsidies, and
connections between trade and the environment. At the 2008 Public Forum he invoked
similar ideas, calling on 'civil society to continue bringing its ideas and solutions forward.
It is only with your active participation that the WTO can come to reflect the type of
institution you seek for the future.,46 The official WTO narrative around the Public
Forums thus draws heavily on the notion that the appropriate relationship between civil
society and the WTO is one in which civil society contributes ideas and suggestions to
the WTD's agenda.
The discourse of 'civil societv can contribute' also appears in national delegates'
interpretations and conceptualisations of their interactions with 'global civil society'.
The Geneva-based NGOs have established something of a reputation among national
delegates as organisers of workshops, seminars and working lunches that help
particularly developing country delegates understand and explore issues relating to
ongoing negotlanons," and as providers of technical assistance and support. These
workshops and seminars are packaged as opportunities for delegates and other
interested parties to explore and find solutions to negotiating problems, and to develop
their awareness and understanding of complex negotiating issues. According to a
member of staff in one of the Geneva-based organisations most known for providing
solid, reliable information and support to national delegates, 'what we're trying to do is
facilitate a better understanding of the problem, we're trying to contribute a better
conceptualisation of the issues, and in that way try to see what the solutions are'.
Developing country delegates I interviewed repeatedly praised these events and the
level of understanding generated through attending and participating in them,
emphasising the ways in which these interactions with civil societv organisations
44 WTO (no date), 'WTO Public 2009: "Global Problems, Global Solutions: Towards Better Global
Governance", http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/publicforum09e/publicforum09e.htm
45 The text of the 2007 speech is available here:
http://www.wto.org/english/newselspple/sppI73e.htm
46 The text of the 2008 speech is available here:
http://www.wto.org/english/newselspple/sppllOle.htm
47 I outline the various spaces of civil society-WTO interaction and highlight the role of the Geneva-based
NGOsin maintaining certain spaces in Chapter Five.
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contributed to their awareness of relevant issues and details, and ultimately their
negotiating positions. One delegate, for example, told me how 'civil society played a big
role' in developing and defending a position on what are referred to in the WTO as the
TRIPS-CBDissues. As he put it:
they helped me a lot, since I arrived, to understand the issue, and
afterwards, to discusswith real experts on IP [intellectual property] and to
understand and present and to even draft the papers that we have
presented, so all the work there is basically because, I mean delegates alone
cannot do anything, we are not magicians or wizards or experts, that's the
thing.
Another delegate described how a TRIPS-CBDproposal drafted in 2006 was 'based on
inputs from civil society', naming a number of individuals, several of them academics,
who provided key expertise and support. 'They are like-minded, they helped a lot', he
concluded, thus iterating a version of the 'civil society can contribute' discourse that
emphasises the expertise and specialist knowledge that individuals and organisations
understood to be part of civil society can contribute to ongoing work and concerns.
Developed country delegates also articulated versions of the 'civil society can
contribute' discourse, but tended to see developing countries as most in need of the
expertise and support that civil society organisations can offer. As one official put it:
What NGOswant and do in respect to developed members of the WTO is
very different to their work with developing members. With Peru, for
example, the NGOsare supporting the policy objectives of the country, the
development and environmental objectives. They provide material and
arguments, they back them up. But with developed members, their work
consists of convincing us that we have to do something.
The official was quite clear, nevertheless, that any contribution made by civil society
should support members' existing priorities and positions. The relationship between
developing countries, their delegations in Genevaand civil society organisations should
be one where the developing countries first 'identify where their national interests lie',
then 'NGOs can defend them, back them up, give them the factual information they
need.' The problem, according to the sameofficial, is that countries do not always have
sufficient resources to identify their own national interests, and delegates can end up
over-relying on civil society organisations for information and policy direction.
The discourse of 'civil society can contribute' articulated by PascalLamy and present in
national delegates' accounts and rationalisations of their interactions with Geneva-
based NGOs relies, it should be noted, on a particular understanding or construction of
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what being a 'contributor' entails. As mentioned earlier, national delegates understand
'contributing' to mean sharing knowledge and expertise which helps them better
understand negotiating issues, or be able to develop and defend particular negotiating
positions. 'Contributing' thus entails engaging in technical, specialist debates with
national delegates about policy issues and their potential ramifications, and requires
detailed, substantive knowledge of trade policy and related policy areas. As one WTO
official put it, 'this place is a legal place, it's technocratic. It's very difficult to understand
if you go into the substance, it's not an easy matter. It's not simplistic stuff. And if you
want to influence, you need to focus on substance.' 'Contributing' thus requires an
ability to engage in debates with national delegates, and to a lesser extent Secretariat
staff, at the legal, technocratic level at which work is carried in the WTD.
Civil Society Must Be Informed
The second dominant way of conceptualising the relationship that should connect the
WTO and 'global civil society' competes with the discourse of 'civil society as
contributor', and centres around the notion that the purpose of civil society-WTO
interactions is to (better) inform civil society organisations about the work carried out in
the WTO. There are two distinct but connected strands to the 'civil society must be
informed' discourse, which draw on different sets of assumptions and rationalisations,
but nevertheless reach the same conclusion about the need for Secretariat staff and
trade officials to provide more detailed information about the WTO and its activities to
interested civil society organisations. The first, what we might call more strategic,
strand of this discourse constructs opposition to the WTO and its policies as a result of
insufficient or mis-information, which can be overcome by better disseminating 'real'
information about the nature of the WTO and its activities. The second, more
principled, strand of the discourse draws on ideals of transparency, democracy and
participation, and the moral right of the public to know what kind of policies and
decisions are being made at a global level, all of which also require better dissemination
of information about the WTO and its activities. The 'civil society must be informed'
discourse, in contrast to the 'civil society can contribute' discourse discussed above, thus
constructs civil society as a recipient rather than contributor of information and
expertise, and, in consequence, as a more passiveand malleable object of knowledge.
The more strategic strand of the 'civil society must be informed' discourse is particularly
prevalent in the sections of the WTOSecretariat that are responsible for delineating and
delivering the organisation's strategy towards civil society organisations, i.e. the
Information and External Relations Division and the Office of the Director-General. It
draws on collective memories and constructions of the 1999 Ministerial Conference in
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Seattle and the so-called Battle of Seattle that accompanied it, which are interpreted as
a wake-up call or watershed moment in the organisation's relatively short history,
because they revealed the extent of public hostility to and perceived misunderstanding
of the nature of the WTO. According to an interviewee in the Information and External
Relations Division, the WTO's current efforts to engage in dialogue with civil society can
be traced back to experiences in Seattle, and to a sense that events there revealed a
need for a closer relationship between the WTO and civil society based on sharing
information:
After Seattle, it was very clear that we had to do something, we had to work
more in collaboration, a relationship had to be established ... in the
Secretariat and at the Director-General level as well there was an
understanding that we needed to enhance our relationship, basically inform
them, because a lot of the criticism they were directing at us was about the
lack of transparency.
Hostility and opposition to the WTO such as that demonstrated in Seattle are linked, in
the strategic strand of the discourse, to a lack of proper information or understanding
about the WTO, which can be corrected through engaging in dialogue with civil society
and better disseminating information about what the organisation actually is and does.
The same official talked, for example, about outreach activities organised for
parliamentarians and NGOs in different regions of the world as an opportunity 'to go
and inform them [parliamentarians and NGOs] about the work that the WTO does ...
From our perspective, it's about providing them with information, [as] many of them
have misconceptions about what the WTO is, for example that environmental concerns
are never taken into consideration.'
The desire to inform and correct misconceptions about the WTO prescribed by the
strategic strand of this discourse is also evident in many of the publications and
communications produced by the WTO Secretariat and aimed at civil society and the
public more generally. One of the pages introducing the WTO and its main functions on
the WTO's website includes, for example, a link to a brochure entitled '10 Common
Misunderstandings About the WTO,.48 The short description of the brochure included
on the page clearly alludes to the discourse of 'civil society must be informed': 'Is it [the
WTO] a dictatorial tool of the rich and powerful? Does it destroy jobs? Does it ignore
the concerns of health, the environment and development? Emphatically no. Criticisms
of the WTO are often based on fundamental misunderstandings of the way the WTO
works.' The brochure then works through these '10 Common Misunderstandings',
which include statements such as 'The WTO Dictates Policy', 'Commercial Interests Take
48 WTO (no date), 'What is the WTO?', http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whatise.htm.
The brochure itself is available here: http://www.wto.org/english/res e/doload e/10mis e.pdf.
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Priority Over Development' and 'The WTO is Undemocratic', providing alternative
readings and counter-arguments intended to convince readers of the inaccuracy of such
viewpoints and the misconceptions on which they are based. The same logic also
underpins many of the Secretariat's face-to-face interactions with representatives of
civil society organisations, which are premised on providing detailed information about
and interpretations of ongoing WTO work and activities to interested individuals and
organisations. The Information and External Relations Division organise regular informal
briefings, for example, which provide the mainly Geneva-based NGO representatives
who attend with an overview and some degree of analysis of the content of WTO
meetings and seminars open only to national delegates and Secretariat staff and are
intended to make sure, one official told me, that these individuals are 'well-informed'.
An overriding concern of staff in the Division seems to consist of ensuring that civil
society and the public more generally are well-informed about the WTO, in order to limit
misunderstandings and criticisms about a lack of transparency which could distort public
debate on trade.
The more principled strand of the 'civil society must be informed' discourse mirrors
much of the academic literature on civil society and the WTO in linking increased
dissemination of information with classic liberal values such as transparency,
participation and the public right to be able to access information about governing
activities and processes (see e.g. Charnovitz 2003, 2005; Dunoff 1998, 2003; Smythe and
Smith 2006). It is also perceptible in official WTO narrative about civil society and its
relationship with the WTO, and in the calculations and rationalisations of Secretariat
officials involved in making decisions about civil society engagement. Pascal Lamy,
according to interviewees in the Secretariat, is a strong believer and advocate of this
kind of thinking. According to one official:
It has to be said, to his great credit, he [PascalLamy] is also someone who is
not afraid. And he's also someone who's very independent and what's
more, he believes in this. He believes that it's very important to liaise with
civil society and with the outside world in general. The public after all has
elected the politicians, and whoever deals with or does the negotiations
here, deals with something that actually interferes [in people's lives], to a
certain extent.
The logic underlying this strand of the discourse thus places more emphasis on making
information about the WTO available and accessible to the public than the more
strategic strand, which focuses more on engaging with and informing sections of the
public that are critical of the WTO in order to potentially shape debates about trade
policy. It thus prescribes making efforts to disseminate information and generally being
transparent about the WTO and its activities, as well as providing information to
individuals or organisations that specifically request it. National delegates to the WTO,
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particularly those from countries with liberal democratic traditions, are also reported to
espouse and reproduce this kind of logic. After Seattle, for example, some members
'started making proposals on transparency', as 'they realised the public interest is there,
the knowledge is absent, we need to do something'. Proposals were made by 'the
Europeans, the Americans, the Canadians' to open up trade policy review mechanisms
and the General Council, but these 'didn't fly with most of the developing country
members', who are more likely to espouse and enact other discourses about the
appropriate relationship between civil society and the WTO.
Civil Society Is Confusing
The third dominant way of thinking about and relating to civil society within the WTO is
rather different to the 'civil society can contribute' and 'civil society must be informed'
discourses, in that it does not articulate any clear messageabout the relationship that
should exist between 'global civil society' and the WTO, and does not prescribe any
particular course of action or policy. It centres on a construction of civil society as a
confusing, uncertain and complex set of networks and elements, which although
accepted as a legitimate presence in discussions about trade policy and its impacts,
defies easy definition and straightforward response. This discourse thus reflects a
number of elements that are present in the academic literature: Helmut Anheier and his
co-authors, for example, in their introduction to Global Civil Society 2001 explicitly
recognise that 'global civil society is a fuzzy and a contested concept' (Anheier et al
2001: 11); Jens Bartelson has even argued that 'no one seems to know exactly what
global civil society is, only that it is' (Bartelson 2006: 372). The sensethat civil society is
rather confusing pervades the WTO Secretariat, particularly those sections of it which
are not involved in defining policy towards civil society but are nevertheless expected to
engage in dialogue and provide information to civil society organisations. In my
interviews with officials in the Intellectual Property Division, interviewees often
expressed a sense of confusion and doubt about what 'civil society' actually is, and the
most appropriate way to define and conceptualise it. One interviewee, for example,
told me that 'I personally would like a definition of civil SOCiety',before discussingsome
of the complexities and ambiguities inherent in the term. The fact that staff in the
Secretariat can themselves be considered part of civil society, in that alongside their
professional duties, they are also concerned about issuesconventionally understood to
be part of civil society's agenda, such as environmental concerns and worries about
energy consumption and security, was just one of issuesmentioned.
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Other interviewees in the Secretariat talked about the difficulty of defining civil society
and the types of organisations that are understood to be part of it, and pinpointing who
it is exactly that they should be engaging in dialogue with. An official in the Information
and External Relations Division, for example, told me that 'we don't have a strict
definition of what an NGO is', before elaborating on the type of organisation that is
treated asan NGOwithin the division: 'for us there's no distinction really, we treat NGOs
asNGOs,businessgroups aswell, labour, trade unions aswell, they all fall under the civil
society grouping that we regularly work with.' The lack of formal definition of 'civil
society' or 'NGO' provided by the organisation's mandates and laws, or even agreement
about which category is most relevant (both terms are used throughout the WTO's
communications and publications), mean that officials in the Secretariat often develop
their own working definitions and practical understandings of these terms. These
working definitions and understandings can vary from official to official, however. One
official, for example, included industrial associations in his definition of 'NGOs', but
excluded them from his definition of 'civil society': 'the other side, if I were to call it the
other side, the industry NGOs, industrial associations, well, they're also non-
governmental, so I suppose you can call them NGOs,although you wouldn't call them
civil society as such.' 'Civil society' is thus understood to refer to organisations that are
driven by moral principles, and to exclude industrial associations that are presumably
driven by profit and material concerns. TheWTO-published World Trade Report 2007, in
contrast, whilst also including industrial associations in the category 'NGO', positions
them all within a broader category of 'civil society':
The use of the term NGO in the present WTO context encompasses public
action NGOs, labour unions, industry associations, but not individual
companies. The somewhat wider concept of civil society, while still
excluding firms, also includes parliamentarians and the general public,
including associations and citizens' networks.
(2007: 333)
Another official interviewed in the Secretariat provided a definition which equates civil
society with both NGOsand businessassociations:
We basically consider business at the same level as civil society groups. We
also don't distinguish, we don't even have a definition of civil society or
NGOs. Any non-profit, non-governmental organisation we deal with and all
the business associations are considered NGOsfor us. Specific enterprises
are a different thing, although they only come under the heading or umbrella
of an association, so you don't really deal with them specifically.
Inside the WTO Secretariat it is by no means clear, therefore, who exactly should be
considered part of any '(global) civil society', and what types of organisations should be
involved in dialogue and interaction with the WTO.
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In addition to confusion or doubts about where to draw the boundaries around the
concepts of 'civil society and 'NGO', the discourse of 'civil society is confusing' also
refers to the messages and information disseminated by groups and individuals
understood to be fall into these categories. Officials interviewed in the WTOSecretariat
commented, for example, on the sheer volume of material produced by civil society
organisations, and the difficulties associatedwith understanding and making use of the
information they provide. According to an official in the Intellectual Property Division:
There's too much information, I keep saying, especially in the area of access
to medicines, you know it's all very nice to have all these well-meaning
people who want to educate developing countries, but I must say I have
difficulties following all of this, and I keep saying, how on earth can you
expect this poor guy sitting somewhere in a developing country to follow all
of this information.
Other interviewees highlighted the confusion and complications caused by the fact that
what some of them referred to as 'international civil society' and 'national civil societies'
have different agendas and priorities, that complicate the type of messageswhich are
disseminated by 'civil society'. One interviewee, for example, talked about the need to
distinguish and be aware of the differences between national civil societies which try to
feed into their government's positions and priorities, and the more internationally-
focused NGOs which can be considered something of a 'side industry' or 'side
government', who are not interested in engagingwith national authorities. 'Civil society
is a mosaic of elements', the same interviewee put it, with competing interests,
perspectives and demands, which defies easydefinition and response.
(G/obal) Civil Society Is Not That Relevant
The fourth dominant way of thinking about 'global civil society' and the way in which it
relates to the WTO is also a more negative discourse,which rather than focusing on any
particular construction of the relationship that should exist between civil society and the
WTO, emphasises what it is not. What I have termed the 'global civil society is not that
relevant' discourse positions civil society organisations as unimportant to the running of
the WTO, and interprets direct civil society involvement with the WTO as improper and
inconsistent with democratic processes. Civil society, this discourse prescribes, should
feed into positions and debates at the national level, where governments can balance
the demands and perspectives of competing interest groups, rather than attempting to
bypass these processes through lobbying Geneva-based delegates directly.49 The
49 This is not to imply, of course, that all national governments always do this, but rather that the
discourse constructs governments asthe proper actors to take civil society views and perspectives into
account.
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discourse thus draws on and reinforces a state-centric logic which sees the WTO, and
the process of global trade policy-making more generally, as the business of states and
state representatives, and states as the only legitimate actors in trade policy-making
processes. It thus competes with and contradicts the discourse of 'civil society can
contribute' and, to a lesser extent, the discourse of 'civil society must be informed'
discussedearlier.
The 'global civil society is not that relevant' discourse manifests itself in a number of
ways, including disinterest in the activities of civil societv organisations and in the efforts
made by the WTO Secretariat to promote dialogue and interaction between them and
the WTO, and scepticism about the relevance of civil society activities and perspectives
to the proper, state-centred business of the WTO. One national delegate I interviewed,
for example, when asked about the various programmes and schemes introduced by the
WTO Secretariat to increase interaction between civil society and the WTO, including
the badge scheme which allows representatives of trusted and known NGOsto access
the WTO buildings freely, told me that 'we don't go there [to the WTO] from that
viewpoint, who's sitting there or who's not, are NGOsthere or not. Our struggles are
different'. Another delegate, when asked his views on the same programmes and
schemes,simply responded 'I don't know anything about it'. The activities of 'global civil
society' and the kind of interaction that the Secretariat has been trying to facilitate with
civil society organisations are not considered particularly relevant or important by these
delegates: what matters are the trade negotiations and efforts to maintain and protect
what are perceived as national interests. As another interviewee, a former delegate put
it, 'it doesn't matter for the governments, or their delegates, what civil society is saying.
What matters to them is the mandate is that comes from their bossesback home, which
is their politicians, which is their ministers.'
The 'global civil SOciety is not that relevant' discourse also manifests itself in a sense,
perceptible amongst both national delegates and WTOSecretariat staff, that civil society
should participate in dialogue and debate at the national level rather than trying to
bypass national democratic processes. According to one official in the WTO Secretariat,
for example, 'the WTO is a forum where civil SOciety,through the delegations, can make
a decision ... even if you don't see the direct representation of civil society in a
delegation, then the delegation still has to reflect their views' (emphasis added). The
correct way for civil society organisations to become involved in decision-making
processes in the WTO thus entails, according to this discourse, feeding their views and
perspectives into the positions of their national delegations, rather than through being
granted any independent presence or status in the organisation. The state-centric logic
underpinning the 'global civil society is not that relevant' discourse was even clearer in
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the assessment of the WTO's relationship with NGOsoffered by one of the national
delegates I interviewed. 'The WTO Secretariat is a secretariat for WTO members', he
told me, which means that 'it's the responsibility of the members to create the channels
for interaction with NGOs, to hear the positions of NGOs'. Later in the interview he
commented on what he called 'the myth of the democratic deficit' at the WTO:although
decision-making processes at the WTO are often criticised by NGOs as being
undemocratic, he said, 'it's NGOswho would like to bypassthe democratic processand
go directly to the WTO'.
The 'global civil society is not that relevant' discourse, although prevalent and accepted
as common sense by many national delegates to the WTO, is nevertheless being
problematised and challenged by several Geneva-based civil society organisations.
Many of the NGO representatives I interviewed recognise that, historically, trade policy-
making has been considered by many to be the preserve of states and their
governments, but offer arguments and counter-narratives which seek to destabilise this
state-centric discourse. One NGOdirector, for example, traced the idea that states are
the only relevant actors in trade policy-making to the WTO's predecessor, the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),and challenged the relevance of this idea given
the different nature of the two organisations:
GATT was an extremely dosed organisation. But that didn't matter very
much because GATT essentially only dealt with what happens to
manufactured goods when they reach a frontier. Which hasvery little public
policy impact. The Uruguay Round agreements are mostly behind-the-
border agreements. They concern how domestic policy is crafted and the
impact of that on trade. Soall of a sudden, the WTOwas questioning health
and food safety policies, it was questioning regulations on packaging, it
included intellectual property rights, all of that stuff went straight to the
heart of what was traditionally domestic policy terrain. And as a result it
tripped over the interests of all sorts of groups, NGOs,you know fighting
AIDS or whatever, and how you actually get in and influence that process
became very important. And of course the WTO initially followed the GATT
culture of saying this is government business, stay out. It's not an answer
that NGOsparticularly welcomed.
NGO interest and involvement in WTO processes is thus framed, in this counter-
narrative, as a necessary response to the fact that WTO policy does not just impact on
trade, but also to areas of public policy such as healthcare and development. later in
the interview, he further elaborated the argument:
What I think we need is a clear recognition first, and a clear mapping second,
of those issues in the WTO that are of central public policy interest. They
can be healthcare, they can be human rights, they can be environment, they
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can be the development policy space, whatever it is. But there has to be a
very clear recognition ... that issues that have a strong impact on public
policy should not be debated in closed forums, and should not be debated
on the basisof commercial logic.
Other interviewees in Geneva emphasised the particular skills and expertise they can
bring to delegates and trade policy-making, thus positioning themselves as superior
sources of information and therefore necessary elements in decision-making processes
at the WTO. An interviewee in one Geneva-based NGO told me, for example that
'delegates have realised that the research that we produce is quite good, what we do is
not just rhetoric or ideology, or rhetorical ideology'. An interviewee in another Geneva
NGO, similarly, commented that 'what we're trying to do, particularly in this area of
intellectual property is to bring some evidence'. This type of argument and narrative
about the superior level of expertise and evidence that NGOscan bring to the WTO thus
attempts to undermine and destabilise the state-centric logic underpinning the
discourse of 'global civil SOcietyis not that relevant', through simultaneously suggesting
that states alone are not capable of making expert, evidence-based policy decisions, and
constructing a specialist niche that NGOscan then successfully fill.
A Regime of Visibility and Invisibility
I now turn my attention to the regime of visibility and invisibility generated through the
intersection of these four competing discourses, in terms of what kind of civil society
organisations and knowledges are visible and recognised as legitimate in civil society-
WTO interactions and debates. In doing so, I draw on what one scholar has referred to
as Foucault's 'theory of visibility', i.e. the understanding that the 'phenomenon of 'being
seen' [is] neither an automatic nor a natural process, but linked to what
power/knowledge guides one to see' (Lidchi 1997: 195). My intention is not to outline
the grid of visibility generated by these discourses in great detail, but to highlight some
important tendencies that emerge from the intersection and interaction of the four
dominant discourses. I argue that the four dominant discourses identified in the
previous section - the discourse of 'civil society can contribute', 'civil society must be
informed', 'civil society is confusing', and 'global civil society is not that relevant' -
combine together in ways that render certain types of civil society organisation, and
certain types of interventions, more visible and legible than others. I identify and
discuss three elements or axes of the regime of visibility generated through the
intersection of the four basic discourses: the importance of maintaining a presence in
Geneva; the increased visibility of organisations and individuals who can contribute
technical expertise; and the visibility gained through using appropriate vocabularies and
frameworks.
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The first noteworthy element in the regime of visibility generated by the four discourses
is the importance of maintaining a regular presence in Geneva. The discourse of 'global
civil society is not that relevant', in combination with the still occasionally perceptible
older discourse which positions civil society as dangerous and unruly, means that
engaging with civil society and creating opportunities to exchange information and
viewpoints, are not seen as a particularly high priority in the WTO. The Information and
External Relations Division, aswell asother divisions in the WTOSecretariat that interact
regularly with civil society, work with a relatively narrow mandate that emphasisesthe
importance of transparency and communication with NGOs, but clearly states that
'primary responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public interest
which are brought to bear on trade policy-making' lies 'at the national level',5oand,
connected to this, relatively limited resources for organising outreach and
communication activities. This narrow mandate and lack of resources, in combination
with the 'civil society is confusing' discourse, generate a strong pressure for Secretariat
staff and national delegates to interact mainly with organisations and individuals who
make themselves visible and available for interaction, either through regular face-to-face
interactions in Geneva, or to a lesser extent, regular telephone and email contact. To
put it another way, the combination of the 'global civil society is not that relevant'
discourse and the 'civil society is confusing' discourse is linked to a tendency for WTO
Secretariat staff, national delegates and trade officials to be passive rather than
proactive in their dealings with civil society, to wait and see who contacts them rather
than seeking out interactions or trying to identify new organisations and groups who
might also be interested in sharing their perspectives and/or experiences. This tendency
automatically renders civil society organisations and individuals who can and choose to
maintain a regular or permanent presence in Geneva more visible than those who do
not."
The second element worth mentioning in this regime of visibility is the value associated
with technical understanding and expertise, and the increased visibility of organisations
and individuals who are willing and able to contribute to debates at a technical,
specialist level. This preference for technical expertise derives in large part from the
'civil society can contribute' discourse, which positions civil society organisations as
50 WTO Document WT/L/162, 'Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental
Organizations: Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996', Article VI, available here:
http:Uwww.wto.orglenglish/forumse/ngoe/guidee.htm
srOfficials in the Secretariat do recognise that this Geneva-bias is not ideal. When discussing the relatively
new badge system which gives NGOsregular accessto the WTO buildings, for example, and the fact that
at the time of interviewing, it was only Geneva-basedorganisations that were permitted badges,an
interviewee in the Information and External Relations Division told me that 'the next step in the scenario
is to advise, all this seems to work, now how are we going to deal with visitors from out of town ?'. The
importance of maintaining a base in Genevamay well decrease, therefore, at some point in the future.
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contributors of detailed, specialist knowledge to ongoing policy debates and sources of
technical support and assistance for national delegates. It is reinforced by the 'civil
society is confusing' discourse, which makes groups and individuals who use vocabulary
that resonates and makes sense to national delegates and Secretariat officials appear
more reasonable and easier to engage with than other civil society organisations.
National delegates and Secretariat officials interviewed in Geneva frequently referred,
for instance, to ICTSOas an example of a civil society organisation that does useful,
relevant, high-quality work on the topic of TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity.
This organisation, highly visible to delegates and Secretariat staff, describes itself as 'a
leading broker of knowledge and information on trade policy and sustainable
development', which aims to 'mobilize the best expertise around the world through
dialogue and research', and process it 'so that it is applied and relevant for international
policy making processes,.52The visibility of ICTSOmust be interpreted, at least in part,
to the ability and willingness of its staff to accumulate information and expertise and
communicate it in a form which is suitable for policy-making.
The visibility that accrues through technical expertise is closely connected to the third
form of visibility to be discussed here, namely the visibility generated through the ability
to communicate using appropriate vocabularies and conceptual frameworks. This form
of visibility is also primarily a product of the 'civil society can contribute' discourse and
the logic it carries, which positions civil society as a source of ideas and expertise which
can enhance trade policy-making processes. Interviewees in Peruvian NGOsthat try to
follow and feed into discussions about trade policy talked about needing to learn and
use more business-oriented and technical forms of language in order to follow and
participate in discussions. According to one interviewee in Lima:
EI comercio nunca ha sido un tema fikil, es cierto, ha sido mas un tema de
expertos. Pero al final el comercio era el intercambio de bienes y servicios.
Luego aparecio la propiedad intelectual, luego aparecio el tema de las
inversiones. 0 sea, entre a unos campos en los cuales ya la cosa se escapaba
del comercio realmente. Lasorganizaciones sociales, por 10 menos las que
conozco en varios parses de la region, no cuentan con, porque quieren
tamblen, con equipos tecnlcos que pueden decir vamos a hacer el
seguimiento de eso. Entonces ha habido un aprendizaje, por hacer que se
pongan al dla en la dlscuslon, encargar estudios, responder. Pero siempre
con una enorme desventaja. Una enorme desventaja, porque la sociedad
civil que mas representada esta en esto, por decirlo de una manera, si tu
tienes una vision amplia de sociedad civil, son los empresarios.
52 See ICTSD(no date), 'About Us', http://ictsd.org/about/.
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Trade has never been an easy topic, it's true, it's always been more a topic
for experts. But trade used to mean the exchange of goods and services.
Then intellectual property appeared, the topic of investment appeared. To
put another way, it entered areaswhere it's not really about trade anymore.
Social organisations, at least the ones I know in various countries in the
region, don't have, because they want to as well, they don't have technical
teams that can say let's monitor of all of this. So there's been a learning
process, so that they are able to follow discussions, commission studies,
respond. But always with an enormous disadvantage. An enormous
disadvantage, becausethe civil society that's most represented in this, to put
it one way, if you have a broad vision of civil society, it's businesspeople.
The same interviewee talked about the Peruvian government's efforts to consult with
civil society organisations on trade issues,and the factors that increase the chancesof
being heard. 'Conveagro [Convencion Nacional del Agro Peruano] tuvo un rol, lPor que
tuvo un rol? Porque tenia una representaclcn muy amplia de los sectores productores
agrkolas, campesinos. Porque tenia academlcos y porque tenia empresarios. Y ellos
lograron tener una voz para que se les escuche' (Conveagro [National Convention for
Peruvian Farming] played a role. Why did it playa role? Because it represented a very
wide range of agricultural producers and farmers. Becauseit had academics, because it
had businesspeople. And they managed to find a voice that was listened to). Visibility is
thus also increased by possessingan ability and willingness to communicate using trade-
and business-oriented language and frameworks, including when interacting with trade
officials at the national level.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified and outlined four dominant ways of thinking about and
conceptualising global civil society, its capacities and attributes, and the kind of
relationship it can/should have to an institution of global governance such as the WTO.
Although traces of older discourses, such as a 'civil society is dangerous' discourse, can
still be perceived in the sensitivities that are seen to surround the question of civil
SOCietyinvolvement in WTO affairs, I have suggested that conceptualisations of, and
attitudes towards, 'global civil society' within the WTO currently cluster around four
basic discourses: the discourse of 'civil society can contribute', 'civil society must be
informed', 'civil society is confusing', and 'civil society is not that relevant'. In the final
section of this chapter, I pointed out some of the ways in which these discourses
intersect and coalesce to form a regime of visibility, in which certain types of
organisation, notably those with a permanent or regular presence in Geneva, those with
the capacity and willingness to contribute technical expertise, and those able to
communicate using technical, business-oriented vocabularies which are recognisable
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and legible to Secretariat officials and delegates, are more visible and appear more
legitimate than others. In the following two chapters, I turn my attention, firstly, to the
technologies of government that these discourses support and permit, and, secondly, to
the forms of subjectivity that these discourses incite and prescribe.
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Chapter Five
Structuring Global Civil Society: Sites
and Technologies of Government
The previous chapter explored the regime of truth and visibility that hasemerged within
the WTO in relation to 'global civil society'. In this chapter I turn my attention to the
practices and procedures that sustain and reflect this regime of truth and visibility, and
to the forms of control and restriction it permits. I outline the various formal and
informal practices that structure interactions between representatives of 'global civil
society' and of the WTO. These practices emanate from a range of individuals and
institutions, including members of the WTO Secretariat, national delegates based in
Geneva, trade officials, and Geneva-basedNGOs,and constitute the field of civil society-
WTO interactions as a distinct transnational social space with its own regularities and
norms. I also examine some of the ways in which power is implicated in the constitution
of this field, through exploring the governmental technologies that extend across the
various spaces of civil society-WTO interaction. These technologies of government
work, as Foucault put it, 'to structure the possible field of action' (1983: 221) of those
who wish to participate in dialogue with representatives of the WTO, and to define what
forms of subjectivity are desirable and acceptable in the field of civil society-WTO
interactions.
The chapter begins with an overview of the contexts and spaces in which formal and
informal contact takes place between representatives of civil society and of the WTO,
and of the main practices and procedures that regulate this contact. I then identify a
number of governmental technologies that work across these social and communicative
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spacesto shape the field of possible action of those who wish to participate in them. I
examine four governmental technologies, along, where relevant, with the counter-
conducts that challenge them: (1) the control over accessto information; (2) what I have
called the 'responsibilisation' of would-be participants in dialogue; (3) the logic of
competition; and (4) the use of trust as a technology of government. In combination,
these governmental technologies effectively structure the field of possible action of
those members of civil society who wish to participate in dialogue and interaction with
representatives of the WTO, by encouraging and rewarding particular behaviours,
subjectivities and models of action.
CivilSociety-WTO Interaction: Spaces, Practices and
Procedures
Interaction between representatives of civil society and the WTO takes place in a
number of public and private spaces,and is regulated through both formal and informal
practices and procedures. These practices and procedures emanate from a range of
individuals and institutions, including members of the WTO Secretariat, national
delegates based in Geneva, trade officials in national governments as well as NGOs
themselves. Relatively stable practices and patterns of interaction have now emerged,
particularly between those organisations and individuals that have a base in Geneva. In
the sub-sections that follow, I outline the main contexts and spacesin which this regular,
routinised interaction takes place, and the practices and procedures that produce,
maintain and structure these spaces. I begin with the official spaces and channels of
interaction that have been established by the Information and External Relations
Divisions3 in the WTOSecretariat, and outline the main WTO programmes and initiatives
that have been set up to manage the organisation's relations with 'civil society'. I then
focus on the spacesof interaction created and maintained by many of the Geneva-based
NGOs, which take the shape of regular meetings, workshops and working lunches
attended by many national delegates and WTOSecretariat staff, aswell as staff of other
international organisations in Geneva. In the third sub-section, I identify a number of
more informal but routinised ways in which interaction takes place between NGO
representatives, national delegates and WTO Secretariat staff, in addition to or
alongside the more formalised spaces and channels. Although there are other spaces
and channels through which interaction takes place between representatives of 'civil
society' and the WTO, including, for example, briefings and dialogues organised at a
53 The Information and External Relations Division was created in 2009 through the merging of the
Information and Media Relations Division and the External Relations Division. Prior to 2009, it the
External Relations Division managed the WTD's relations with civil society.
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national level between trade officials and national civil society organisations, these are
more ad hoc and irregular, so are not discussedhere.54
Information and External Relations Division-Managed Spaces and
Programmes
The Information and External Relations Division of the WTO Secretariat plays a central
role in creating and shaping the spacesand official contexts in which interaction takes
place between representatives of civil society and the WTO, and, albeit to an ever
decreasing extent, in regulating and channelling actual and attempted interaction.
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As
the administrative division officially chargedwith communicating information about the
WTO to interested parties and with managing the WTO's relations with other
organisations and the general public, the Information and External Relations Division has
established a series of channels and official spaces to enable interaction between
Secretariat staff, national delegates and NGO representatives. There are four main
channels or spaces of communication: regular informal briefings about ongoing
meetings and activities delivered by members of the Information and External Relations
Division to primarily Geneva-based NGOs; informal issue-specific 'dialogues' between
Secretariat staff, delegates and selected NGO representatives; NGO Centres at WTO
Ministerial Conferences, with briefings and facilities such asmeeting rooms and internet
accessprovided to accredited NGOs;and annual two-three day Public Forums held at
the WTO headquarters in Geneva.
The first of these channels, the regular informal briefings delivered by staff from the
division to mainly Geneva-basedNGOs,provide those who attend with an overview and
some degree of analysiSof the content of WTOmeetings and seminars only attended by
delegates. Secretariat staff involved in delivering these briefings stress that they differ
in style and substance from the more formal 'on-the-record' briefings given to the press,
in that they offer more personalised, less 'sanitised' readings of official discussions,and
include personal interpretations, commentary and predictions. The briefings are
provided on a strictly informal and off-the-record basis, and on the condition that
nothing from the briefing be quoted or attributed to the Secretariat in any way. As one
of my interviewees in the Secretariat put it, 'if you violate this unwritten rule that it's
54 For another discussion of the main channels of civil society-WTO interaction, see for example Mason
2004. He identifies 'four modes of civil society access [that] have become significant for transnational
ENGOs: derestriction of documents; symposia on trade and environment; briefings on WTO council and
committee work; and attendance at ministerial conferences' (2004: 568).
ssAs time has passed, Geneva-based NGOs have increasingly developed separate working relationships
with the national delegates, so can to some extent bypass these channels and processes.
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informal and off-the-record, it's over and out'. According to interviewees who regularly
attend these briefings, they have, as trust has built up between the Secretariat staff and
regular attendees over time, developed into 'frank and open' discussions between
Secretariat staff and regular attendees about the ongoing work carried out by the WTO.
The second communicative channel, the informal issue-specific dialogues that take place
between selected NGO representatives, national delegates and Secretariat staff, occur
much more infrequently than the informal NGO briefings (only two or three times a
year). They were initiated by the then WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero in 1998
to provide a space in which NGO representatives could meet informally with the
Director-General and national delegates, in order to exchangeviews and perspectives on
negotiating issues. These dialogues now only take place when the chair of a negotiating
group or the WTO Director-General feels that such an informal exchange of views and
expertise might help move negotiations forward. Invitations to participate in such
dialogues are only issued to Geneva-based NGO representatives who are trusted and
known to the WTOSecretariat.
The third official space for communication and interaction, the NGO Centres that run
alongside the WTO Ministerial Conferences, are meeting spaces made available to
accredited NGOs during Ministerial Conferences, either inside or close to the main
conference venue. They function as a parallel conference or side event to the formal
Ministerial meetings, and provide a context in which accredited NGOs, national
delegates, journalists and Secretariat staff interact and exchange information and
viewpoints. The content of discussions at the NGOCentres is determined by the NGOs
that have been accredited to participate by the WTO Secretariat. These NGOsorganise
discussion sessions, meetings, and workshops on topics of interest and co ncern, to
which Ministerial Conference attendees, Secretariat staff and members of the press are
invited. In addition, staff from the Information and External Relations Division and, less
frequently, staff from the technical divisions of the Secretariat, provide briefings about
the ongoing Ministerial meetings. The programme of activities at the NGOCentre at the
2009 Geneva Ministerial consisted, for example, of a series of parallel discussion
sessions, some open to all attendees, others only open to invited participants, which
were run by accredited NGOs,daily 'orientation' or 'briefing' sessionsby the Information
and External Relations Division, and a 'briefing' from the WTO Director-General, Pascal
lamy.S6
56 The programme for the 2009 Ministerial Conference NGOCentre is available here:
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min09 e/ngo programme e.pdf.
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The events that make up the fourth space of interaction, the annual two-three day
Public Forums held at the WTO's premises in Geneva, are the largest of the various
official meetings bringing together representatives of 'civil society' and the WTO. They
are presented by Secretariat staff aswell as official WTO literature as the centrepiece of
Secretariat efforts to promote dialogue and interaction between civil society and the
WTO. The WTO website, for example, describes the Public Forums as 'the major
opportunity for governments, NGOs, academics, businesses and students to come
together to discuss issues regarding the multilateral trading svstern'." The Public
Forums, like the NGO Centres at Ministerial Conferences, consist primarily of parallel
panel presentation and discussion sessionsthat have been proposed by NGOsand other
representatives of 'civil society' such asacademics,and selected as suitable for inclusion
by staff in the Information and External Relations Division. Participation is open to
anyone who registers to attend beforehand and is prepared to leave their passport at
the WTO Security Desk in exchange for a visitor's badge, as well as the national
delegates, WTO Secretariat staff, staff of other international organisations in Geneva
and members of the presswho normally have accessto the WTO buildings. The number
of attendees at the Public Forums who are not members of the WTO Secretariat, other
international organisations or national delegates is reported to be around 800 to 900
eachyear.
In addition to these four main channels and spacesof interaction, the Information and
External Relations Division administers a number of other smaller-scale and less
formalised programmes. It runs a small regional outreach programme, for example,
conslstlng of workshops and seminars for national or regional 'civil societies' in Africa,
Asia or Latin America, which are organised in collaboration with (and usually co-funded
by) partners such as local or international networks and foundations. Sucheve nts
typically include presentations by three or four members of the Secretariat staff (a
mixture of members of the Information and External Relations Division and the technical
divisions), and input from invited academics, NGOrepresentatives and businesspeople.
The content is usually tailored towards the interests of the host country and surrounding
region. The division also manages a programme in which badges permitting free access
to the WTO building and all the public spaceswithin it (i.e. corridors and meeting spaces
but not the rooms where negotiations take place) are issued to well-known and well-
trusted NGOs. The programme is relatively new (it was first tria lied in 2008, then made
permanent in 2009), and marks a significant change from previous security
arrangements, which required NGO representatives visiting the WTO building to be
invited and signed in by a member of the Secretariat staff. The Secretariat also
57 WTO (no date), 'The WTO: Secretariat and Budget. Divisions',
http://www.wto.org!english/thewtoe/secree/dive.htm.
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administers an internet discussion forum,58 in which registered members of the public
can respond to comments and webcasts posted by Secretariat staff, or start their own
discussion threads about WTO-related matters. Members of 'civil society' may also be
invited to submit reports to the WTO Appellate Body as part of the WTO's dispute
settlement process (see e.g. Eckersley 2007; Howse 2003; Pauwelyn 2002; Van den
Bosche2008).
NGO-Managed Spaces and Activities
Geneva-basedNGOsor, to put it more accurately, the Genevaoffices of what are usually
international NGOs,have also played animportant role in creating and maintaining a set
of social spaces in which regular communication and interaction takes place with
representatives of the WTO. These spaces consist of regular seminars, working
breakfasts, lunches and dinners, workshops and other meetings, as well as so-called
'side events' organised alongside WTO meetings, such as the Geneva Trade and
Development Symposium held to coincide with the 2009 GenevaMinisterial Conference.
They are attended by national delegates and WTO Secretariat staff, as well as staff of
other international organisations in Geneva, and are generally presented as
opportunities to develop and deepen understanding of ongoing negotiating issues.
Some of these events are publicly advertised and open to any interested individuals who
wish to attend; others are made known only to selected invited participants and operate
on a strictly 'off-the-record' basis. These spacesof interaction and communication are
maintained, and the content of the discussion which takes place within them largely
determined, by a core group of Geneva-basedorganisations, who frequently co-organise
events as well as organising separate events and meetings. They have now become an
accepted and regular part of the Geneva-basedschedule of activities, to the extent that
national delegates I interviewed reported being in 'permanent interaction' and
'permanent dialogue' with Geneva-basedNGOrepresentatives.
The content of the discussions that takes place in these spaces of interaction and
communication is generally quite detailed and technical, and often oriented towards
exploring and finding solutions to negotiating problems or uncertainty. Emphasismight
be placed on generating awareness and better understanding of complex technical
issues, or on helping national delegates gain the knowledge of negotiating issues
necessary to be able to develop sustainable and defensible positions. As one NGO
programme director put it, 'what we're trying to do is facilitate a better understanding
of the problem, we're trying to contribute a better conceptualisation of the issues, and
58 http://www.wto.org/english/forumselchate/chate.htm
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in that way try to see what the solutions are'. Emphasis might also be placed on
providing technical content and understanding that the delegates themselves request
and require, either by presenting in-house analysisof the issuesto the delegates, or by
inviting other individuals with particular expertise to write and present papers on the
issues. An interviewee in another NGOexplained how, in a series of NGOmeetings held
in 2002 to 2003 to help delegates develop their understanding and position on the
TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity debate, 'the delegates would identify
which experts they wanted to be present, and to advise them directly on wording [of
positions], and approaches, both legal and technical and political'.
The Geneva-based NGOsare generally very careful in the way they describe the purpose
of the various meetings, seminars and workshops they organise, presenting them, for
example, as opportunities for 'information-sharing' and 'brokering of knowledge', rather
than attempts to advocate particular positions or courses of action. Information is
presented as advice or suggestion which the delegates and Secretariat staff should use
or disregard as they see appropriate. One of my interviewees, for example, described
the regular meetings, seminars and workshops held by Geneva-based NGOs as an
opportunity for NGOs to 'raise their concerns to the delegates', or 'tell them that we
have noticed that there is a problem in this specific issue, maybe you should put
emphasis on this particular point'. Another interviewee told me that the starting point
of any successful relationship with the national delegates has to be the question 'what
do you want to do?' Anything that looks like advocacy, or that could be interpreted as
an attempt to impose particular positions or opinions on the delegates or Secretariat
staff, thus seems to be avoided in the spacesof interaction that the Geneva-basedNGOs
have carved out and seek to maintain. The Geneva NGOsalso publish and regularly
circulate written reports, briefings, position papers and specialist research that they
have either conducted themselves or have commissioned from other NGOs. These
written forms of communication are generally framed and presented according to the
same norms as interaction in the spaces of face-to-face communication, namely as
information-sharing and an opportunity to better understand the technical detail and
implications of negotiating issues.
Informal Contact
Alongside the relatively formalised spacesof interaction created and are maintained by
the WTOSecretariat and the Geneva-basedNGOs,more informal spacesand channelsof
communication have also emerged and been consolidated over the past decade.
Informal contact between the different Geneva-basedactors - the NGOrepresentatives,
Secretariat staff, trade delegates, as well as staff from the other Geneva-based
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international organisations - regularly takes place, and some NGO representatives,
particularly those who have been established in Geneva for some time and have been
able to build up a reputation for carrying out good quality work, are in regular informal
contact with Secretariat staff and national delegates. This takes the form of informal
phonecalls and emails to Secretariat staff whenever particular pieces of information or
clarification of issues are sought, informal conversations that take place around the
edges of more formal gatherings, and, in some cases, socialising with members of the
Secretariat and the diplomatic missions in Geneva. Interviewees reported being able,
for example, to regularly call and send informal emails to Secretariat staff whenever
they need particular pieces of information or confirmation of new developments, and
also receiving this type of call or email from Secretariat staff. This informal contact
occurs particularly frequently with staff in the Information and External Relations
Division. According to the director of one NGO:
We've certainly never had any problem whatsoever with the External
Relations Division. The person responsible for NGO relations ... is extremely
NGO-friendly, couldn't be better. And [the person] who does the Public
Forum is great, open and accessibleand in touch and at any time you can call
her on her cell phone, so no complaints whatsoever there.
Staff in the division also mentioned being in constant contact with NGO representatives
and other interested individuals, although the frequency of contact has reduced
somewhat in recent years, as relationships with delegates and staff in the technical
divisions of the Secretariat have strengthened, and WTO documents have been made
available on-line more promptly. As one interviewee put it, 'it's not like it used to be
where your phone would ring regularly, daily, whatever, and you got emails all the time,
"what's this?", "what's going on?", "can you give me this?", "can you send me that?"'.
This informal contact continues, nevertheless, and is sought when the NGOs want
conffrmation of rumours or reliable details and interpretations of new developments.
According to the same interviewee, 'what they do, they call you up when they hear
something and they need a trusted source, and they say, "hey, we hear this is
happening, can you tell us a bit more?". And that's again often about the overall
political situation, or political questions.'
Similar types and levels of informal telephone and email contact are also developing
between NGOsand staff in the technical divisions of the WTO, although they are less
stable and less constant than the contact with the Information and External Relations
Division. According to one NGOdirector, 'by and large, accessto WTO officials depends
on their personality more than anything else. Some are extremely open and others say
we're terribly busy with other important things, go away. But far more the former than
the latter, far more.' This type of informal contact is, like the contact with the
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Information and External Relations Division, also initiated when NGO researchers and
directors want to exchange information and interpretations of new developments.
According to another interviewee:
Everybody's a human being, so it's personal relationships quite often, and
informal emails, and "what do you think of this?" and "what's happening
there?", and there's quite a lot of information flow between the Secretariat
and organisations that are involved at the technical level, that can deal with
the complexities of the issues. If I've sent an email to someone in the
Secretariat saying "look, what's your interpretation ofthis?", or "how do you
understand that?", people always reply.
Informal interaction between NGO representatives and staff in the technical divisions of
the WTO Secretariat also takes place, as one interviewee put it, 'in the margins' of the
regular Geneva NGO-organised seminars, workshops and meetings outlined above.
Technical experts from the Secretariat are regularly invited as speakers or participants at
these NGO-organised events, and the regular contact in the relatively formalised space
of these seminars and workshops offers opportunities for more informal exchanges of
opinions and information alongside the presentations and group discussions.
Attendance and participation at such events, according to one official, 'offers a platform
for communication', which has led to increasing trust and familiarity developing
between the well-established Geneva NGOs and the technical experts in the Secretariat.
As the same official put it, 'I've been working in this field for about ten years now, so I
know those people who are responsible for certain issues on the NGO side, so they
would come to me, I would go to them if I need an explanation, their support for
something we do.'
Informal interaction between Geneva-based NGOs and WTO representatives also occurs
entirely separately from these more formalised NGO-organised spaces, through, for
example, socialising together, through informal NGO visits to the embassies and
missions to discuss issues of common concern with the national delegates, and through
contact which arises in other institutional settings, such as the World Intellectual
Property Organisation's (WIPO) Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) meetings, which NGOs
are accredited to attend. For many national delegates, Geneva-based NGOs are part of
the Geneva 'trade' or 'intellectual property community', which is sustained not only




In this section, I turn my attention to the technologies of government that work across
and within these different spacesof communication and interaction, and that structure
the field of possible action of NGDs and other parts of 'global civil society' that wish to
participate in them. These technologies of government should not be understood as the
result of calculated strategies on the part of officials in the WTD Secretariat or any of the
delegates (although their calculations and strategies certainly feed into the broader
governmental technologies and rationalities discussed). The WTD Secretariat does
attempt to steer and manage the organisation's relations with civil society and the
outside world more generally (the existence of the various programmes designed to
facilitate and channel interaction with civil society is evidence of this), but these
attempts are supported, challenged or transformed by other practices and logics. The
practices and preferences of the national delegates, for example, and the activities of
the Geneva-based NGDs themselves, also feed into and sustain the technologies of
government that structure activity in this social field. Rather than straightforward
mechanisms of control or domination which are wielded by the WTD, these
technologies of government thus emerge and are maintained through constant social
interaction between the Secretariat staff, national delegates to the WTO and
representatives of 'global civil society'. I identify and discuss four technologies of
government that operate within and across the social spaces in which interaction takes
place between representatives of civil society and the WTD: (1) control over accessto
information, or what I have termed 'the will to inform'; (2) the 'responsibilisation' of
would-be participants in dialogue; (3) the logic of competition; and (4) the use of trust as
a technology of government.
The Will to Inform
The first governmental technology, the 'will to inform', works through constructing
interactions between NGDsand the WTD asa simple exchange of information, devoid of
political content or any attempt to influence the other party in the exchange, and
through controlling access to this information. It relies on a construction of NGD
criticism of and/or opposition to the WTD as a lack of information or understanding,
which can be corrected through better informing civil society representatives about the
WTD's activities. Criticism of and opposition to the WTD is thereby neutralised as based
on misinformation and misunderstanding, and thus correctible and adaptable.
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Thewill to inform permeates the activities and attitudes of the WTOSecretariat towards
NGOs:one of the main goals of the Secretariat's programme of activities for NGOsis,
according to interviewees in the WTO, to inform NGOsabout WTO activities. As one
official put it, 'what we have to worry about is that if there is a debate on trade [within
civil society], we have people that are well-informed'. Interactions between Secretariat
staff and NGOs are thus constructed as exchangesof information, or opportunities to
gain accessto 'real information' about what is happening within the WTO. The informal
briefings delivered by the Information and External Relations Division, for example, are
presented by Secretariat staff as providing accessto superior information about ongoing
meetings and negotiations. The staff I interviewed emphasised that these briefings
differ in style and substance from the more formal'on-the-record' briefings given to the
press in that they offer more personalised, less 'sanitised' readings of official
discussions, and include personal interpretations, commentary and predictions.
Underpinning these briefings, according to Secretariat staff, is a desire to maximise the
depth of understanding of WTO processesand activities that NGOscan gain. As one
official put it, 'I want people to understand the full picture, not just what has been said
by the representative, but why it was said, or why this may have been the reason that
this led to a debate or clash or that it might come back'.
The will to inform, and the attendant construction of differences of opinion about WTO
policy as a lack of information, is also mobilised and exploited by NGOs seeking to
contribute to and shape debates and activities at the WTO. It is particularly evident in
the activities and discourse of the Geneva-basedNGOswho have been most successful
at building relationships with Secretariat staff and delegates, who have successfully
constructed a niche and identity as providers of neutral, expert information and
guidance. As mentioned earlier, the Geneva-basedNGOstypically present the various
meetings, seminars and workshops they hold for national delegates and WTO
Secretariat staff as opportunities for 'information-sharing' and 'brokering of knowledge',
rather than attempts to advocate particular positions or courses of action. They also
position themselves as providers of expert information that can lead to progress in trade
negotiations. One NGO programme director I interviewed, for example, told me that
'what we're trying to do is facilitate a better understanding of the problem, we're trying
to contribute a better conceptualisation of the issues,and in that way try to see what
the solutions are'. The Geneva NGOs'will to inform is not mobilised only in interactions
with representatives of the WTO, however; it also gives structure to their interactions
with NGOs and other types of civil society organisations in the rest of the world.
According to an interviewee at the Geneva office of a large international NGO, for
example, disseminating information about the WTO and its activities both inside and
outside the NGO's network is an important part of the work carried out by the office. As
he put it, 'it's important that local groups and organisations get the information, that
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they understand why it's important, and can do their own advocacy'. This emphasis on
information, and on transmitting what is presented as neutral, objective information,
servesto reinforce the notion that better transmission and dissemination of information
is all that is required for there to be a constructive relationship between NGOsand the
WTO. It also constructs these Geneva-based NGOsas knowledge-brokers that know
more, or know in more appropriate ways, than other parts of 'global civil society'.
Responsibilisation
The second governmental technology that can be observed at work across the different
spaces of interaction is 'responsibilisation'. Scholars working in the governmentality
tradition understand 'responsibilisation' as a logic or dynamic inherent in many forms of
liberal government, wherein the subjects of particular governmental strategies or
programmes are constructed as responsible for outcomes which affect them as
individuals, whether in relation to their education, health or welfare, or the smooth
functioning of organisations or processes (see e.g, Cruikshank 1999; Joseph 2009; Lemke
2002). In the context examined here, responsibilisation entails constructing NGOs as
responsible for ensuring their relationship with the WTO functions smoothly and
properly, rather than imputing responsibility, for example, to the WTO Secretariat or
member governments, or a combination of these. NGOs are held responsible for
ensuring, for example, the quality and relevance of discussions that takes place in the
different spaces of interaction, for successfully bringing any concerns they have about
WTO policies to the attention of WTO Secretariat staff and delegates, and for
understanding the procedures through which decisions are made in the WTO and the
formal and informal rules which govern the WTO's interactions with civil society.
Responsibilised NGOs are also expected to avoid disrupting the ongoing work of the
WTO in any way, and to avoid using any information gained through interacting with
representatives of the WTO against the organisation.
The technology of responsibilisation is instantiated through a number of techniques and
practices, some of them embedded in the WTO's official programmes and initiatives for
NGOs,others more informal and enacted by individuals on a more personalised basis.
Pascal Lamy, for example, in his inaugural speeches at the Public Forums as Director-
General of the WTO, regularly calls forward a responsible, active and participatory civil
society, whose representatives should bring useful, constructive contributions to WTO
debates. 'Let me be clear', he announced to the NGO representatives, academics,
journalists and staff of other international organisations present at the opening session
of the 2007 Public Forum, 'the WTO is looking for your contribution, it needs you to help
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shape its agenda'." In his speech at the 2008 event, he invoked similar notions of a
responsible, participatory civil society, calling on 'civil society to continue bringing its
ideas and solutions forward. It is only with your active participation that the WTOcan
come to reflect the type of institution you seek for the future.,6o The World Trade
Report 2007,61 one of a series of yearly reviews and analysesof the multilateral trading
system published by the WTO, is even more direct in its invocation of an active and
participatory civil society, whose representatives are responsible for ensuring the quality
of participation and debate in the Public Forums. According to the report, 'the quality
and interactive nature of the discussionsat the Public Forum depends crucially on the
organisers and participants' (WTO2007: 337).
Responsibilising logic and practices also permeate the formal procedures and processes
through which the content of the Public Forums is determined. The Public Forums are
mainly composed of parallel panel presentation and discussion sessions which have
been proposed by individual or, increasingly commonly, groups of NGOs,and have been
selected for inclusion in the programme by the WTO Secretariat. Although the overall
theme of the conference is set by the Secretariat (usually around six months before the
Public Forum takes place), NGOsand other types of civil society actors are responsible
for putting together panels and combinations of speakers,which can, asone interviewee
in the Secretariat put it, {really engage those that are in the audience'. Individuals or
organisations interested in proposing panels are encouraged to include {renowned
speakers' and a 'variety of perspectives' in their panels, in order to attract and retain the
audience of academics, national delegates, members of the WTO Secretariat and other
international organisations and other representatives of civil society that attend these
events. NGOsare thus constructed as responsible for ensuring the quality and relevance
of the discussion that takes within the Public Forums, and, by extension, the very
successof these events.
The technology of responsibilisation can also be observed in the way officials in the WTO
Secretariat tend to deal mainly with a core group of Geneva-basedNGOs,particularly on
a day-to-day or informal and ad hoc basis. Although the Secretariat does maintain a
number of spaces of interaction which are open to non-Geneva-based organisations,
including the NGOCentres at Ministerial Conferencesand the annual Public Forums, and
officials in the Secretariat happily respond to email or telephone queries from
59 The text of the 2007 speech is available here:
http://www.wto.org!english/newse/spple/sppI73e.htm
60 The text of the 2008 speech is available here:
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/spple/sppll0le.htm
61 Available here: htt~://www.wto.org/english/res e/booksp elan rep e/world trade report07 e.pdf
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organisations anywhere in the world, the focus of efforts to engage and interact with
NGOsis overwhelmingly Geneva-oriented. The Secretariat interacts primarily and most
frequently with NGOs that have been able to establish offices in Geneva, and it is
assumed that these organisations transfer the information and perspectives gleaned
from their interactions with the Secretariat through their networks to other parts of
'global civil SOciety'. Officials in the Secretariat thus leave much of the responsibility of
transmitting information and constructing global networks around trade issues to the
core group of Geneva organisations with which they regularly interact. As one of my
interviewees, an advisor in a Geneva-basedNGO,explained:
I think you can look at the broader interaction ... , [and] what is interesting is
of course asmost organisations grow, even like the UN, different parts of the
UN, it's always convenient for the organisation to say let's have a sort of
focal point, or some kind of group of NGOs who will somehow be the
gatekeepers, and so you then delegate the responsibility of too many
groups.
The Geneva-based NGOs that have most access and space to interact with
representatives of the WTO are thus also made responsible for ensuring that
information and demands flow smoothly between the WTO and NGOsand other groups
around the world who have an interest in global trade policy-making.
The Logic of Competition
The third technology of government at work in these spaces, what I have termed the
'logic of competition', is closely connected to the technology of responsibilisation, and
incorporates some of the same governmental techniques and practices. It works
through placing NGOsin a position where they and the perspectives they represent have
to compete for space and recognition in official forums and meetings. In some cases,an
official in the WTO Secretariat acts as an arbiter or referee in the competition for space
and recognition; in other cases, the selection occurs through what we might call 'social
selection', whereby individuals and organisations compete for space and attention, and
winners emerge dependent on their capacity to survive by satisfying WTO expectations
and preferences. The logic of competition thus places NGOsin a position where they are
encouraged to compete rather than cooperate with each other, which places particular
limits on the possibilities of action of organisations that do not satisfy the necessary
expectations.
The logic of competition is particularly evident in the processes through which the
annual WTO Public Forums are organised, and participants are selected by the
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Secretariat for inclusion in the programme. As mentioned in the discussion of the
technology of responsibilisation, would-be presenters and organisers of panels at the
Forums are invited to submit proposals of panel topics and content to the Information
and External Relations Division approximately six months in advance of the event. The
Secretariat generally receives more panel proposals than can be accommodated in the
space and time made available for the Public Forums, and officials therefore select
participants and panels based on their perceived capacity to engage the audience and
make high-quality contributions to debates. The competition that this selection process
generates between different organisations, voices and perspectives is understood and
presented by WTO officials as increasing the quality and relevance of the Public Forums.
As one interviewee in the Secretariat explained:
the idea behind [the process] was to have competition. And competition, we
have 42 workshops [at the 2008 forum], and on average, there's a parallel
system of five at the same time, so people have to choose, and that
competition has worked great, becausethe number of people attending has
increased.
The rules that govern this 'competition' and determine what kinds of organisation and
what kinds of perspective win space and recognition, favour organisations and
individuals that can engage in policy-focused and technical debates, that do not
challenge the frameworks and assumptions underpinning WTO activities and that help
national delegates explore and refine their negotiating positions. Academics, trade
delegates and ambassadors, government officials and officials at international
organisations typically make up a high proportion of panel participants at the forums,
and the debates that take place in the panel sessionsare frequently highly technical and
based on economistic ways of understanding and conceptualising problems. I was
present, for example, at the 2008 Public Forum, and was initially rather surprised at the
extent to which 'expert' voices, such as academics, ambassadors and government
officials, dominated the programme, and the lack of space and recognition given to
more grassroots organisations and members of the 'public'. A typical panel at the forum
was composed of a combination of academics,trade delegates, ambassadors,officials at
other international organisations such as the various UN agencies, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the International Labour Organisation, government
officials, and sometimes, but by no meansalways, included representatives of NGOsand
other types of civil society organisations.62 The 'capacity to engage the audience', the
criterion applied by the Secretariat when determining the contents of the Public Forum,
in practice seems to mean contributing technical understanding and solutions to already
recognised problems.
62 The programme is available here:
http:Uwww.wto.org!english/forumse/publicforum08e/programmee.htm
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Trust as a Technology of Government
The fourth governmental technology is what I call 'the governmental use of trust'. Trust
plays an essential role in the relationship that has emerged between the WTO and
NGOs,which functions both to regulate NGOaccessto particular individuals and types
of information in the WTO, and to keep civil society activities and demands within
acceptable, non-disruptive limits. Trust, on the one hand, has emerged between
officials in the Information and External Relations Division, certain delegates who have
developed close working relationships with NGOrepresentatives, and those who work in
a core group of Geneva-based NGOsas a natural consequence of regular contact and
exposure over the past fifteen years (see also Matthews 2007: 1373). Trust has also
been consciously sought and cultivated by both the WTO and NGOs, in order to gain
better accessto information and to attempt to shape behaviours and attitudes.
Trust, and the presence or absence of trust, functions as either a gateway or barrier to
particlpatlon in certain spaces and types of interaction between the WTO and civil
society organisations. Many of the channels of communication between Secretariat
staff, national delegates and NGOs are only open and publicised to organisations and
individuals who have proven th emselves to be trustworthy. The informal briefings
delivered by staff from the WTO's Information and External Relations Division to mainly
Geneva-based NGOs,for example, are only open to reliable individuals who are willing
to comply with the condition that nothing from the briefing be quoted or attributed to
the Secretariat in any way. As mentioned earlier, individuals who behave in an
untrustworthy way and, as one interviewee in the Secretariat put it, 'violate this
unwritten rule that it's informal and off-the-record', are not permitted accessto these
spacesof interaction. The badge programme which gives selected NGOsfree accessto
the WTO building, Similarly, only involves Geneva-based NGOswhose staff have, over
years of interacting with WTO representatives, proven themselves to be trustworthy and
capable of behaving as professional, non-disruptive contributors to the work of the
WTD. Trust also serves as a gateway to informal contact and informal sharing of
information and interpretations with Secretariat staff and national delegates. As one
official in the Secretariat told me, 'of course if I don't know somebody I would be more
careful probably with what I'm saying. If you know somebody and you know you can
trust the person you may be a bit more open and share your personal views.' In short,
proving oneself to be trustworthy and willing to respect the informal rules of the game
allows entrance to more informal spaces of interaction and communication with
representatives of the WTO, in which interpretations and personal opinions are shared
more openly and more frankly than in the spacesof interaction accessibleto all.
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Alongside permitting access to more informal and less carefully packaged types of
information, the presence of trust between NGOsand Secretariat officials and delegates
also functions as a controlling or limiting influence on these organisations' activities. If
trust, and generally behaving in what is seen asa trustworthy way, is one of the qualities
that regulates access to meaningful information and interaction, this creates a strong
incentive for individuals to abide by any explicit or implicit rules about what can be done
with any information obtained. It becomes in the organisations' perceived interests to
comply with any conditions attached to participation in these communicative spaces,
even if the interests of the networks and constituencies they purportedly represent
would be better served by disregarding them. Participation in the regular informal
briefings provided by officials in the Information and External Relations Division, for
example, is dependent on never quoting the source of any information obtained in the
briefings. Although insider information from trustworthy sources might be valuable for
non-Geneva-based NGOsin their efforts to monitor and put pressure on state officials
over trade policy, NGOspresent at the briefings are never able to circulate it assuch. As
an interviewee in one Geneva NGOtold me, 'we recognise that these briefings are very
valuable, so we don't want to shoot ourselves in the foot by doing anything to interfere
with them.'
Although the emergence of trust between individuals who regularly interact over an
extended period of time is a normal part of human social behaviour, the governmental
use of trust also works through conscious efforts to cultivate trust and trusting
relationships. NGOs that have been successful at generating and maintaining close
working relationships with WTO Secretariat officials and national delegates, have, for
example, simultaneously sought to build the trust of these officials and show themselves
to be trustworthy, in order to convince them that they are legitimate and worthy
partners in dialogue and to reap the benefits seen to accrue through closer interaction.
Interviewee in Geneva NGOstalked about the value of playing by the rules of the game
set by the WTO Secretariat, including not using information acquired from the informal
briefings against the Secretariat and not quoting the Secretariat as a source, in order to
show that NGOs and the WTO can work together 'in a professional way'. The
Information and External Relations Division has also deliberately sought to build
trusting, constructive relationships with NGOs,and staff in the division recognise the
benefits, such as information about NGOactivities and concerns, that flow from these.
The governmental use of trust thus relies on both spontaneous reactions and calculated
actions on the part of certain Geneva-basedNGOsand officials in the WTOSecretariat.
Both the Geneva-based NGOs and the WTO Secretariat therefore facilitate and make




This chapter has focused on the technologies of government that structure the
possibilities of action of would-be participants in dialogue between civil society and the
WTO. After outlining the main spaces and channels in which civil society-WTO
interaction takes place, the chapter identified and outlined four governmental
technologies that operate across these spaces: (1) the 'will to inform' that constructs
civil sOciety-WTOinteraction as neutral exchangesof information and marginalises other
types of interaction; (2) the technology of 'responsibilisation' that seeks to create an
active, self-regulating, participatory civil society that is itself responsible for ensuring the
quality of the civil society-WTO relationship; (3) the 'logic of competition' that places
civil society organisations in competition for space and attention according to certain
criteria; and (4) the use of 'trust as a technology of government' in order to keep civil
society activities within acceptable limits. In combination, these technologies of
government have created a terrain of interaction between civil society and the WTO in
which individuals who wish to participate in meaningful dialogue and interaction with
WTO representatives are required to present their interventions as information
exchange, take responsibility for providing the type of information and interaction the
national delegates to the WTO demand, compete with other civil society actors for
space and attention, and behave in a way which causes no embarrassment or
disturbance to the WTO and its regular activities.
In Chapter Seven, I explore some of the implications of these technologies of
government for the possibilities of action of the different types of civil socletv
organisations trying to engage in debates about TRIPS, traditional knowledge and
biodiversity. Two points are worth mentioning here, however. The technologies of
government identified in this chapter have, firstly, differential effects on different kinds
of civil society organisations. Organisations willing and able to engage in the type of
information exchange considered acceptable to Secretariat staff and delegates, to
compete for space and attention according to the implicit criteria in this social field, and
to behave in a way which causes no embarrassment or disturbance to the WTO, obtain
preferential accessto information and individuals, albeit with limitations on the kind of
actions that are possible. Organisations that are unable or unwilling to comply with the
requirements and preferences in this social field find themselves with fewer
opportunities for meaningful interaction with Secretariat officials and national
delegates, and their perspectives and voices sidelined and marginalised in debates. In
the specific case being examined in this study, what has happened in practice is that a
core group of Geneva-based organisations have emerged that are happy to conform to,
and indeed play a significant role in maintaining, the logics inherent in these
governmental technologies, while other organisations around the world, including
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indigenous associations, are invisibilised and can find little way into official dialogue and
debate. The practices and procedures which transmit and support these governmental
technologies emanate, secondly, from a variety of sources, including the WTO
Secretariat, national delegates to the WTO and the core group of Geneva-basedNGOs
that regularly interact with representatives of the WTO. These Geneva-basedNGOs
might also be considered partly responsible, therefore, for maintaining and supporting
these governmental technologies, and for the structuring and governing effects that
emerge from them in the field of civil society-WTOinteractions.
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Chapter Six
Inciting Global Civil Society:
Legitimate Subjectivities and
Subjectification
In this chapter, I turn my attention to the processesof subjectification at work and the
forms of subjectivity being encouraged in the field of civil society-WTD interactions. As
outlined in Chapter Two, subjectivity is understood, in the perspective underpinning this
study, as an important field or terrain through which governmental processes can
operate. Appropriate subjectivity is understood to be necessary for the smooth
functioning of a governmental regime, and is conceptualised as a potential target or site
of governmental actions and interventions. Governmental processes and technologies
may work to instil particular values, self-understandings and attitudes in the relevant
group or population, and to encourage certain kinds of governable subjects. They may
likewise discourage less desirable, more disruptive forms of subjectivity and associated
behaviours, and discipline or exclude those individuals and groups who do not conform
to the desired models. The processes through which appropriate qualities, logics and
attributes are encouraged, and through which subjects come to identify themselves as
particular kinds of subjects, can be referred to as 'subjectification'. These processesare
not straightforward or linear, however, and may provoke counter-conducts and counter-
subjectivities which seek to disrupt the logic carried within them.
The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I outline some of the channels
and sites through which particular forms of subjectivity are being encouraged in the field
. 128
of civil society-WTO interactions. In the second, I focus on the forms of subjectivity that
are rewarded and promoted in this field. I identify a series of figures, including 'the
anonymous contributor', 'the pragmatist', 'the technical expert' and 'the responsible
member of the trade community', that represent acceptable subject positions for
members of 'global civil society' who wish to interact with representatives of the WTO.
In the third section, I explore some of the flexibilities and attempts to subvert these
acceptable subject positions, and examine what space is available for other forms of
subjectivity in this social field. The sections, in combination, illustrate the ways in which
subjectivity is implicated as both a site of government and of contestation in the field of
civil sOciety-WTOinteractions.
Sites and Processes of Subjectification
Subjectification, as discussed in Chapter Two, is understood to take place not through
techniques of domination or control, but through what Foucault has called the
'government of the self (2005: 252), in which subjects' own efforts to conform to the
categories and logics inherent in discursive formations leads them to identify with and
enact particular subject positions. Subjectification is an iterative, inherently social
process, which is only ever variably successful, as it works to the extent that subjects
themselves come to experience themselves through and identify themselves with the
relevant forms of subjectivity. In this section, I identify a number of processes of
subjectification at work in the field of civil society-WTO interactions which foster, elicit
and reward particular forms of subjectivity in individuals who seek to interact with
representatives of the WTO. The discussion is not intended to provide an exhaustive
summary of the mechanisms of subjectification at work in the field of civil society-WTO
interactions, but rather to illustrate some of the social processes through which
particular forms of subjectivity are elicited and rewarded. I identify and discussthree
processes of subjectification: (1) the normalisation of certain roles, behaviours and
practices; (2) WTO Secretariat decisions about which kinds of organisations and which
individuals should be given accessand space to present their work and opinions about
WTO policy and ongoing negotiations; and (3) the operation of what I term 'disciplinary
communicative norms', which require would-be participants in dialogue to adopt certain
modes and styles of communication.
The first process of subjectification operating across the different sites and spacesof
civil sOciety-WTO interaction discussed here is what I call the normalisation of certain
roles, behaviours and practices. This process is particularly evident in the Geneva-based
spaces of interaction, where Geneva-basedNGOs,national delegates to the WTO and
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members of the WTO Secretariat have been taking place for over ten years. As the
individuals involved have become ever more used to working and interacting together,
and reputations for carrying out certain types of work have become established, certain
expectations have developed about what kind of behaviours and what forms of
subjectivity are required if the relationship between the WTO and globalising civil
society is to function smoothly. The Geneva-based NGOshave played a central role in
these processes:they have been able, over time, to analyse what kinds of practices and
attitudes are considered acceptable by national delegates and Secretariat staff, and to
find or create acceptable niches or subject positions to occupy. They have worked out,
for example, that providing what is presented as technical advice is appreciated and
rewarded, as is making space and resources available to help national delegates
understand and develop positions on negotiating issues. These niches and subject
positions, along with the practices that sustain them, have, I suggest, become
normalised and now help define acceptable subjectivity in this field of activity.
A second process of subjectification involves more conventional forms of power and
control, and consists of decisions made by the WTO Secretariat about which
organisations and which individuals should be given access and space to present their
viewpoints in both private and public meetings and discussions. The Information and
External Relations Divisions plays a particularly important role here: a s the division
responsible for convening WTO events involving civil society, providing briefings to
selected NGO representatives, and making information available to civil society
organisations, staff in the division regularly make decisions about which individuals and
organisations to invite into the formal spaces and processes administered by the
Secretariat. The content of the annual Public Forums, for example, is determined
through a process in which interested members of 'civil society' submit panel proposals
to the Information and External Relations Division four to six months in advance of the
event, who decide which panels and topics to include in the final programme. One of
the officials in the division explained to me: 'we're looking for panels with renowned
speakers, different perspectives, a variety of speakers and to really engage those that
are in the audience'. Staff in the division thus determine which individuals and
organisations can present their perspectives and viewpoints in the Public Forums, and,
in seeking individuals who will 'really engage those that are in the audience', are actively
involved in policing the forms of subjectivity that are admitted into this social sphere.
Decisions made about which individuals and organisations to invite to the regular,
informal briefings held for Geneva-based NGOs similarly feed into and reflect ideas
about what constitutes acceptable subjectivity. In practice, only NGO representatives
who are personally known to staff in the division, and have shown constructive, non-
confrontational attitudes towards the WTO, are invited: at the time of carrying out this
study, this amounted to between 20 and 30 Geneva-based NGO representatives who
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were trusted and known, as one of the NGOprogramme officers I interviewed put it, to
'play by the rules'.
A third process of subjectification works through what I call disciplinary communicative
norms, which require participants in interaction and dialogue to adopt suitable modes
and styles of communication. These norms are particularly evident in the annual Public
Forums, which bring together a broad range of NGO representatives, academics,
national delegates and diplomats, and staff of other international organisations, some of
whom are accustomed to interacting and working together in Geneva,while others are
not part of what several interviewees referred to as the Geneva-based 'trade
community'. Communication in the Public Forums is structured according to an implicit
set of communicative norms, which value, for example, orderly turn-taking, emotional
detachment and making articulate, dispassionate and measured contributions to the
discussion. Panel discussions take place in a formalised, almost ritualised manner,
following what Iris Marion Young has termed the norms of 'articulateness',
'dispassionateness' and 'orderliness' (2000: 56). These communicative norms support
and underpin the legitimate forms of subjectivity discussed in the next section, as they
represent qualities which are sought after and valued in a number of the positions,
including 'the pragmatist' and 'the non-challenging interlocutor'. Transgressingthese
norms leads to disapproval and ostracism by other Forum participants. In one sessionin
the 2007 Public Forum, for instance, I observed an exchange between the moderator of
a panel session and a member of the audience, in which the moderator dismissed the
comments made by the audience member for not being expressed according to
appropriate communicative norms. The audience member, a Francophone African, had
commented on the fact that the panellists' presentations in the session had all relied
heavily on Powerpoint slides, which were dense with information, but only written in
English. He pointed out that making the information available in the WTO's other two
official languages, French and Spanish, would have allowed non-English speakers to
better follow the presentations and participate in discussion, and spoke in a more
embodied, animated and passionate style than is the norm in the Public Forum. The
moderator immediately dismissed the comment as impolite and improper, seemingly on
account of the style of expression: 'Monsieur, vous n'etes pas poii' (Sir, you're not being
polite), she repeated several times. These disciplinary communicative norms thus
function as another mechanism through which appropriate forms of subjectivity are
promoted, and forms of subjectivity that are considered disruptive or challenging are
dismissed as illegitimate and improper.
131
Legitimate Subjectivity: AMatrix of Acceptable Subject
Positions
I now turn my attention to the particular forms of subjectivity that are elicited and
rewarded in the field of civil society-WTO interactions. As just discussed, appropriate
forms of subjectivity are encouraged and elicited through a number of channels and
processes,including the normalisation of certain roles and practices, and decisions made
by the WTD Secretariat about who to invite into the various spaces of official
communication. Members of 'global civil society' are just as involved in the creation and
maintenance of acceptable subject positions as other participants in the field: the
processes of subjectification discussed have emerged through constant interaction
between NGO representatives, national delegates and trade officials and staff in the
WTOSecretariat. I identify and illustrate six subject positions that represent what have
come to be considered acceptable or desirable behaviours, qualities and attitudes in this
field of interaction: 'the aide', 'the technical expert', 'the anonymous contributor', 'the
pragmatist', 'the non-challenging interlocutor', and 'the responsible member of the
trade community'. These subject positions in combination represent, I suggest, the main
contours and boundaries of acceptable subjectivity in the field of civil society-WTD
interactions.
'The Aide'
'The aide' is docile, biddable subject position, called upon to bring expertise and
analytical skills to bear on issues already recognised as concerns by national trade
delegates and members of the WTO Secretariat. The activities of 'the aide' are
constrained by the 'global civil society is not that relevant' discourse discussed in
Chapter Four, which sees trade officials and national delegates as the only groups that
are properly mandated to negotiate and make decisions about international trade
policy. Allowing members of 'global civil society' too much influence or latitude in their
interactions with officials and delegates is thus understood to contravene the state-
based underpinnings of the international trade regime. Many would-be participants in
dialogue with the WTD, as discussed in Chapter Four, contest these assumptions,
arguing, for example, that the WTD, unlike its predecessor GATT,has such an impact on
public policy that the presence or even partlcipatlon of NGDs and other interested
members of the public in the trade policy-making arena is entirely appropriate. It is out
of this tension between the state-centric logic underpinning the multilateral trading
system, and the challenge to this logic articulated by certain sections of civil society, that
the compromise subject position of 'the aide' has emerged. 'The aide' may interact
fairly closely with trade officials and delegates, and thus have some kind of presence in
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trade policy-making circles, but the interests and identity of 'the aide' are clearly
subordinated to those of the trade officials and delegates.
The main characteristics of 'the aide' include a willingness to provide material and
technical support and assistance to national delegates, particularly those from
developing countries who may lack what they perceive to be sufficient resources,
support and expertise from their national governments, and the ability to anticipate
delegates' needs and requests for assistance. 'The aide' is also expected to understand
and be prepared to think within the logics and rhythms of trade negotiations, and be
willing to act when called upon by national delegates, but remain suitably on the
.sldeltnes at other times. 'The aide' is thus only summoned and permitted a presence
when national delegates feel support is required. As one NGO director put it, many
developing countries only work with NGOs 'if they feel that civil society groups can
enhance their interests'. 'The aide', moreover, is expected to recognise that personal
interests and priorities are subordinate to those of the delegates, and must not be seen
to be pushing a personal agenda in interactions with national delegates. According to
another Geneva-based NGO programme director, the question 'what do you want to
do?' has to be the starting point in discussionsand interactions with national delegates.
Any sense that NGOsare simply pushing their own agenda and interests will result in
conversations being shut down and interactions curtailed. The opinions and analysis
that 'the aide' can provide are thus welcomed and valued, but must be presented in a
way which does not challenge the authority of the delegates. Other Geneva-basedNGO
representatives talked, for example, about how they 'raise their concerns to the
delegates', or 'tell them that we have noticed that there is a problem in this specific
issue', so 'maybe you should put emphasis on this particular point', when meetings and
seminars take place. Support and advice are thus provided and presented when
required in a non-challenging, non-threatening way.
The types of activities 'the aide' may carry out include organising and facilitating
meetings and seminars between national delegateswho wish to discussissuesof mutual
concern, and inviting relevant 'experts' from other civil society organisations or from
academia to present their interpretations and advice. One national delegate I
interviewed, for example, warmly praised the work carried out by an NGOthat made a
neutral space available for a series of meetings between national delegates to the WTO
and invited representatives of 'global civil society' in 2006, providing lunch and covering
the expenses of particularly sought-after experts from outside Geneva. 'The aide' may
also be asked to write papers to help delegates better understand the issuesat stake in
negotiations, or to identify suitable experts and commission research papers if there is a
need for additional expertise. One NGO researcher recounted, for example, that, 'the
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African Group wanted a study on Geographical Indications, so they said that they
needed a paper on this issue because they don't have an assessment of Geographical
Indications in Africa. Sowe received a request and we asked an expert to write a paper'.
'The aide' may also be called upon to provide more specific assistance, such as analysing
what should be included in position papers to be presented in the different Councils in
the WTO, or the most appropriate way to structure them. Another Geneva-based
interviewee explained how delegates sometimes appreciate assistance working out
'how one would structure things, what information is needed, what arguments are
relevant, what evidence'. The interviewee was clear that such assistance is only
provided when delegates decide that they need it, either as a result of their own analysis
or analysis provided by other observers. According to an interviewee in another of the
Geneva NGOs, there's been 'a big evolution in the way that developing country
delegates relate to NGOs. They used to be very reluctant to deal with them, but they
have now realised how they can use NGOspositively in pursuit of their own goals, how
NGOscan support them in their work'.
'The Technical Expert'
'The technical expert' is one of the most valued subject positions in the field of civil
society-WTO interactions, called upon to help national delegates understand and
explore the policy implications of particular negotiating issues, and also valued as a
sounding board by WTO Secretariat staff. Performing the role of 'the technical expert'
requires familiarity and easewith the technical vocabulary and concepts typically used in
WTO negotiations and official documents, as well as a detailed understanding of trade
policy-making processes. Individuals who wish to follow developments and to
partlclpate in discussions with trade officials about the substance of their work either
have to already understand the highly technical debates and terminology, or have had to
learn the particular logics and vocabulary of the trade sphere. As one interviewee in
lima put it:
Lasorganizaciones sociales, por 10menos las que conozco en varios paisesde
la regi6n, no cuentan con equipos tecnlcos que pueden decir vamos a hacer
el seguimiento de eso. Entonces ha habido un aprendizaje, por hacer que se
pongan al dia en la discusi6n, encargar estudios, responder. Pero siempre
con una enorme desventaja. Una enorme desventaja, porque la sociedad
civil que mas representada esta en eso, por decirlo de una manera, si tu
tienes una visi6n amplia de sociedad civil, son los empresarios.
Social organisations, at least the ones I know in various countries in the
region, don't have technical teams that can say let's monitor all of this. So
there's been a learning process, so that they can keep up to date with
discussions, commission studies and respond. But always with an enormous
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disadvantage. An enormous disadvantage, because the civil society that's
most represented in this, to put it one way, if you adopt a broad view of civil
society, it's businesspeople.
The subject position of 'the technical expert' not only involves familiarity with technical
vocabulary and concepts; it also relies on a discursive move that constructs trade policy
making as a technical rather than a political activity. As the director of a Geneva-based
NGO commented in relation to debates about TRIPS, traditional knowledge and
biodiversity, 'they try and keep it legal [but] it's an essentially political debate. It's the
perfect museum specimen of the wicked corporations imposing their will on poor
farmers' (see also May 2005: 164). Performing the role of 'the technical expert' thus
also requires presenting viewpoints and contributions to debates as technical rather
than political interventions: knowledge must be presented as objective, evidence-based
and balanced, rather than advocating a particular position or course of action.
According to an interviewee in the Secretariat:
I can only respond for myself, but I certainly think the more objective
approach, I think that's the way to do things. I would explain something to
you, but I would leave you the decision-making to you, becauseyou may be
in a particular national environment that I cannot necessarily assess,so you
may be much better placed to take the final decision.
In the case of debates about TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity, it is legal
expertise that is most valued and legal experts, whether academics or trained lawyers,
who are sought out and accorded most space and status when interactions do take
place. Researchers and programme coordinators I interviewed in Geneva-basedNGOs
that maintain relatively close working relationships with both national delegates and
members of the WTO Secretariat use terms, for example, like providing 'technical
assistance' or 'technical support' and 'legal expertise' to delegates, or 'facilitating
understanding' of legal and technical issues,when they talk about the type of role they
play in trade policy-related circles in Geneva. They attribute their ability to maintain this
type of relationship with national delegates and Secretariat officials, and their success
and visibility asorganisations, to the level of expertise they are able to make available to
delegates, and to the accuracy and quality of their research and publications. According
to one of these interviewees:
The WTO Secretariat ... reads a lot of our materials. We engage with them,
becausewe're also very keen to get it right, to get their expert opinion. And
I would say most of the time they're very happy with the work that's
produced. That was also true in the intellectual property area. They might
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not like the conclusions or agree with particular emphasis placed, but they're
not going to dispute the quality of the research and analysis.
Delegatesand officials in the WTOSecretariat also emphasised the value of the technical
assistance and the quality of the research that these organisations provide. One
national delegate I interviewed praised the technical assistance offered to delegates by
the Geneva-based NGOs who work on intellectual property-related issues, and even
attributed some of the progress made in negotiations to the support these organisations
have provided. The fact that countries like Brazil, India and Peru were able to ensure
that the protection of traditional knowledge became and remained part of the
negotiating agenda in the TRIPSCouncil is, as he sees it, 'in part because civil society
were next to us, in order first to understand, and second to analyse how to present this,
to draft papers and to understand what the best strategy is and which alliances would
be best'. Another delegate emphasised the importance of NGOs providing well-
researched, rigorous and technically proficient reports and publications. As he put it, 'as
a delegate, you need them to be professional, You need data, research, the right
arguments. You have to be able to convince people that have a stake in the
negotiations'.
This 'technical assistance' and 'legal expertise' that NGOsprovide need not necessarily
come from within the organisation, however. A reasonable understanding of the
technical issues, and connections to individuals with a high level of technical expertise
can be sufficient to at least partially occupy the position of 'the technical expert'. An
interviewee in one of the Geneva NGOsthat enjoy close working relationships with the
WTOcommented that:
We like to think we know something about these issues. We're not
necessarily experts, but we have a certain understanding of the problems,
we can identify what the main issues are. If we need support, we have a
network of highly qualified experts that will support our work. We organise
a lot of collective work, and commission papers from experts on particular
issues.
Specialist technical and legal knowledge and technical assistance, whether generated
inside a civil socletv organisation or transmitted through the organisation from another
source, is accorded privileged status in the field of civil society-WTO interactions, and is
what national delegates in particular are believed to want from 'global civil society'.
According to a Geneva-based NGOprogramme director, 'delegates are very aware of the
distinction between technical assistance and advocacy, they take what's useful to them
and discard what they feel is advocacy'.
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This special status or visibility of legal experts and other individuals who can understand
and contribute to debates at a technical level is not only apparent in the Geneva-based
spacesof interactions but also in interactions between the Peruvian state and Peruvian
'civil society'. Officials in government ministries involved in determining Peru's internal
and external policies on traditional knowledge and biodiversity interact almost
exclusively with one civil society organisation, an NGOcomposed primarily of lawyers.
According to an interviewee in one of the go vernment ministries, one of the legal
experts working in this NGO 'es el que mas conoce en todo el Peru. Es el que mas
conoce, y con el hemos trabajado desde el principio estos temas' (he's the person who
knows the most in the whole of Peru. He's the person who knows the most, and we've
worked with him on these issuessince the beginning). Other NGOsthat have an interest
in issues relating to traditional knowledge and biodiversity but lack the technical and
legal expertise, or that 'se oponen a este tema, a la relaci6n con la propiedad intelectual'
(are opposed to the topic, to the link with intellectual property) are not, as discussed
further in Chapter Seven,accorded anywhere near the same spaceand status.
There are, nevertheless, limits to the discursive space and deference accorded to 'the
technical expert' by delegates, trade officials and Secretariat staff. One national
delegate I interviewed, for example, recounted how, at a certain point in a series of
discussions that took place between delegates and academics, researchers and/or
advisors working in Geneva-based NGOsin 2006, 'we had to tell them to please stop
discussing some very fine detail', such as the difference between 'disclosure' and some
other legal concept. 'We needed to find a working concept', he explained, 'we couldn't
get stuck discussing fine details like that'. He concluded that 'apart from that, they were
really helpful. We needed the technical input from them, they have the technical
expertise'. 'The technical expert' is thus valued and encouraged only to the extent that
performing this role does not conflict with other permissible subject position, such as
'the aide' and 'the pragmatist'. These comments also reveal quite clearly where
authority and agenda-setting power are perceived to lie: 'the technical expert' may be
valued and called forward in interactions with representatives of the WTO, but is still,
like 'the aide', in a subordinate position vis-a-visthe national delegates.
'The Anonymous Contributor'
'The anonymous contributor' shares some of the same qualities and characteristics as
'the aide', and is another of the subject positions that is particularly preferred and
encouraged by some national delegates. 'The anonymous contributor', like 'the aide',
provides support and assistance to delegates, and may be called upon to carry out a
number of tasks, such as helping to prepare position papers or developing arguments to
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defend particular negotiating positions. Where the 'anonymous contributor' differs
from 'the aide', however, is in the emphasis placed on acting in a discreet, restrained
and unobtrusive manner, and in not overtly publicising the particular activities and
services performed. NGO researchers and directors I interviewed gave me numerous
examples of assistance and support they had provided to national delegates on an
anonymous and confidential basis. One of them explained how, for example, whenever
any specific assistance is provided to the national delegates or any work is carried out on
their behalf, the organisation never 'put their name on it' or publicise their efforts or
specific involvement, so that the delegates themselves 'can take ownership of the work'.
Another of them told me that his organisation does not advertise the type of technical
assistancethey provide to national delegates, and never report the details of any advice
given or private meetings held with delegates. This organisation has 'an added
advantage', furthermore, in that they are trained lawyers, and thus able to 'give legal
advice on a confidential basis'.
Some individuals and organisations seem able to combine performing the role of 'the
anonymous contributor' with other subject positions without too much difficulty. One
interviewee talked about performing different roles as 'putting on different hats'. When
providing technical support to delegates, he puts on his 'technical assistance hat'; in
other contexts, including interactions with developed country delegates who do not
share the organisation's concerns and objectives, or in other forums where more explicit
or political goals are being pursued, he puts on his 'advocacy hat'. Enacting different
subject positions in different contexts is not perceived to harm relationships with
national delegates, provided that the organisation as a whole is transparent about its
aims and that its staff are seen to act in accordance with those aims. 'The anonymous
contributor' can thus co-exist alongside other more public and more challenging subject
positions in some organisations and individuals, and only be called upon in certain types
of interactions and contexts.
Other organisations have built their entire reputation and niche in the field of civil
society-WTO interactions around enacting the role of 'the anonymous contributor'. As a
programme director in one such organisation explained to me, meetings hosted by the
organisations always take place on an 'off-the-record' basis, whether they take place
exclusively between national delegates or between national delegates, NGO
representatives and other 'experts', and whatever is discussed is considered confidential
information and never revealed to anyone who was not present. Staff in this
organisation would, for example, never discuss the details of what happened in such
meetings with me. Interviewees would discuss the principles underpinning their work,
and the type of meetings organised, but were clear that referring to any of the content
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covered or showing me documents produced in preparation for these meetings would
contravene the confidential basis on which they took place. This organisation has built
up a particular position of trust with the mainly developing country delegates they work
with on a regular basis based on enacting 'the anonymous contributor'. As one
interviewee put it, 'we have a special niche, and we stay there'. She continued:
We try to be a place where trade partners can meet, discuss, and exchange
points of view on trade issues. This is what we do, to organise off-the-record
meetings and to say, ok, we can invite you and provide you with technical,
legal expertise, but we don't give any kind of opinions, we just like to discuss
and be a forum where you can come and discuss and exchange your
positions. And I think it's good like that, because trade is very sensitive, and
if you invite them and then you sort of give your own opinions, 'you should
do that or', I mean that would be very sensitive, so we try to just be
facilitators, to organise off-the-record meetings, to meet with people to see
what their needs are, developing countries, LDCs, the African Group, and to
help them benefit from trade.
'The Pragmatist'
'The pragmatist' is expected to understand the underlying logics and processes that
shape multilateral trade negotiations, and based on that understanding, be 'realistic'
about what can be achieved by national delegates and Secretariat staff in the context of
ongoing WTO work and negotiations. 'The pragmatist' can be contrasted to both 'the
dreamer', who is idealistic, and analyses problems and proposes solutions on an abstract
and what is perceived to be detached and 'unrealistic' level, and 'the ideologist', who
does not share the goals and assumptions of trade officials, and questions or challenges
the economic principles and assumptions that underpin the multilateral trading system.
'The dreamer' and 'the ideologist' are both treated as undesirable subject positions by
many national delegates, trade officials and Secretariat staff, and little time or space is
accorded to individuals or organisations seen to be enacting these positions. 'The
pragmatist', on the contrary, is welcomed and called forward in interactions with
delegates, Secretariat staff and national trade officials, as well as in broader
communicative spaces such as the annual Public Forums.
National delegates interviewed in the course of this study talked, for example, about the
importance of civil society organisations having realistic, well-grounded arguments and
making pragmatic, realistic suggestions. This is particularly important, according to
interviewees, when organisations wish to influence and feed into trade policy-making
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processes,such aswhen they write proposals and position papers which they encourage
national delegates to use and adopt. As one trade diplomat put it:
We need them to put forward serious proposals. If a delegate puts
something forward, it's expected that they've considered it seriously
enough. It requires a big political effort from all WTOmembers to consider a
proposal, so the proposer needs to be able to defend it with intellectual,
factual information. The problem is that sometimes these proposals are very
thin, there's not much behind them.
Unrealistic, ideological and unviable proposals are not welcomed. As the same
interviewee put it: 'revamping the IP system, eliminating patents, these are positions
that are not politically viable. We can't propose things that are not politically realistic.'
The additional space accorded to 'the pragmatist' can also be noted at the national level.
Interviewees in the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, expressed
frustration at the 'unrealistic' demands and positions of many civil society organisations
that seekto engage in discussion about multilateral trade negotiations. Although willing
to interact with and provide information to any civil society organisation that requests it,
even those who are perceived to be 'antl-trade'," Peruvian state officials would prefer
civil society actors to understand trade negotiations from the same perspective as they
do, i.e. as a necessary and desirable process in a globalising world, and to be realistic
about what can be achieved or negotiated within them. According to one official, many
of the NGOsthat follow multilateral trade negotiations are guilty of adopting radical,
unrealistic positions. As he put it:
Son posiciones radicales. Cuando tienen posiciones radicales, y posiciones
sobre todo ideol6gicas, hace mucho mas complejo. En vez de ayudar la
negociaci6n, incluso pueden complicarla mas. Sobre todo porque debilitan
la posici6n de los gobiernos que supuestamente quieren apoyar. Esoes un
tema, el tema de la responsabilidad, el peso que tienen las ONG, ellos
quieren que sean tomados mas en serio. Pero para ser tomados mas en
serio tienen que ser mas realistas. Tienen que manejarse con temas mas
politicos.
These are radical positions. When they have radical positions, and above all
ideological positions, it makes things much more complicated. Instead of
helping negotiations, they make them even more difficult. Mainly because
they weaken the position of the governments they supposedly want to help.
This is an issue, the issue of responsibility, the weight that NGOshave. They
want to be taken more seriously. But to be taken more seriously they have
to be more realistic. They need to be able to handle more political issues.
63 The organisations in question tend not to describe themselves in this manner, but as pro-development
or pro-environment; if they are 'anti' anything, it is neoliberal economics.
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Not only are members of civil society who do not enact the subject position of 'the
pragmatist' unwelcome and undesirable according to this official, they are also
positioned as naive and misguided, and as ultimately damaging to Peruvian and other
developing countries' interests in multilateral trade negotiations. Another official talked
about the impossibility of serious dialogue with civil society actors who adopt
'ideological' positions. As he put it, 'es al nivel ideol6gico donde empiezan los
problemas, por ejemplo hay ONGs que no creen que el TLC pueda contribuir al
desarrollo. lQue puedes hacer con elias?' (it's at the ideological level that the problems
start, for example, there are NGOswho don't think that the Free Trade Agreement can
contribute to development. Where can you start with them ?). The other official
concurred: 'anti-comercio, anti-propiedad intelectual, eso es el tema con las ONGs. lA
que va todo este pensamiento?' (anti-trade, anti-intellectual property, these are the
themes of the NGOs. What use is all this thinking?). The primacy of trade and the need
for trade liberalisation are treated as common sense by these officials; members of
Peruvian civil society who challenge or question this common-sense, and are perceived
to be unrealistic about the nature of international trade negotiations, are met with
bafflement and frustration. To engage in interaction and two-way discussion about
multilateral trade negotiations, members of Peruvian civil society must be perceived to
be realistic and pragmatic about what can be achieved, and accept the common senseof
ongoing trade liberalisation.
'The Credible, Non-Challenging Interlocutor'
'The credible, non-challenging interlocutor', like 'the pragmatist', is expected not to
question the economic principles and assumptions underlying the current multilateral
trading system, and in the caseof the TRIPS-traditional knowledge-biodiversity debates,
the use of Western intellectual property mechanisms to protect traditional knowledge
and biodiversity. 'The credible, non-challenging interlocutor' also shares a number of
characteristics with 'the technical expert', notably the capacity and willingness to act as
a sounding board and potential source of advice for trade officials, national delegates
and WTOSecretariat staff. 'The credible, non-challenging interlocutor' is valued by both
national delegates and WTOSecretariat staff, and rewarded with space and recognition
in the various communicative spaces that make up the field of civil society-WTO
interaction.
One of the central characteristics of 'the credible, non-challenging interlocutor' is the
willingness to accept or at least not overtly challenge the liberal economic principles
underpinning the multilateral trading system, and to accept that the WTO exists
primarily to liberalise trade. As one national delegate I interviewed put it, 'we should
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never forget what the WTO is there for: promoting free trade. Neither the delegates nor
the NGOs should forget that'. 'The credible, non-challenging interlocutor' is thus
expected to work, like the delegates and WTO Secretariat, within the framework of
ongoing trade liberalisation, and to seek solutions to any identified problems within
rather than by dismantling that framework. An interviewee in a Geneva-based NGO
attributed, for example, the level of access and contact the NGO has with WTO
Secretariat staff, including regular 'high-level contact with the D-G [Director-General]' to
always being both publicly and privately supportive of the Doha Round of negotiations.
The NGO in question does not challenge the work being carried out by delegates and
Secretariat staff, and can therefore successfully occupy a subject position which requires
acting asa sounding board and source of support and advice. An interviewee in another
Geneva-based NGO who regular Iy interacts with all levels of WTO Secretariat staff,
national delegates and ambassadors based in Geneva ascribed the successand level of
accessavailable to him to the credible, recognisable understanding of trade and the
trade world the NGOhasdemonstrated. As he put it:
I can go see [Pascal] Lamy [the Director-General] any time I want, I can go
see any of the ambassadors any time I want. In fact the ... ambassador's
coming here today to see me about some trade matter. Why? Because
we've developed a reputation for doing useful stuff that's interesting, that
understands trade and is not out leftfield somewhere. That's all.
He further elaborated on the particular approach adopted by the NGO, in which
concerns are raised and solutions to problems sought within the framework of trade
liberalisation, rather than by attacking or seeking to dismantle it:
Our view is that trade openness should serve sustainable development.
Further, we believe that an open, multilateral-based trading system can
support sustainable development. And essentially you've got a choice
between a trading system that rewards narrow commercial interests or one
that serves the public good. We'd rather have one that serves the public
good. We're trying to point out how you get from here to there. That's
essentially what we do.
An acceptance of the existing trade system and the broad economic principles that
underpin it, or at least the willingness and ability to frame and formulate concerns
within such a framework, thus mean this organisation is taken seriously as an
interlocutor, and can act as a sounding board and potential source of advice for trade
officials, national delegates and WTOSecretariat staff.
'The credible, non-challenging interlocutor' is also called forward and given privileged
accessto government ministers in the spacesof interaction that have emerged between
NGOsand the Peruvian state. The importance of trade liberalisation and the belief that
142
trade takes primacy over other policy areas have come, as discussed earlier, to be
treated as common sense in this field of interaction, and NGOs who accept and can
formulate questions and proposals in a way which does not challenge this framework
have achieved particular prominence and status. Alternative viewpoints and
perspectives are marginalised and squeezed out of debates. Interviewees in Peruvian
NGOs talked, for example, about the impossibility of questioning or challenging the
desirability of free trade in interactions with the state and in public dialogue more
generally. According to an interviewee in one Lima-based NGO:
Lo que pasa es que el discurso del comercio, del libre comercio, es el
discurso de la clase politica en el gobierno. A pesar de que la crisis financiera
te ha mostrado el contra rio, ellos siguen apostando a liberalizar mercados
reales y financieros. Entonces es casi como una mala palabra decir, oye, yo
no estoy de acuerdo con los tratados de libre comercio, porque ellos han
tenido exlto en ligar libre comercio con el desarrollo. Porque hay una fuerte
concentraclon y convergencia de poder poHtico-empresarial y de los medios
de cornunlcaclon.
What is happening is that the discourse of trade, of free trade, is the
discourse of the political class in the government. Even though the financial
crisis has shown the opposite, they continue to bet on liberalising real and
financial markets. So it's almost like a swearword if you say, hang on, I don't
agree with free trade agreements, because they've been so successful at
linking free trade with development. Because there's a strong concentration
and a strong convergence between political-business power and the media.
Other interviewees in Peruvian NGOs talked about needing to learn to understand and
speak the, language of trade laws and theory in order to be able to participate in
discussion with Peruvian trade officials. One of them told me that 'yo voy con mi
lenguaje aprendiendo un poco de su lenguaje' (I go with my language, learning a little bit
of their language) whenever she participates in meetings and briefings with trade
officials (mostly in the context of bilateral trade negotiations between Peru and the
European Union), until it is possible to be understood and recognised as a legitimate and
knowledgeable interlocutor. She described how, in one meeting:
Lo que hacia era discutir desde los terminos comerciales la posibilidad de
enfoques sociales. Es decir la apncaclon del trato nacional en las compras
pubtlcas pone restricciones para el uso de ... , que eso es importante para
nuestros paises porque tal 0 cual razon ... Cuando tu planteas un dialogo de
este estilo, a veces me dicen 'se nota que usted si sabe'. Yo no se mas que
los otros sino yo 10 que estoy haciendo es, es un aprendizaje tamblen para la
incidencia, estoy haciendo que en vez de hablar en arabe, hable en un
lenguaje de raiz latina de tal manera que el otro pueda por 10 menos captar
mi mensaje.
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What I did was discuss the possibility of focusing on social issues but using
the terminology of trade. For example the application of national treatment
in public spending places restrictions on the use of ... , that this is important
for our countries for such or such a reason ... When you set out a dialogue
in this way, sometimes they say to me 'it's clear that you at least know
things'. I don't know any more than anyone else, but what I am doing is, this
is also a lesson for advocacy, instead of speaking in Arabic, I spoke in a
language of Latin-origin so that the other person can at least grasp my
meaning."
To be considered a knowledgeable subject thus requires not only familiarity with the
particular terminology and conceptual framework of (neo)liberal economics, but also
the willingness and capacity to frame concerns within these terms of reference.
Legitimacy and recognition as an interlocutor in discussions with trade officials thus
derives from using an economics-oriented vocabulary which is recognisable to trade
officials and non-challenging to their worldview.
'The Responsible Member of the Trade Community'
In some respects, 'the responsible member of the trade community' is the most
important of the subject positions identified, as its logic can be discerned throughout
the five subject positions already discussed. It is closely connected to the discourse of
'civil society can contribute', and prescribes a number of desirable attitudes and
behaviours. There are two key elements to this subject position: the requirement to act
'responsibly', i.e. in a manner which supports, or at least does not interrupt, ongoing
WTD activities; and the invocation of a 'trade community', of which the member of civil
society is called upon to be part. Acting 'responsibly' entails respecting the explicit and
implicit rules that structure interactions between 'global civil society' and the WTO, by
never quoting, for example, specific information provided in the informal briefings
organised by the Information and External Relations Division. Failure to comply with
these rules leads to exclusion from the trade community. Acting 'responsibly' also
entails not behaving in a way which disrupts or disturbs ongoing WTD work and
activities. An official in the WTD Secretariat recounted an example of how, when
working in another international organisation:
we had attacks from NGDs on the phone lines of the [organisation], to
basically block everything for the whole day, just to convert their views on
certain things. I must say, on a personal basis,that is the point where I don't
64 This comment follows on from an earlier point in our conversation, where she likened trying to
communicate with trade officials to trying to communicate with someone who only speaks Arabic or
Chinese.
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want to ever talk to these people again, this is not a way of dealing with
people.
Such disruptive behaviour thus also disqualifies individuals and organisations from
membership of the trade community.
The notion of a Geneva-based 'trade community', or in the specific caseexamined here,
a Geneva-based 'IP [intellectual property] community', was frequently invoked by
national delegates and Secretariat staff I interviewed and, albeit to a lesser extent, by
Geneva-based NGOs. One national delegate, for example, referred several times to the
'IP community' in Geneva, which includes delegates and diplomats, staff in international
organisations, as well as NGOs working on intellectual property-related topics. He
credited the Geneva-based organisations with playing a key role in creating and
maintaining this community. As he put it:
Getting to know people in Geneva, it's something that is made much easier
by gatherings of people. Of course receptions are nice and everything, but
normally it's the seminars and discussionsthat civil society prepares, that's
where you start knowing people and learning. I can say that I'm well-known
here, because I've been here a long time, and it's like, you're part of the
community here. And that's valuable in the sense that it helps you in your
work.
A number of other interviewees invoked a 'trade community', but drew more flexible
boundaries around it. One Geneva-based interviewee referred to a trade community
which consists of a core of both more junior and more senior diplomats, surrounded by
a layer of NGO representatives, who are sometimes but not always part of the
community, depending on the issue area. Other interviewees in both NGOsand the
WTO referred to slightly different configurations of the 'trade community', using terms
like the 'Geneva community' or the 'WTO community', the 'Geneva NGOcommunity',
the 'international trade community' and 'the NGOcommunity'. Irrespective of the exact
boundaries and terms used to denote the 'trade community', what is striking is the
emphasis placed by interviewees on the notion of 'community', and the ways in which
NGOs are both invited to be part of and involved in the construction of such a
community.
Official WTO discourse on the subject of 'civil society' reinforces this notion of a trade
community that responsible members of civil society are invited to join and help sustain.
As mentioned in Chapter Four, PascalLamy, in his inaugural speechesat the annual WTO
Public Forums, regularly evokes civil society as a pool of knowledgeable, responsible
global subjects, ready to share their opinions and expertise and thus contribute to the
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activities of the trade community. In his opening speech at the 2007 Public Forum, for
example, he began by inviting participants to contribute to WTO decision-making:
It is my pleasure to welcome you to the WTO's ih Annual Public Forum, this
time on "How the WTO Can Help Harness Globalization?" This year's title,
ladies and gentlemen, is a question that the WTO puts to you, to get your
thoughts and your views. If we are opening our doors to the public today it
is becauseWTO Members wish to tap into a wider pool of ideas - into fresh
ideas - on how the WTO can best contribute to shaping the forces of
globalisation.65
He further emphasised the contribution that civil society can make and has already
made to trade negotiations throughout the speech. 'Let me be clear', he declared a few
minutes into the speech, 'the WTO is looking for your contribution, it needs you to help
shape its agenda' (italics in original text), before outlining a number of cases (relating to
intellectual property rights and accessto medicines, negotiations on fisheries subsidies,
links between trade and the environment and food aid) where civil society has made a
positive contribution to the WTO's activities. He concluded the speech by stating that 'I
look forward to your views and your active engagement in these two days', thus
reinforcing the messagethat members of civil society can play their part in the activities
that take place in the WTO. His speech in 2010, similarly, evoked a civil society
populated by knowledg eable, participating subjects, whose views and expertise can
contribute positively to the businessof the WTO:
ladies and gentlemen, this is your Forum. And on behalf of all WTO
Members and myself, let me say that we look forward to learning from you,
and interacting with you. We hope that the Forum will enable our Members
to take the Multilateral Trading System forward based on the ideas that it
generates."
The WTOwebsite uses similar language and imagery to evoke a trade community which
members of the public are invited to be part of. The welcome page, for example, of the
on-line forum, reiterates the message that the WTO encourages members of the public
to contribute their opinions and views to ongoing discussions and thus shape the
debates taking place at the WTO:
Welcome to the WTO's on-line forum and chat area. We will be having
regular discussions in which we encourage you to enter and give your views.
The topics will cover WTO issues and will either be chosen by ourselves or
suggested by you the WTO audience. For eachWTO-initiated discussion, we
65 See 'Opening Remarks by Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General' in 2007 WTO Public Forum: "How Can the
WTO Help Harness Globalization", 323-327 for the full text of the speech.
66 See 'Public Forum 2010: The Forces Shaping World Trade: Opening Speech PascalLamy', leaflet
distributed at 2010 Public Forum, for the full text.
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will have panellists from within the WTOand experts from outside invited to
participate aswel1.67
Before entering the on-line forum, would-be participants are requested to read and
comply with a series of 'rules for participation', which include the instruction to not
'post messages, material or links which are defamatory, obscene, abusive or
threatening,.68 The message is clear: as a member of the public, you are welcome to
become part of a virtual trade community engaged in debate about the multilateral
trading system, provided you behave responsibly. The responsible member of the trade
community' is thus incited and called upon in multiple spaces of interaction between
civil socletv and the WTO, including Geneva-basedface-to-face interactions and more
open communicative spaceslike the on-line forum.
Flexibilities and Struggles over Meaning
In the previous section, I identified and examined a number of acceptable subject
positions which are preferred and called forward in the various spacesof interaction and
communication which have opened up between representatives of civil society and of
the WTO. I identified six interconnected subject positions - 'tne aide', 'the technical
expert', 'the anonymous contributor', 'the pragmatist', 'the non-challenging
interlocutor', and 'the responsible member of the trade community' - which in
combination demarcate the boundaries of acceptable subjectivity in field of civil society-
WTO interactions. I now turn my attention to the flexibilities within and between these
preferred forms of subjectivity, and to the counter-conducts and struggles over meaning
that challenge and either pose a threat to, or are absorbed into, them. I consider three
sets of issues: (1) the flexibilities inherent in the matrix of acceptable subjectivity that
arise from the existence of multiple permissible subject positions; (2) attempts to
subvert the subject positions identified, particularly 'the technical expert' and 'the
pragmatist', through the use of emotion and emotional interventions; and (3) attempts
to challenge or bypass the logic of trade liberalisation underpinning both 'the
pragmatist' and 'the non-challenging interlocutor'.
The existence of multiple permissible subject positions appears, firstly, to function as an
intrinsic source of flexibility for would-be participants in the field of civil society-WTO
interactions. Individuals who wish to engagein dialogue and interaction effectively have
a choice of acceptable roles and subject positions that they can enact, and can to some
67 WTO (no date), 'Community: Forum', http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/chate/chate.htm
68 WTO (no date), 'Rules for Participation in WTOOn-LineForums',
http://www.wto.org!english/forumse/chate/guidee.htm
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extent select which role to play. As mentioned in the discussion of 'the anonymous
contributor', some Geneva-based NGO staff 'put on different hats' when interacting
with national delegates and members of the WTO Secretariat, performing the role of
'technical expert', for instance, when participating in meetings and seminars in Geneva,
but putting on their 'advocacy hats' in other contexts. Individuals thus seem aware of
the expectations of representatives of the WTO, and choose to emphasise particular
behaviours and attitudes as deemed necessary in the pursuit of their organisation's
overall goals. The complexity of the decision-making processes in the WTO and the
sheer number of delegates and diplomats involved also gives representatives of 'global
civil society' a degree of choice about who to approach and interact with. Participants in
the field of civil society-WTO interactions can thus to some extent choose to intervene
at points in this field where adopting one of the acceptable subject positions does not
conflict with their own sense of identity and purpose. One Geneva-based NGO
programme director revealed, for example, that he works mainly with delegates from
the LDC(LeastDeveloped Countries) Group and the African Group in the WTO, countries
that 'don't have extensive indigenous issues', so there is no real conflict between
providing 'technical assistance' to these delegates and advocacy work on indigenous
rights carried out elsewhere by the organisation. 'The relationship works because we
share the same goals', he said. With delegates and countries who are not 'like-minded',
the type of work attempted is rather different, and incorporates more advocacy. This
means occupying a less favoured subject position and potentially failing to be accepted
as a legitimate interlocutor in that context, but allows the individual and organisation to
maintain a coherent senseof identity and purpose whilst pursuing their objectives in this
field of interaction.
Although a source of flexibility and means to pursue objectives without compromising
existing ideas about identity and purpose, this practice of adopting different subject
positions in different contexts does not challenge perceptions of what constitutes
acceptable subjectivity in this field of social activity, and might thus be seen as merely
reproducing and reinforcing the preference for the subject positions outlined. Other
practices in the field of civil society-WTO interactions do, however, challenge the logics
and assumptions in the field, and thus pose more of a threat to the processesgoverning
civil society-WTO relations. Emotion and emotional reactions, for example, seem to be
used to disrupt the categories and logics implicit in substantive debates about the WTO
as well as ideas about what constitutes appropriate subjectivity in the field of civil
society-WTO interactions. At one of the WTO Public Forums, for example, I participated
in a panel session where one of the presenters adopted an unusually (in the context of
the WTO Public Forums and formally organised interactions between civil society and
the WTO) passionate, embodied style of expression, both during her formal
presentation and in the subsequent group discussion. The topic of the panel was the
148
link between patents and public health, and an assessmentof how an exemption to the
general provisions of TRIPSagreed by the WTO General Council in 2003 had been
working since it came into force. The presenter was the only member of the panel who
used emotional terms and emotional forms of expression, and stood out from the other
presenters who framed their interventions in more technical language and used a more
neutral, impassive delivery style. Her impassioned, animated delivery and use of
emotional language can be read as attempts to disrupt and challenge the
overwhelmingly technical terms in which debates had been framed and the neutral,
docile forms of subjectivity enacted by the other panel participants. Her emotional
intervention, interestingly, was met by disapproval by the other presenters: 'it's all very
well to make an impassioned speech about ... " said one of her fellow panellists,
seemingly quite irritated that her arguments had been articulated in such embodied,
emotional terms, 'but we need to address everything'. In response, the emotional
presenter defended her passionate style of expression: 'for me, it was understood that
we're also talking about ... , but why ratify something that doesn't work? I have no
shame in being passionate about what's going on. I have passion because it's about
people'. Despite this defence, the preferred forms of subjectivity prevailed: her attack
on the disembodied forms of reason and tendency to frame the issues as technical
problems in the panel was swiftly closed down by the other participants. Her emotional
interventions were given little space or serious consideration, and the model of more
emotional, embodied subjectivity she represented was dismissed as passionate and
therefore unreasonable.
Another set of practices and perspectives that can be read as counter-conducts in the
field of acceptable subjectivity centre around a refusal to work within the logic of trade
liberalisation assumed by subject positions such as 'the pragmatist' and 'the non-
challenging interlocutor'. In the caseof debates about TRIPS,traditional knowledge and
biodiversity, it is primarily indigenous associationswhose perspectives and interventions
explicitly challenge the trade liberalisation paradigm, although other organisations also
challenge the primacy of free trade economics in more subtle ways. Indigenous
associations in the Peruvian Andes frequently frame, for example, their understanding of
trade, intellectual property, traditional knowledge and biodiversity in terms of their
'cosmovisi6n andina' (Andean cosmovision), which emphasises collective ownership of
knowledge and the collective responsibilities of communities towards the natural world,
and rejects the notion that the natural world can be divided up, owned and traded by
Individuals or private companies. This cosmovision rejects many of the assumptions
underpinning liberal economics and thus poses a considerable challenge to the
permissible subject positions identified above. Tellingly, however, not one official I
interviewed in the Peruvian government or in the WTO even alluded to an Andean
cosmovision or any of the key elements within it. As discussedin more detail in Chapter
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Seven, this 'Andean subjectivity' has not been successfully asserted or recognised as
legitimate in the communicative spaces that have opened up between representatives
of 'global civil society' and the WTO. Nevertheless, this tension between Andean
subjectivity and liberal economic principles represents a noteworthy site of friction in
the field of civil society-WTO interactions.
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the way that subjectivity is implicated both as a terrain of
governmental activity and as a site of contestation in the field of civil sccletv-wro
interactions. After outlining three of the main channels through which subjectification
takes place in this social field, I focused on the forms of global subjectivity that have
emerged as acceptable and desirable. Six legitimate subject positions were identified:
'the aide', 'the technical expert', 'the anonymous contributor', 'the pragmatist', 'the
non-challenging interlocutor', and 'the responsible member of the trade community'. I
then considered the flexibilities inherent within the matrix of acceptable subjectivity and
the struggles to disrupt and challenge the logics and assumptions of the field. Although
an important site of contestation, these struggles to disrupt ideas about acceptable
subjectivity do not seem, for the time being at least, to have had much success:
attempts to use emotion to challenge dominant logics and categories and the refusal to
work within the framework of trade liberalisation have either been closed down and
dismissed by trade officials and WTO representatives, or have found little resonance or
consideration in broader debates. Nevertheless, the use of emotion and the refusal to
accept the logic of trade liberalisation represent important points of friction in the field
of civil societY-WTD interactions, and may constitute potential sites and sources of
change in the future.
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Chapter Seven
TRIPS, Traditional Knowledge and
Biodiversity: Rarefied Discourse in
Global Civil Society
In the previous three chapters, I analysedthree interconnected dimensions of the social
field in which interaction takes place between representatives of civil society and the
WTD: the dominant discourses about 'global civil society' within the WTD and the forms
of visibility and invisibility that emerge from these (Chapter Four); the technologies of
government that extend across the field of civil society-WTD interactions and work to
keep behaviour and interventions within acceptable, non-challenging limits (Chapter
Five); and the processes of subjectification and preferred forms of subjectivity in the
field (Chapter Six). In this chapter, I draw out some of the implications of these
interconnected and mutually sustaining discourses, technologies of government, and
preferred forms of subjectivity. I return to the debates about TRIPS,traditional
knowledge and biodiversity, and examine how these different elements combine to
structure the field of possible action of would-be participants in these debates. I argue
that these discourses, governmental technologies and preferred subjectivities generate
processesof what Foucault termed 'rarefaction' (1981: 56-67) in the field of civil society-
WTD interactions, which place limitations on the kinds of intervention and the kinds of
speaking subject that are deemed authoritative and legitimate.
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The concept of 'rarefaction',69 although not one of the elements of Foucault's work on
discourse and discursive practices which has been most exploited within Foucauldian
studies of global governance, provides, I suggest, a useful tool with which to
conceptualise and examine the effects of the discourses, technologies of government
and preferred forms of subjectivity already discussed. The term is intended to convey a
sense of narrowing, thinning out or making less dense of discourse and those who are
qualified to speak it. As Robert Young has put it:
The French term 'rarefaction' includes not only the meaning of the
rarefaction of gases, but also the sense of depletion (of supplies), of growing
scarcltv, of dwindling, dying out and exhaustion. The effect of an analysis of
forms of discourse is to reveal not a plenitude of meaning, but a scarcity.
(1981: 49)
Foucault did not elaborate in great detail on the precise mechanisms and processes
through which this scarcity of meaning is produced, but he did identify a number of
'procedures for controlling and delimiting discourse' (1981: 56), including what he terms
'commentary' .and 'the author', and a 'a third group of procedures' that impose rules on
the individuals who attempt to produce and accessdiscourse, and lead to what he calls
'rarefaction of the speaking subjects' (ibid.: 61). Rarefaction thus not only works to
generate a scarcity of meaning within discourses by limiting what kind of statements and
what kind of meaning can legitimately by expressed, but also generates a scarcity of
legitimate speaking subjects. As Foucault explained:
none shall enter the order of discourse if he [sic] does not satisfy certain
requirements or if he [sic] is not, from the outset, qualified to do so. To be
more precise: not all the regions of discourse are equally open and
penetrable; some of them are largely forbidden (they are differentiated and
differentiating), while others seem to be almost open to all winds and put at
the disposal of every speaking subject, without prior restrictions.
(1981: 61-62)
In the following sections, I identify a number of systems of restriction and control in the
field of civil society-WTO interactions, which emerge through the interplay of the
discourses, governmental technologies and preferred subjectivities discussed in the
previous three chapters. I identify three types or levels of rarefaction: the rarefaction of
the subject matter of debates on TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity in the
field of civil society-WTO interactions; the rarefaction of legitimate perspectives and
forms of knowledge; and the rarefaction of the knowing, speaking subject in this field. I
then consider what interests and perspectives are amplified through these processesof
69 It is sometimes, but less frequently, translated into English as rarification (e.g. Foucault 2003 [1972]:
134)
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rarefaction, and reflect on the kind of 'global civil society' that is being called forward as
a result.
Rarefaction of Subject Matter
The first type of rarefaction is a narrowing or scarcity of the subject matter of debates
on TRIPS, traditional knowledge and biodiversity. As discussed in Chapter Three,
debates in the WTO's TRIPSCouncil on traditional knowledge and biodiversity have
come to focus increasingly narrowly on proposals to modify the TRIPSAgreement so as
to require disclosure of origin of traditional knowledge in patent applications, aswell as
proof of prior informed consent and benefit-sharing arrangements. Some countries
have made submissions to the TRIPSCouncil which conceptualise the issuesdifferently.
The Africa Group, for example, made a submission in 2003 which proceeded from the
position that '[p]atents on life forms are unethical' and 'contrary to the moral and
cultural norms of many societies in Members of the WTO,;7oBolivia, similarly, has
argued that the 'patenting of life forms is unethical as it is against the moral and cultural
norms of many societies and indigenous peoples', and vowed to 'prevent the patenting
of any form of life and the granting of private monopolistic intellectual property rights
on any traditional-ancestral knowledge,.71 Nevertheless, the vast majority of
submissions to the TRIPS Council have either advocated protecting traditional
knowledge and biodiversity by regulating patent applications, or have questioned
and/or rejected the need for additional protection altogether. This focus on disclosure
of origin, prior informed consent and benefit-sharing in the TRIPSCouncil, along with the
implicit acceptance of the patent system that underpins it, gives particular meaning and
content to the discourses discussed in Chapter Four and the preferred forms of
subjectivity discussed in Chapter Six.
As discussed in Chapter Four, four competing discourses permeate the ways in which
Secretariat staff a nd national delegates enact and conceptualise their dealings with
representatives of (global) civil society: the discourses of 'civil society can contribute',
'civil society must be informed', 'civil society is confusing' and 'civil society is not that
relevant'. These discourses construct civil society as either a contributor of technical
expertise, a recipient of information, a source of confusion or irrelevant to WTO
activities. The only space the intersection of these discourses leaves open for civil
society to be actively involved in debates is thus as a contributor of technical expertise.
More passive involvement is sanctioned by the 'civil society must be informed'
70 Africa Group, 26 June 2003 communication to the TRIPSCouncil (WTO document IP/C/W/404)
71 Bolivia, 26 February 2010 communication to the TRIPSCouncil (WTO document IP/C/W/545)
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discourse, but civil society organisations are otherwise constructed as confusing or
irrelevant, and therefore unhelpful or unnecessary participants in dialogue and debate.
In a context where TRIPSCouncil discussions have come to focus increasingly narrowly
on disclosure of origin, prior informed consent and benefit-sharing as posited solutions
to the misappropriation of traditional knowledge and biodiversity, and most delegates
concerned about the 'misappropriation' of traditional knowledge and biodiversity
implicitly accept the patent system as an appropriate mechanism for protection, this
active involvement entails engaging in relatively technical, legalistic debates which take
the patent system as a point of departure. The preferred forms of subjectivity discussed
in Chapter Six reinforce this narrowing of the debate to issues surrounding disclosure of
origin, prior informed consent and benefit-sharing. Representatives of civil society who
wish to engage in active dialogue are expected to enact subject positions such as the
'the aide', 'the technical expert', 'the anonymous contributor', 'the pragmatist', 'the
non-challenging interlocutor', and 'the responsible member of the trade community', all
of which require an acceptance of trade officials' and trade delegates' perceptions of
what constitute relevant issues and problems, and a willingness and ability to apply
technical knowledge and expertise to recognised negotiating issues. Like the discourses
which permeate Secretariat officials' and delegates' understandings of the role 'global
civil society' can play in trade negotiations, these legitimate forms of subjectivity thus
reward would-be participants in dialogue with the WTO who work and, crucially, can
provide support for negotiations within the relatively narrow terms of reference that
TRIPSCouncil discussions have increasingly taken.72
Thus interactions between representatives of civil society and the WTO on the subject of
TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity have often focused on sharing evidence
and technical expertise which supports the specific discussions taking place in the TRIPS
Council. Interviewees working in Geneva-based organisations who regularly interact
with national delegates and Secretariat staff reported providing support for the
development of the disclosure of origin proposal which has come to dominate
discussions in the TRIPSCouncil in the form of analysts and research. A programme
director in one Geneva-based NGOtold me, for example, that:
What we've tried to do is to contribute to the analytical work and the policy
work behind the proposal, particularly the disclosure proposal. So on the
disclosure proposal, we don't say that this is the solution, but we try to show
how it can be implemented, how patent laws can be amended to
incorporate such a disclosure requirement, what the situation is from a legal
point of view.
72 Examining the processes through which debates in the TRIPSCouncil have become increasingly narrow
and rarefied in terms of relevant subject matter and perspectives would, were sufficient empirical
material available, no doubt also prove to be enlightening.
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An interviewee in another Geneva-based NGO talked about providing 'technical
assistanceand advice about making decisions' to negotiating groups to enable them to
develop their positions and proposals on the so-called TRIPS-CBDissues in the TRIPS
Council. Interventions in the field of civil society-WTO interactions have also focused on
how developments in the WTO relate to work being carried out in other international
organisations on the protection of traditional knowledge and biodiversity. Indeed, this
would seem to be one of the main ways that organisations have found to raiseconcerns
about TRIPS,through highlighting differences in focus and tensions between the work in
the WTO and in other international organisations. At the 2010 Public Forum, for
example, a panel was organised on 'The (Elusive?) Quest for Coherence in Global
Negotiations and Norms: The Case of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBO),.73
At the Public Symposium held in 2005, a panel was held on 'Disclosure Requirements:
Incorporating the CBDPrinciples in the TRIPSAgreement On the Roadto Hong Kong',14a
focus which mirrored efforts in the TRIPSCouncil to use commitments under the CBOas
a lever to prompt discussion on traditional knowledge and biodiversity.
Removed from discussion, however, are topics such as whether patents on any form of
life are ethical, and the related question of whether Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS
Agreement should oblige WTO member states to provide intellectual property
protection to forms of life such as plant varieties. As one interviewee in a Geneva-based
NGOput it, 'the whole issueof whether you can patent life has fallen out of the debate.
Events have overtaken the TRIPS-CBDdimension of discussions,in many ways we would
like to get this out of the way, and get back to the patents-on-life issue'. Another
interviewee in one of the NGOsthat has been most involved in generating awarenessof
issues around biopiracy and misappropriation of traditional knowledge made a similar
polnt, telling me that 'we're talking to some of our NGO friends about the need to
actually revive the campaign on no patents on life'. Also erased are debates about
whether patents are an appropriate mechanism to protect traditional knowledge and
biodiversity, and the risks associated with drawing these elements into a global
intellectual property regime based around a model of private property and private
ownership of ideas. An EUofficial I interviewed, for example, was very clear that civil
society reports and proposals need to work with the existing patent system if they are to
be useful and taken seriously by negotiators: 'revamping the IP system, eliminating
73 Session38 of the 2010 Public Forum. The Public Forum programme is available here:
http:Uwww.wto.org!english/forumse/publicforumloe/programmee.htm
74 Session 17 of the 2005 Public Symposium (these events became known as Public Forums from 2006).
. The programme is available here:
http://www.wto.org!english/newse/eventse/sympOse/sympdevagendaprOgOse.htm
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patents, these are positions that are not politically viable. We can't propose things that
are not politically realistic'.
Also notable for their absence are strands of thinking and argument that invoke themes
such as spirituality, alternative epistemologies, culture and identity, despite their
importance to the communities whose so-called traditional knowledge is the subject of
discussion. It was only after travelling to Peru and interviewing representatives of
peasants' and indigenous associations, for example, that I became aware of debates and
concerns about TRIPS that are rooted in alternative epistemologies and identities,
despite having followed TRIPSCouncil discussions for several years and having already
carried out thirty in-depth interviews with NGO representatives, national delegates and
Secretariat staff who regularly interact in Geneva. The director of a peasants'
association based on Lima, for example, was surprised that nobody in Geneva had
mentioned Andean identity and epistemology when discussing concerns about TRIPS
and traditional knowledge with me. As he put it:
lTu no has escuchado hablar de cosmovisi6n andina? Esmuy practtco, es 10
que nosotros encontramos empezando nomas, porque estuvimos
estudiando las practlcas. Es que si tu no entiendes la cosmovisi6n, no
entiendes nada. As! nomas,
You've never heard anyone talk about Andean cosmovision? It's very
practical, that's what we found when we started, because we were studying
practices. If you don't understand the cosmovision, you don't understand
anything. That's how it is.
Another interviewee in a Geneva-based NGO told me that despite working on
indigenous rights in other arenas, his organisation 'does not address the rights of
indigenous peoples in the WTO context' because there's a 'lack of purchase' for these
concerns in this context. Questions of culture, identity and indigenous rights, despite
their centrality to communities whose practices and knowledge are perceived to require
protection, are thus also rarefied out of Geneva-baseddialogue and debates.
Rarefaction of Legitimate Perspectives
The second type of rarefaction is closely connected to this narrowing of the subject
matter of debates on TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity, and consists of a
narrowing or scarcity of the theoretical perspectives and worldviews from which these
issues can be approached. The narrowing of the subject matter to technical, legalistic
debates around disclosure of origin, prior informed consent and benefit-sharing already
places limits on the perspectives and worldviews that are considered relevant, through
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privileging legalistic frameworks and conceptualisations of the issues. As an interviewee
in a Geneva-based NGO that does not engage in debates about TRIPS,traditional
knowledge and biodiversity told me, 'strong legal expertise is necessary in this area. We
can read and understand the TRIPStext in a general sense, but that text is a tough one
to understand, and we can't bring any added value to this work'. Lackof relevant legal
expertise, combined with a sensethat other organisations are better placed to engage in
the details of debates as they have come to be framed, thus leads individuals and
organisations that do not consider themselves experts in intellectual property law to
withdraw from dialogue. This in turn means, of course, that the narrow, patent system-
focused framing of WTO debates on TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity
remains unchallenged. This privileging of technical, legalistic perspectives overlaps and
intersects with the processes of subjectification and preferred forms of subjectivity
discussed in Chapter Six, which encourage and reward the adoption of trade-friendly
vocabularies and frameworks. The types of perspectives that are welcomed, then, in
discussions relating to intellectual property, traditional knowledge and biodiversity are
those that are rooted in legalistic understandings of the issues, and accept trade
liberalisation as the overarching framework of discussions. As one of the national
delegates I interviewed put it, 'we should never forget what the WTO is there for:
promoting free trade. Neither the delegates nor the NGOsshould forget that'.
As with the rarefaction of subject matter, this narrowing of legitimate perspectives
excludes many of the strands of thinking and discussionabout intellectual property and
the protection of traditional knowledge and biodiversity that have been articulated
within Peruvian civil society. According to a Peruvian journalist and consultant I
interviewed who works on issuesrelating to biodiversity and indigenous rights:
Y tu me preguntas, en el Peru, llos debates sobre derechos de propiedad
intelectual que se generan a nivel de las comunidades y de la sociedad civil
incorporan el tema de la cosmovlslon? Sf. Y 10 incorporan fuertemente. tOe
que manera la sociedad civil que representa a toda esta movilidad social 10
traslada? No, no existen esos canales. Tu hablas de algo bien interesante
cuando dices, haces una nota aqul, de que la Organizacion Mundial de
Comercio, como que tiene una preferencia por escuchar la opinion de ONGs
que se dedican mas profesionalmente al tema de biodiversidad y propiedad
intelectual. De hecho es asf, Es mucho mas facll hablar en esos niveles
tecnlcos. Pero esos niveles tecnicos no estan expresando la problernattca
por ejemplo de los pueblos lndfgenas andinosy amazonicos.
And you ask me if, in Peru, the debates about intellectual property rights
that are taking place within communities and civil society include the topic of
cosmovision. Yesthey do. And it's a very important part of these debates.
How does the civil society that represents all this movement transmit this
topic? It doesn't, there aren't any channels that transmit it. You talk about
157
something very interesting when you say, there's a note here, that in the
World Trade Organisation, there's a preference for listening to the opinion of
NGOs which dedicate themselves more professionally to the topic of
biodiversity and intellectual property. In fact that's how it is. It's much
easier to talk at these technical levels. But these technical levels are not
expressing the problems faced by Andean and Amazonian indigenous
peoples.
What is interesting here is the role attributed to what we might call 'global civil society'
in maintaining the narrowness of perspectives that are permitted in debates about
TRIPS. Interventions rooted in alternative epistemologies such as Andean cosmovision
are not only not heard or recognised as legitimate by trade officials and delegates to the
WTO, but are also not recognised, translated and channelled by the mainly international
NGOs that interact with representatives of the WTO on a regular basis.
Another interviewee in Peru, the director of a peasants' association, talked about the
lack of appreciation and awareness within the WTO of non-market based approaches to
the natural world and knowledge relating to it. As he put it:
Entonces eso, cuando la Organization Mundial de Comercio hace sus
dispositivos, sus arreglos, nunca esta viendo esta vida, esta viendo la otra
nom as, inclusion al mercado. Y la andina no es la (mica lno? Porque hay
agriculturas tan antiguas como esta en Centroarnerlca, en Africa, en Asia, en
la India, en la China, Medio Oriente, son centros de agricultura y cultura
original, que bueno, segura mente por alia deben estar tarnblen
conservandose algo ... Uno sale al campo nornas, y si quieres ver, 10 ves. Un
tecnlco del Ministerio de Agricultura sale y no ve estas cosas.
So when the World Trade Organisation is creating its mechanisms, its
agreements, it's never looking at this type of life, it's just looking at the other
type, insertion into the market. And Andean life is not the only one [that's
overlooked]. Because there are forms of agriculture as old as this one in
Central America, in Africa, in Asia, in India, in China, in the Middle East, they
are centres of original agriculture and culture, and I'm sure they must be
trying to conserve parts of this there as well ... You only have to go out into
the countryside and if you want to see it, you see it. A technician from the
Ministry of Agriculture goes out and doesn't see these things.
Perspectives which seek to protect and conserve traditional knowledge and practices
without seeking to commodify them and absorb them into a capitalist system of
accumulation are also, it seems, not recognised or even understood by those who work
in the WTO, or indeed by other representatives of the Peruvian state. According to the
same interviewee, 'serla bonito ponerle un manifiesto, la suprema ignorancia de los
decidores politicos a todo nivel sobre esta cuestlon de cosmovislon, nada mas. Para ver
cuantos de ellos que dan leyes para la vida de otros saben algo' (it would be wonderful
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to present a manifesto to them, about the complete ignorance of political decision-
makers about this matter of cosmovision, just that. To see how many of those who
make laws about other people's lives know anything about it). These non-market
approaches to knowledge and nature, aswell asthe cultural practices they are rooted In,
are thus removed from view and consideration, and not treated as relevant parts of the
debate over TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity.
Rarefaction of the Knowing, Speaking Subject
The narrowing of the subject matter and of the perspectives that are recognised as
legitimate feed into a third form of rarefaction, which generates a scarcity of subjects
who are considered qualified to know and speak with authority about intellectual
property and the protection of traditional knowledge and biodiversity. This form of
rarefaction works through a number of interconnected channels. The combination of
discourses, governmental technologies and preferred subjectivities already discussed
work, firstly, to render certain types of knowing, speaking subject more visible and
legitimate than others in the field of civil society-WTD interactions. Those with legal
training and the ability and willingness to operate within legalistic frameworks and
conceptualisations of the issues are, at both the national and transnational levels at
which debates have taken place, assumed to have most authority and legitimacy as
representatives of (global) civil society, whilst others are invisibilised and sidelined. The
Geneva focus of the WTD Secretariat's attempts to generate spaces of interaction
between civil society and the WTD also plays a role here, and, as discussed in more
general terms in Chapter Four, feeds into the regime of visibility and invisibility
associated with this field. Rarefaction also works through decisions made by individuals
about whether to participate in the field of civil society-WTD interactions based, for
example, on their willingness and ability to adopt the necessarysubject positions and
preferred vocabularies and frameworks. Not all those who wish to participate in
international debates about the protection of traditional knowledge are comfortable
with the preferred forms of subjectivity and other rituals associated with the field, and
thus choose not to pursue and/or maintain their involvement in WTD-focused debates.
This rarefaction of legitimate speaking subjects is perhaps easiest to observe in Peru,
where the preferential treatment and status of individuals and organisations that
approach the issues through legal lenses is most striking and obvious. Virtually every
government official I talked to, when askedabout the topic of traditional knowledge and
Intellectual property and about debates that have taken place on these issues in Peru,
referred me to one particular Peruvian NGD, an organisation described by the director
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of another Peruvian civil society association as 'una plataforma muy muy capaz, pero
muy tecnlca y abogados. No son los ciudadanos de a pie' (a very very capable group, but
very technical, they're lawyers. They are not the average person in the street).
Although some officials named other organisations or individuals who worked on issues
relating to traditional knowledge, intellectual property and trade policy when
encouraged or asked directly, this one NGOwas always identified as the main, if not the
only, organisation whose staff could tell me something about the protection of
traditional knowledge in Peru. Other organisations, despite their scientific or agronomic
expertise, or their more direct links to indigenous communities and their perspectives
and concerns, were generally less visible to state officials, and thus not invited to
meetings with government representatives or civil society dialogues and information
sessions. According to the director of one of these more scientific NGOs:
Yo diria que hay un proceso de selecclon un poco debajo de la mesa, como
decimos en el Peru, por el cual ya existen algunas personas 0 instituciones
que son las que normalmente van a recibir las consultorias que haya 0 van a
ser pues los eternos representantes del pensamiento naclonal, Y eso no me
parece justo.
I would say there's a process of selection that happens a bit underneath the
table as we say in Peru, in which there are already some people or
institutions which are those that normally participate in consultancy
processes or will always be seen to be the perpetual representatives of
national thinking. And this doesn't seem fair to me.
The Peruvian consultant and journalist mentioned earlier also commented on the lack of
recognition and possibilities for participation of indigenous communities and
movements in state-civil society debates about intellectual property and traditional
knowledge:
Cuando se debatlo el tema de biodiversidad y propiedad intelectual de los
pueblos indigenas en el marco del tratado de libre comercio, no fueron los
pueblos indigenas los que participaron. Fue la sociedad civil 0 las ONGsque
tenian una vocaclon por el tema. AI final los pueblos indigenas han
cuestionado el tratado de libre comercio, pero la sociedad civil que maneja
el tema defiende esa posicion. Entonces encuentras que entre el
movimiento social 0 los movimientos indigenas y esa sociedad civil hay una
confrontaclon, que tu la puedes ver no solamente en el tema de
biodiversidad y propiedad intelectual, sino que tamblen la puedes ver en los
debates recientes sobre el tema de levantamiento de los indigenas en el
norte, sobre la necesidad de derogar determinadas leyes. Entonces la
sociedad civil 0 las ONGs que manejan el tema 10 manejan de una manera
excluyente, y no permiten una partlclpaclon directa de los pueblos indigenas.
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When the topic of biodiversity and indigenous peoples' intellectual property
was discussed in the context of the free trade agreement," it wasn't the
indigenous peoples who participated. It was civil society or NGOs who focus
professionally on the topic. In the end the indigenous peoples questioned
the free trade agreement, but the civil society that works on the topic
supports it. So you find that between the social movement or the
indigenous movements and this civil society there's a confrontation, that you
can see not only with the topic of biodiversity and intellectual property but
also in the recent debates about the indigenous mobilisation in the north."
about the need to revoke particular laws, and so on. So the civil society or
NGOs who work on the topic work on it in an exclusive way, and they don't
allow indigenous peoples to participate directly.
The Peruvian civil society that speaks with authority about intellectual property,
traditional knowledge and biodiversity does not include, it seems, indigenous
communities and their assoclatlons." nor does it include associations that conceptualise
and approach the issues from non-legalistic perspectives.
This rarefaction of the speaking, knowing subject in Peruvian debates is mirrored in the
spaces of interaction in which dialogue takes place in Geneva. Rarefaction of the
speaking subject here is linked not only to the combination of discourses, governmental
technologies and preferred forms of subjectivity in the field of civil society-WTO
interactions already discussed which render certain speaking subjects more visible and
legitimate than others, but also to the costs and compromises associated with
maintaining a presence in Geneva. The only Peruvian civil society organisation, for
example, that has participated regularly in dialogue with representatives of the WTO is,
tellingly, the same legally-oriented Peruvian NGO discussed above. As one of this NGO's
legal experts told me, when asked whether other Peruvian organisations have been
present in Geneva-based debates:
Yo creo que somos en todo caso una de las pocas. Si me preguntas que otra
crganizaclon participa 0 ha participado en estos foros... En la OMC, la verdad
es que, no se cual otra, te estoy franco. En OMPI, en CBO, 51, he visto otras
organizaciones, representantes indlgenas incluso. Y han tenido una
7S The Peru-US Free Trade Agreement, signed in 2006. The text of the agreement is available here:
hUD:Uwww.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreementsIperu-tpa/final-text. The topic of
traditional knowledge and biodiversity appears in Annex III of the agreement, rather than in the main text.
76 The indigenous uprising in Bagua from April to June 2009 involving Amazonian indigenous groups
seeking the repeal of a series of decrees that permit the sale of indigenous territories to private
companies.
77 Brendan Tobin and Krystyna Swiderska raise similar concerns about the lack of indigenous participation
and support for government positions in their analysis of the processes through which a working group
attached to INDECOPI, the Peruvian Institute for Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Protection
developed a sui generis Regime to Protect the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples in 1999, as
required by the Convention on Biological Diversity (2001).
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participaci6n mas activa. Pero en la OMC, creo que tenemos la suerte de ser
una de las muy pocas que ha tenido la poslbllldad de intervenir. V bueno,
hemos podido canallzar nuestras ideas por las instancias mas 0 menos
oficiales.
I think we're probably one of the few. If you askme what other organisation
participates or has participated in these forums... In the WTO, the truth is, I
don't know of any other, to be frank. In WIPO, in the CBO,yes, I've seen
other organisations, even indigenous representatives. And they've
participated in a more active way. But in the WTO, I think we're lucky
enough to be one of the very few [organisations] that has been able to
intervene in debates. And we've been able to feed our ideas into more or
lessofficial channels.
Another interViewee, the director of a peasants' association who previously spent time
in Genevaparticipating in both WIPO meetings and seminars and workshops organised
by the Geneva-basedNGOsbut has stopped attending, talked about his discomfort not
only at using up resources which could be more usefully spent on other types of work,
but alsoat adopting the forms of subjectivity demanded by these events. As he put it, lir
a Ginebra cada vez, es diflcil por la consciencia, te pones una noche en hotel, te cuesta
300 euros, sudas, no puedes dormir de verguenza' (going to Geneva every time, it's
difficult for the conscience, you pay for a night in a hotel, it costs you 300 Euros, you
start sweating, you can't sleep you feel so ashamed). He also told me that, lsi uno esta
metido en Ginebra, uno pierde contacto con la realidad. Esmuy virtual, ... es un mundo
muy extraiio. V las cosas que se hablan pues, el lenguaje de las Naciones Unidas y las
discusiones polltlcas, es una discusi6n muy virtualista' (if you're very involved in what
happens in Geneva, you lose contact with reality. It's very virtual, ... it's a very strange
world. And the things they talk about, the language of the United Nations and political
discussion, such virtual discussions). He illustrated this sense of dislocation with a story
about being invited to speak at a civil society-organised event about intellectual
property and traditional knowledge:
Me invitaron hablar aSI, 10 lIamaban desayuno croissants, cafe croissants.
Copioso, mucha comida, muchos embajadores, todos los delegados a la
OMC, para que escuchen otras perspectivas. Vo deda, mira, para mf, el
conocimiento tradicional, sobre todo en la OMC, se usa, los gobiernos 10
usan como un bargaining chip. No es nada de los derechos de las
comunidades. Escomo sacan beneficios para los elites nacionales. Como es
que dan el acceso a mercados para los ricos del pals, no para las
comunidades. Entonces a ml me pareda muy surrealista que tu puedes
hablar con gente que esta utilizando el conocimiento tradicional como solo
una banderita de batalla, como una ventaja de negociaci6n, para sacarle
beneficios en favor de las clasesque oprimen a los dueiios del conocimiento
tradicional.
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They invited me to speak at what they called a croissant breakfast, coffee
and croissants. Copious, lots of food, many ambassadors, all the delegates
to the WTO, so they can listen to other perspectives. I said, look, for me,
traditional knowledge, above all in the WTO, is being used, governments are
using it as a bargaining chip. It has nothing to do with communities' rights.
It's about getting benefits for national elites. How to get market accessfor
the rich, not for the communities. So it was very surreal to be talking to
people who are using traditional knowledge as a kind of battle flag, as a
negotiating advantage, to get benefits for the classesthat are oppressing the
owners of traditional knowledge.
Because of the costs involved and the discomfort and annoyance provoked by the
virtual, 'tecnocratlco' (technocratic) terms of the Geneva debates, he and his
organisation have decided not to continue attempting to participate directly in these
spacesof interaction:
Yo creo que 10 mas importante es el trabajo en el campo. Yo 10 veo asl, Es
importante pienso sl, es muy importante tener impacto internacional, y
tenemos colaboradores, por ejemplo hay liED en Inglaterra con quienes a
veces hacemos algo, podriamos hacer un poco mas de informaci6n a nivel
internacional. Tenemos colaboradores en EstadosUnidos, somos parte de
redes. Pero tener por ejemplo una oficina 0 una presencia en Ginebra, no 10
veo muy necesario. Imaginate, con los costos de tener una oficina alia, todo
el trabajo que podemos hacer en el campo. Yo creo que las organizaciones
que ya estan en Ginebra, ellos son los que necesitan cambiar. Ellosnecesitan
dar mas apertura.
I think the most important thing is the work in the countryside. That's the
way I see it. It is important I think, it's very important to have an
international impact, and have collaborators, for example there's liED
[International Institute for Environment and Development] in Englandwe do
things with occasionally, we could do a bit more about informing people at
the international level. We have collaborators in the United States, we're
part of networks. But to have an office or presence in Geneva, I don't think
it's necessary. Imagine, with the costs of having an office there, all the work
we could do in the countryside. I think the organisations that are already in
Geneva, they're the ones that need to change. They need to be more open.
The narrowing of authoritative speakingsubjects in Geneva-baseddebates does not only
affect indigenous and peasants' associations from Peru, however, but has a more
general impact on representatives of indigenous organisations aswell asother lesswell-
funded organisations. An interviewee in a Geneva-based NGO told me, for example,
that none of the big indigenous civil society groups such as Via Campesina or the
International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity are involved at the WTO 'because
there's no lever for them, they have no presence in Geneva'. Another Geneva-based
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NGO researcher told me that 'unless organisations have the funding to be here, they're
excluded from the process [of dialogue]'. The regime of visibility that has emerged in
the field of civil society-WTD interactions, which, as discussed in Chapter Four, favours
organisations that maintain a permanent or regular presence in Geneva and use
technical, economically-oriented vocabularies, thus works to rarefy the speaking
subjects in debates about traditional knowledge and biodiversity in such a way that the
voices and perspectives of indigenous associations and other community organisations
are removed and erased. As one of the delegates 1interviewed put it, it's the 'Quakers,
ICTSD,South Centre, ClEL, the usual suspects' that are present and active in debates
about traditional knowledge and biodiversity in this field, without, as the examples
discussed reveal, necessarily representing any of the views or perspectives of
communities whose knowledge and cultural practices are in need of greater protection.
A 'Global' Civil Society?
In rarefying the subject matter, legitimate perspectives and knowing, speaking subjects
in debates on intellectual property, traditional knowledge and biodiversity, the field of
civil society-WTD interaction rewards individuals and organisations that can participate
in dialogue at a legalistic, technical level, and that accept the patent system and the
model of private ownership it embodies as an appropriate mechanism for protection.
The Geneva focus of the spaces of interaction, and the importance of informal practices
and personalised relationships, simultaneously rewards individuals and organisations
that have established a permanent or regular presence in Geneva, and demonstrated
their commitment and reliability through regular, non-challenging interaction with
delegates and Secretariat staff. The 'global civil society' that is called forward and
constructed as legitimate in the field of civil societY-WTD interaction is thus one which is
conversant in legalistic vocabularies and frameworks, does not challenge the model of
private ownership and accumulation underpinning Western intellectual property
regimes, and which has access to sufficient funding and a willingness to use it to
maintain a presence in Geneva.
As the discussion of the different forms of rarefaction reveals, not all of those who wish
to input into global debates about intellectual property and traditional knowledge are
able or willing to adopt the forms of subjectivity and perspectives on knowledge and the
natural world required to be part of this 'global civil society', or to expend the material
resources required to maintain the required presence in Geneva. In rarefying the
subject matter, legitimate perspectives and knowing, speaking subjects in debates on
TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity, the field of civil society-WTD interactions
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works to marginalise and exclude many of the voices and strands of thinking that are
present in the networks and organisations conventionally understood to constitute
'global civil society' (see e.g. Keane 2003: 8-9; Scholte 2002b: 146-7). The field of civil
society-WTO interactions thus serves to amplify the voices and perspectives of the
predominantly (but not, it is important to note, exclusively) Northern, professionalised
NGOsthat do not challenge the patent system or the existence and underlying principles
of the WTO, whilst marginalising indigenous and other critical voices and perspectives.
The field thus amplifies broader discourses about the value of private property, the
necessity of ongoing capitalist accumulation, individualist conceptions of knowledge and
intellectual and creative endeavour, and the supremacy of liberal-rationalist worldviews
at the expense of perspectives which are rooted in alternative epistemologies and
conceptualisations ofthe social and natural world. AsJanet Newman hasnoted:
Discoursesare the product of ongoing work that seeksto hold them together
in the face of other possible social and political imaginaries. What is
important is the way some discourses are amplified through the political
process, how they are coupled with others in new discursive articulations
and how they become part of a new 'common sense' about the best way to
govern.
(2005b: 211)
The 'common sense' that is promoted in and through the field of civil society-WTO
interactions is thus one which is rooted in Western epistemologies and conceptions of
the social and natural world. Other forms of common sense, including indigenous
perspectives and frameworks, along with the individuals and organisations that work
within them, have been rarefied out of this 'global civil society', despite their proximity
and, one might assume, relevance to debates about traditional knowledge and
.biodiversity. As the director of one Peruvian indigenous association put it:
Laglobalidad sigue siendo para algunosy no para todos. Seaplica el derecho
para algunos pero no para otros. Me parece todavia un proceso muy largo
que hay que seguir para el respeto e el reconocimiento de nuestros derechos
en igualdad de condiciones como ciudadanosdel mundo.
Globality continues to be for some but not for all. Rights apply to some but
not to all. It seems to me there's still a long way to go before our rights are
recognised under equal conditions ascitizensof the world.
The field of civil society-WTO interactions thus appears to function in ways which are
consistent with critiques of 'global civil society' developed by scholarsworking within so-
called 'post-colonial' perspectives. Pashaand Blaney,for example, have argued that:
Though TAL [transnational associational life] may be a site of possible
challenges to the oligarchical organisation of contemporary global political
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economy, it also appears as a basis for sustaining the dominance of a narrow
band of humanity; to the extent that GCSrepresents an alternative vision,
this might be seen, then, as equally hegemonic, enacting the "global" values
of North American and European activists, in lieu of a genuinely deliberative
process.
(1998: 419; see also Kamat 2004: 156)
The perspectives, values and worldviews that are accepted as legitimate and amplified
through the discourses, governmental technologies and preferred forms of subjectivity
in this field are predominantly Northern. As just discussed, the interventions that are
most valued and welcomed are those that accept the model of private ownership and
accumulation underpinning Western intellectual property regimes, and that work with
individualist conceptions of knowledge and intellectual and creative endeavour.
However, the hegemonic processes at work in the field of civil society-WTO interactions
are not asstraightforward as those suggested by Pashaand Blaney. What matters most
is not geographical location but what we might term 'cultural location'. Not all NGOs
from Europe and North America work with culturally 'Northern' values and
understandings; not all NGOsfrom other parts of the world enact alternative, critical or
subaltern worldviews. NGOsin the South can and do also enact more 'Northern' values
and subjectivities; indeed, one of the biggest tensions that can be observed within
Peruvian 'civil society' is the 'confrontaci6n' (confrontation), as one interviewee put it,
between professionalised NGOsthat enact more rationalist-individualistic and legalistic
forms of subjectivity, on the one hand, and indigenous associations whose perspectives
on knowledge and the natural world are rooted, self-consciously at times, in Andean
cosmovision, on the other. The 'narrow band of humanity' (Pasha and Blaney 1998:
419) whose interests and perspectives might be seen to dominate the field of civil
society-WTO interactions thus does not only include Europeans and North Americans,
but also sections of 'Southern' civil society that espouse market principles and market-
basedapproaches to governing traditional knowledge and biodiversity.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analysed the ways in which the dominant discourses about 'global
civil society' within the WTO, the technologies of government that work across the
spaces of interaction between civil society and the WTO, and the preferred forms of
subjectivity in these spaces combine to rarefy the subject matter, legitimate
perspectives and knowing, speaking subjects in debates on TRIPS,traditional knowledge
and biodiversity. I have argued that the field of civil society-WTO interactions has
worked to narrow the subject matter of debates so as to render invisible topics such as
whether patents on any form of life are ethical, the related question of whether Article
27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement should oblige WTO member states to provide
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intellectual property protection to forms of life such as plant varieties, and strands of
thinking and argument that invoke themes such as spirituality, alternative
epistemologies, culture and identity, despite their importance to the communities
whose so-called traditional knowledge is the subject of discussion. The types of
perspectives that are welcomed in the field are those that are rooted in legalistic
understandings of the issues, and accept trade liberalisation as the overarching
framework of discussions, while interventions rooted in alternative epistemologies such
as Andean cosmovision are not heard or recognised as legitimate. I have also argued
that the perspectives, values and worldviews that are amplified through the discourses,
governmental technologies and preferred forms of subjectivity in this field are
predominantly Northern. In the next chapter, I explore some of the implications of
these arguments, and draw some conclusions about the ways in which the field of civil
society-WTO interactions is being governed.
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Conclusion
Governing Global Civil Society
In this concluding chapter, I explore some of the implications of the analysis and
arguments developed throughout the thesis, and offer a series of reflections on the
forms of restriction and control at work in the field of civil society-WTO interactions and
in 'global civil society' more broadly. I comment, firstly, on the ways in which the
possibilities of action of '(global) civil society' are being structured in the field of civil
society-WTO interactions, and the forms of global governmentality that are thereby
being enacted and promoted. I then focus on the role played by international Geneva-
based NGOsin these governing processes,and suggest that these organisations play an
important role in shaping and limiting the possibilities of participation of other parts of
'(global) civil society' and in enabling and (re)producing particular forms and mentalities
of governing. I conclude by considering the broader implications of this study for
scholarly understanding of the role played by civil society in global governance, and
suggest a number of avenues for future research based on the analysis and arguments
developed throughout this thesis.
Governing 'Global Civil Society'
The discourses, technologies of government and preferred forms of subjectivity in the
field of civil society-WTO interactions, in shaping the possibilities of action of different
kinds of civil SOCietyorganisations and rarefying debates, work, I argue, to govern the
sphere of activity conventionally referred to as 'global civil society' in particular ways. As
discussed in Chapter Two, governing, in the perspective underpinning this study, is
conceptualised as a set of processes that shape behaviours and subjectivities through
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facilitating and constraining particular models of action. As Foucault put it, '[t]O govern
... is to structure the possible field of action of others' (1983: 221). The model of action
facilitated and legitimated by the discourses,technologies of government and preferred
forms of subjectivity already discussed is one which requires would-be participants in
dialogue to establish a regular or permanent presence in Geneva, to participate in
technical, legalistic discussionsabout WTOpolicy that build on rather than challenge the
existing multilateral trade system, and to enact docile forms of subjectivity that respect
the priorities and authority of national delegates. The 'global' subjectivity that is
promoted is one which does not challenge the logics of trade liberalisation, private
ownership and capitalist accumulation, accepts individualist models of knowledge-
creation and protection, and is prepared to conceptualise debates around TRIPS,
traditional knowledge and biodiversity as a technical and legal issue which can be
resolved through applying appropriate legal expertise. Modes of relating and
communicating that are more confrontational or more emotional, or that mobilise
alternative conceptualisations of the issuesat stake, are constrained and discouraged,
and contributions that are rooted in alternative epistemologies such as Andean
cosmovision or that question the desirability of ongoing commodification of knowledge
and nature are rarefied out of debates. Models of action and subjectivities that do not
conform to the docile, legalistiC, market-based norm are, in other words, suppressed
and excluded. Michael Merlingen has suggested that 'governance is not just about the
production of discrimination. It is also (often) about the suppression of otherness as a
condition for the realisation of the order(liness} imagined by authorities' (2006: 191). In
the field of civil society-WTO interactions, what is being suppressed are non-market,
non-legalistic and non-Western modes of being, intervening and conceptualising the
issuesat stake.
Michel Foucault argued that civil society is a 'necessary correlate of the state', a
constructed object that enables, legitimises and calls for particular forms of government
or rule (2009: 350). As Graham Burchell has put it, '[c]ivil society is not, Foucault says,a
kind of aboriginal reality that finally we are forced to recognise; it is not a natural given
standing in opposition to the timeless essential nature of the state... It is, he says,the
correlate of a political technology of government' (1991: 141). Scholars of 'global civil
society' have taken up this understanding of civil society as a constructed object which
can tell us something about global technologies of government, and have started to
analyse and theorise the sort of global governance that is enabled and called for by
particular constructions of '(global) civil society'. Jens Bartelson, for example, has
argued that 'theories of global civil society are not to be understood primarily as
theories about global governance at all, but rather as theories that help to justify a
distinct set of practices and institutions of global governance' (2006: 386). Hakan
Seckinelgin has suggested that 'the widely used languageof civil society organisations is
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more about the entrenchment of an international liberal agenda based on a particular
form of life in market-economy social relations than about engaging with people's
expressed concerns' (2002: 375). Following this line of theorising, the docile, legalistic,
market-oriented 'global civil society' that is being called forward in the field of civil
socletv-wro interactions might be seen as a necessary correlate to a market-oriented,
legalistic, expert-dominated global governance, which relies on 'participation' to justify
and entrench its mentality and form of government. According to one of my
interviewees in Peru:
Yo creo que es bien importante en este escenario analizar como es que, y yo
creo que esto explica la razon por la cual la Organizacion Mundial de
Comercio prefiere algunas instituciones que no se oponen muy fuertemente
a 10 que plantea la OMC, y de otro lado se genera un proceso de exclusion.
Pero la razon por la cual nosotros consideramos que los multilaterales han
incorporado este tema de propiedad intelectual, biodiversidad y
conocimientos tradicionales va mas por ellado de justificar mecanismos que
• fortalezcan este enfoque de construcclon de una sociedad de mercado, y no
porque realmente esten muy preocupados en generar un proceso de diseiio
de polltlcas publicas globales en donde haya una gran participacion.
I think it's very important in this caseto analyse how, and I think this explains
why the World Trade Organisation prefers certain institutions who don't
strongly oppose what the WTO is suggesting, and why there's a process of
exclusion. But we think the reason why the multilaterals have incorporated
this theme of intellectual property, biodiversity and traditional knowledge is
more about justifying mechanisms that strengthen this focus on constructing
a market society and not because they're really worried about creating a
process to devise global public policy with large-scaleparticipation.
The logic of competition and preference for technical expertise in evidence in the field of
civil society-WTO relations might thus be seen as a correlate of a broader mentality of
government which favours and reproduces market logics and anaesthetises global
struggles over knowledge and biodiversity by constructing them as technical problems
with technical solutions.
In highlighting the ways in which the possibilities of action in the field of civil society-
WTO interactions are structured and governed, the analysis developed in this thesis
challenges many existing accounts of the relationship emerging between the WTO and
NGOs. Although some scholars have identified restrictions and exclusions in the WTO's
relations with civil society (e.g. Scholte 2004: 154-5; Williams 2005: 38), analysis of civil
society-WTD relations has tended to focus on the enhanced transparency, accountability
and democratic legitimacy that increased NGO involvement can bring (e.g. Charnovitz
2003; Dunoff 1998, 2003; Smythe and Smith 2006), and the 'new energy, ideas, and
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values' that NGOscan inject into deliberation in the WTO (Charnovitz 2005: 442). The
analysis developed in this thesis suggests that confidence in the ability of NGOsand
other types of civil society organisation to inject 'new energy, ideas, and values' into
WTO negotiations and contribute to more democratic global governance is misplaced.
The ideas and values that are welcomed and accepted in the field of civil society-WTD
interactions are those of a narrow sub-section of 'global civil society', i.e.
professionalised, predominantly Western NGOs that work within a framework that
accepts both trade liberalisation and a commodifying logic of private ownership of
knowledge and elements of the natural world. The perspectives of indigenous
communities and associations - those that might be considered most relevant if
analysing global governance through the lens of democratic legitimacy and
representativity - and other more critical elements of 'global civil society' are rarefied
out of debates. The processes of governing identified in the field of civil society-
relations work, in other words, to limit the ideas and values that are accepted from
'global civil society', with worrying implications for global democracy.
Governing the Field of Civil Society-WTO Interactions: The Role
ofNGOs
Although the governing of 'global civil society' just discussed, like all forms of
government, emerges through the interplay of a complex set of practices, discourses,
calculations and habitual behaviour, it is worth highlighting the particular role played by
some NGOs in these governing processes. The professionalised NGOsmost involved in
debates about TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity help enable, maintain and
(re)produce, I suggest, some of the governmental logics and forms of control and
restriction in evidence in the field of civil society-WTOinteractions. They do this through
enacting - and, indeed, helping create - the acceptable subject positions now preferred
by trade officials, national delegates and WTOSecretariat staff, making decisions about
who to invite to workshops and seminarswith WTD representatives, and helping define
the parameters and content of debates. They thus play an important role in enabling
and (re)producing particular forms and mentalities of governing, and in shaping the
possibilities of participation of other parts of '(global) civil society'. 78
71, am not the first to suggest that NGOs can play an important role in governing processes. Raymond
Bryant, for example, has argued that 'a key outcome of NGO activity in the Philippines has been the
facilitation of government in Foucault's sense of the term' (2002: 269). Ole Jacob Sending and Iver
Neumann, focusing on a more global level, have predicted the emergence of 'new practices of
government' wherein 'civil society organisations on the global level are harnessed to the tasks of
governing' (2006: 656).
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Some of the Geneva-based NGOs, for example, through organising regular meetings,
seminars, workshops and side events for national delegates, WTO Secretariat staff and
staff of other international organisations, playa significant role in helping define the
parameters and content of debates in the field of civil society-WTO interactions, and in
determining which members of '(global) civil society' are present. As discussed in
Chapter Five, these events are often presented as opportunities for 'information-
sharing' and 'brokering of knowledge', thus feeding into broader constructions of civil
society organisations as providers of neutral, expert information and guidance.
Emphasis is also placed, especially in the more closed and confidential NGO-organised
meetings, on providing technical content and facilitating delegates' understanding of
technical issues as requested by the delegates themselves. This type of focus helps
reinforce the discourse of civil society as a contributor of technical expertise, prepared
to work within the frameworks and priorities identified by national delegates, and thus
contributes to and reinforces the rarefaction of the subject matter and perspectives on
TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity that are present in the field of civil society-
WTOinteractions.
The GenevaNGOsalso make decisions about which individuals and which organisations
to invite to these events, and thereby regulate accessto these spaces of civil society-
WTO interaction based on the forms of subjectivity enacted. One former delegate, for
example, talked about the spectrum of organisations that can be found in Geneva, and
the distinctions that are frequently made between them. As he put it:
These NGOsthat we interacted with when we wanted the professors to be
flown in, I mean they were ideal material for bureaucrats, for negotiators. I
mean they were sitting there, available, because they believed in the cause,
and not necessarily making placards and banners. So that's ideal, from a
negotiator's point of view. But then there are others that are at the other
extreme, you know, the kinds who make T-shirts.
Delegates and NGOsthat make up 'the Geneva community' all distinguish, he claimed,
between these different types of organisations, so that NGOs, 'when organising an
event, would use their discretion' about who to invite, 'based on their knowledge of
what kind of NGOsthey are, what kind of people they are, the ways in which they work'.
An interviewee in one of the Geneva NGOsconfirmed that these organisations are often
reluctant to invite individuals who are not known and trusted to such events, 'because
for the LDCs[least developed countries] and others, it's important that they know the
people, because for them it would be difficult to place their confidence in someone that
they don't really know, it's important to work with people they feel comfortable with'.
This deference to national delegates' sensibilities may well be what has enabled these
NGOs to build up a relationship of trust with representatives of the WTO and ensure
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continued interaction with them, but it also has consequences for other sections of
'(global) civil society'. Whether selection processes are based on expectations about
delegates' preferences or other ideas about 'what kind of people' are desirable
participants, NGO decisions about who to invite to the Geneva-based events serve to
police and reinforce acceptable forms of subjectivity in the field of civil society-WTO
interactions.
Numerous interviewees in Peru commented on what they perceived as a lack of
openness and willingness or capacity to transmit the perspectives and concernsof many
parts of Peruvian civil society on the part of professionalised NGOsin Genevaaswell as
in Lima. One interviewee, a journalist and consultant, when talking about the
importance of Andean cosmovision to debates about intellectual property and
traditional knowledge in Peru, remarked that 'lOe que manera la sociedad civil que
representa a toda esta movilidad social 10 traslada? No, no existen estos canales' (How
does the civil society that represents all this movement transmit this topic? It doesn't,
there aren't any channels that transmit it). Another interviewee, the director of a
peasants' association, commented that 'yo creo que las organizaciones que ya estan en
Ginebra, son elias las que necesitan cambiar. Eliasnecesitan dar mas apertura' (I think
the organisations that are already in Geneva, they're the ones that need to change.
They need to be more open). Another NGOprogramme director commented that 'creo
que hay toda una dlscusion sobre como se entiende trabajo global, y yo creo que las
organizaciones grandes alii no saben hacer trabajo global' (I think there's a whole
discussion to be had about how to work globally, and I think that the big organisations
there [in Geneva] don't know how to work globally).
These interviewees in Peruvian NGOs and other associations did recognise that the
complexity of debates on intellectual property, traditional knowledge and biodiversity,
and the diversity of perspectives and interests that are present around the world make it
extremely difficult for professionalised NGOsto fully represent the views present within
'global civil SOCiety'.As the director of the peasants' association remarked:
Hay primeramente un punto que tiene que ver con la complejidad misma de
las diferentes organizaciones Y movimientos sociales que existen en el
mundo. sr hay temas comunes, como el AOPIC,Y que hacer con esto. Hay
temas tambien que son mas importantes que otros de acuerdo con el
ecosistema en que vives. Para muchos parses arnazonicos la cuestlon de
semillas es muy diferente que para los centros de origen.
First of all it has to do with the very complexity of the different organisations
and social movements that exist in the world. There are common themes,
such as the TRIPSAgreement and what to do about it. There are also themes
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that are more important than others depending on the ecosystem you live
in. For many Amazonian countries the question of seeds is very different
than for centres of origin.
However, interviewees' comments also suggested ways in which the subjectivities of
those who work in the professionalised NGOs, both in Peru and in Geneva, might be
contributing to particular kinds of filtering and rarefaction. One Lima-based NGO
programme director commented, for example, that, 'el problema es que muchas ONGs,
por su propia formaci6n en las universidades y su propia experiencia, no los [los pueblos
indlgenas] quieren ver, entonces estamos en un proceso totalmente cerrado' (the
problem is that may NGOs, because of the training they've had in university and their
own experience, don't want to see them [the indigenous communities], so we're in a
totally closed process). The director of a peasants' association remarked that:
Para mi mucho de elias han sido cooptadas por el sistema mismo. Con
excepciones, por ejemplo IPWatch, es mas virtual, es muy pequefiito, me
gusta mucho el trabajo que hacen ellos. Pero los otros dan el apoyo de la
diplomacia de las Naciones Unidas, todos estan en las reuniones, ya tienen el
lenguaje mismo.
In my opinion many of them [the Geneva NGOs] have been coopted by the
system. With exceptions, such as IPWatch, it's more virtual, it's very small, I
like their work a lot. But the others support the diplomacy of the United
Nations, they're all in the meetings, they already use that language.
He also suggested that many of the individuals working in these organisations have been
seduced by the lifestyle and luxury that comes with being part of what we might call the
Geneva 'trade community', to the extent that individuals have lost touch with what
might be happening outside this relatively small community. As he put it, 'Ia quien no Ie
va a gustar esol ... unas recepciones con embajadores tomando vino caro y champagne,
entonces ya la gente se acostumbra' (who wouldn't enjoy it? All these receptions with
ambassadors drinking expensive wine and champagne, people get used to it). The
subjectivities enacted by staff in (some of) the professionalised NGOs in both Geneva
and Peru, and what is perceived as a lack of communication with NGOsoutside the small
circle of legitimate interlocutors, thus feed into and reinforce the processes of
rarefaction in the field of civil society-WTO interactions discussed in Chapter Seven.
Individuals who approach debates about TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity
from non-market, non-legalistic frameworks find it difficult to be recognised and treated
as knowledgeable and relevant members of 'global civil SOciety' by these more
professionalised organisations, and the perspectives and concerns they wish to insert
into global debates are overlooked and supplanted by more trade-friendly, legalistic and
individualistic interventions.
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Some NGO directors and researchers are, it should be noted, self-reflexive about the
forms of restriction and control at work in the field of civil society-WTO interactions, and
their own role in sustaining them. One Geneva-basedNGOresearcher commented, for
example, that 'if someone who hasn't been based in Geneva came to do my job, they
would most likely be quite pissed off with certain things. But there are things that you
grow to accept through working here, things you accept because of the political
dynamics, such as not pushing for WTO reform'. Another Geneva-based interviewee
told me that conversations have been taking place amongst some of the GenevaNGOs
about:
how many of the NGOs were very critical of the WTO and then all of a
sudden we all look to the WTO asthe sort of desirable benchmark, because
the bilaterals are so much worse. And in a way how clever it is on behalf of
those who wanted to liberalise more, to push the NGOsinto that position. I
suppose it's becausemaybe we acceptedjust too much. In Frenchthere's an
expression, you allow your finger to go into the machinery and it takes your
whole arm off.
Notwithstanding such misgivings, staff in the GenevaNGOsgenerally prefer, for the time
being at least, to enjoy the benefits seen to accrue through interacting with
representatives of the WTO. In enacting acceptable forms of subjectivity in the field and
thereby helping rarefy debates on TRIPS,traditional knowledge and biodiversity, the
Geneva-basedNGOsmight therefore be seen to have been effectively 'harnessed to the
tasks of governing' (Sending and Neumann 2006: 656) the contours of debates and the
possibilities of action of 'global civil society' in the field of civil society-WTO interactions,
despite intentions to the contrary.
Disaggregating and Decolonising 'Global Civil Society'
In exploring the processes of governing and rarefaction at work in the field of civil
.society-WTO interactions, and, in particular, the ways in which the activities of some
professionalised NGOs feed into them, the analysis developed throughout this thesis
highlights a number of important but still relatively under-examined themes and
questions. The analysis developed points, firstly, to some of the tensions and struggles
within the field of activity conventionally referred to as 'global civil society' over what
constitutes legitimate knowledge of 'global' problems. In the case of debates about
intellectual property, traditional knowledge and biodiversity, the main axis of tension
relates to competing conceptualisations of knowledge, intellectual endeavour and what
can be privately owned. On one side are professionalised NGOsand thinktanks that
approach the issues through culturally Western, legalistic and market-oriented
perspectives that divide knowledge and the natural world into discrete, commodified
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units; on the other are rural development and indigenous associations that
conceptualise knowledge and the natural world in more holistic ways, and challenge the
notion of individual ownership of knowledge or nature. Struggles over knowledge and
what constitutes legitimate 'global' knowledge thus appear as a key site of conflict
within '(global) civil society', which warrant, this analysis suggests, further exploration
and examination.
Connected to this, the analysis highlights some of the social processes and forms of
restriction and control that lead to these more legalistic, market-oriented perspectives
being amplified at the expense of more holistic, less individualistic approaches. I have
argued that broader discourses about the role '(global) civil society' can and/or should
play in global governance, along with ideas about what forms of civil society subjectivity
are appropriate and desirable, contribute to a narrowing of legitimate perspectives and
legitimate speaking subjects in this particular field of global governance. The analysis
thus raisesquestions about whether other fields of global governance are permeated by
the same discourses and logics, and whether the same forms of invisibility and silencing
are produced when other institutions of global governance institute processes of
dialogue with '(global) civil society'. It also prompts reflection on whether and how
conventional academic modes of analysing and presenting civil society involvement in
global governance feed into the forms of rationality and visibility identified in this field.
Although practlcal, individually generated and accumulated knowledge, as discussed in
Chapter Four, plays a relatively important role in shaping WTO representatives'
responses to 'global civil society', these individuals also look to academic knowledge for
guidance and understanding of 'global civil society'. Interviewees in the Secretariat, for
example, reported 'read[ing] academic studies about civil society' to deepen their
understanding of this sphere of activity, and often had copies of relevant academic texts
on their bookshelves. A potentially fruitful area of further research therefore lies, I
suggest, in examining and theorising the connections between the forms of knowledge
mobilised and generated through scholarly enquiry and the forms of visibility that are
produced in and through contemporary fields of global governance.
The analysis developed in this thesis points, thirdly, to some of what can be gained
gained by researching the role of civil society in global governance using a multi-sited
ethnographic approach. Researching across multiple geographical and social sites has
made it possible to examine perspectives and knowledges which are invisibilised in
much official (and scholarly) debate, and to develop an account of the processes of
rarefaction through which these perspectives and knowledges are erased. The
ethnographic sensibility adopted throughout the process of generating and analysing
empirical data, and the sensitivity to diversity, complexity and the negotiation and
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transmission of meaning systems this implies, has also facilitated an examination of
some of the forms of silencing and misrecognition that operate in and through 'global
civil society'. Carrying out more multi-sited re search sensitive to the diversity and
complexity of interests, perspectives and knowledges that are present in 'global civil
society' might help subvert and break down the image of a homogenous, consensual
and unproblematically 'global' civil society that, as discussed in Chapter One, emerges
from much existing scholarship.
The analysis developed in this thesis suggests, in short, a need to better disaggregate
'global civil society' as an object of theorising and analysis, and, related to this, to
decolonise both the theory and practice of 'global civil society'. In highlighting the
struggles over what constitutes legitimate 'global' knowledge within 'global civil society'
and the forms of rarefaction at work when this 'global civil society' interacts with an
institution of global governance, this thesis illustrates some of what is masked if 'global
civil SOCiety'is analysed at the aggregate level. In masking the struggles over what
constitutes legitimate knowledge and the limits on participation in global governance,
homogenising accounts of 'global civil society' contribute to the invisibilisation and
erasure of these alternative knowledges, and the subsequent colonisation of this sphere
of activity by culturally Northern knowledges and perspectives. Scholarsof 'global civil
society', as well as practitioners in this and other fields of global governance, would be
well-advised to take the diversity and tensions within 'global civil society' more
seriously. Better disaggregating the actors, interests and knowledges at play in this
sphere would be an important step towards decolonising both the theory and practice
of 'global civil society'.
177
Bibliography
Abbott, Frederick M. (2009), Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate
Change: Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health,
ICTSD's Programme on IPRsand Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24,
Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
Abrahamsen, Rita (2004), 'The Power of Partnerships in Global Governance', Third World
Quarterly 25:8, 1453-1467
Albin, Cecilia (1999), 'Can NGOs Enhance the Effectiveness of International
Negotiation?', International Negotiation 4:3, 371-387
American Anthropological Association (1998), 'Code of Ethics', available on-line:
http://www.aaanet.org!committees!ethics!ethicscode.pdf (last accessed
04.05.11)
Amoore, Louise and Langley, Paul (2004), 'Ambiguities of Global Civil Society', Review of
International Studies 30:1, 89-110
Amoore, louise and Langley, Paul (2005), 'Global Civil Society and Global
Governmentality', in Germain, Randall D. and Kenny, Michael (eds), The Idea of
Global Civil Society, London and New York: Routledge, 137-155
Anheier, Helmut, Glasius, Marlies and Kaldor, Mary (2001), 'Introducing Global Civil
SOCiety' in Anheier, Helmut, Glasius, Marlies and Kaldor, Mary (eds) Global Civil
Society 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-22
Anheier, Helmut and Themudo, Nuno (2002), 'Organizational Forms of Global Civil
Society: Implications of Going Global' in Glasius, Marlies, Kaldor, Mary and
Anheier, Helmut (eds) Global Civil SOCiety2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
191-216
Appadurai, Arjun (1991), 'Global Ethnoscapes: Notes and Queries for a Transnational
Anthropology' in Fox, Richard G. (ed), Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the
Present, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 191-210
Appadurai, Arjun (1996), Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
Appadurai, Arjun (2002), 'Grassroots Globalisation and the Research Imagination' in
Vincent, Joan (ed), The Anthropology of Politics: A Reader in Ethnography, Theory,
and Critique, Oxford: Blackwell, 271-284
178
Asal, Victor, Nussbaum, Brian and Harrington, William O. (2007), 'Terrorism as
Transnational Advocacy: An Organizational and Tactical Examination', Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 30:1, 15-39
Axford, Barrie (2004), 'Global Civil Society or 'Networked Globality': Beyond the
Territorialist and Societalist Paradigm', Globalizations 1:2, 249-264
Baker, Gideon (2002), 'Problems in the Theorisation of Global Civil Society', Political
Studies 50:5, 928-943
Barry, Andrew, Osborne, Thomas and Rose, Nikolas (1996), 'Introduction' in Barry,
Andrew, Osborne, Thomas and Rose, Nikolas (eds), Foucault and Political Reason:
Liberalism, Neo-Iiberalism and Rationalities of Government, London: UCLPress, 1-
17
Bartelson, Jens (2006), 'Making Sense of Global Civil Society', European Journal of
International Relations 12:3, 371-395
Barwa, Sharmishta and Rai, Shirin M. (2003), 'Knowledge and/as Power: A Feminist
Critique of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights', Gender, Technology and
Development 7:1,91-113
Battiste, Marie (2007), 'Research Ethics for Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and
Heritage: Institutional and Researcher Responsibilities' in Oenzin, Norman K. and
Giardina, Michael O. (eds), Ethical Futures in Qualitative Research: Dec%nizing
the Politics of Knowledge, Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press, 111-132
Beier, J. Marshall (2005), International Relations in Uncommon Places, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan
Betsill, Michele M. and Bulkeley, Harriet (2004), 'Transnational Networks and Global
Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program',
International Studies Quarterly 48:2,471-493
Berg, Bruce l. (2004), Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, Boston:
Pearson Education
Bernard, H. Russell (2006), Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and
Quantitative Approaches, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield publishers
Beyer, Cornelia (2007), 'Non-Governmental Organizations as Motors of Change',
Government and Opposition, 42:4, 513-535
Bhagwati, Jagdish (2001), 'After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO', International Affairs
77:1,15-29
Borowiak, Craig (2004), 'Farmers' Rights: Intellectual Property Regimes and the Struggle
over Seeds', Politics and Society 32:4,511-543
179
Bourdieu, Pierre (1977), Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Bourdieu, Pierre (1990a), In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology,
Cambridge: Polity Press
Bourdieu, Pierre (1990b), The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press
Bourdieu, Pierre (1991), Language and Symbolic Power (edited and introduced by John
B. Thompson), Cambridge: Polity
Bourdieu, Pierre (1998a), Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time,
Cambridge: Polity Press
Bourdieu, Pierre (1998b), Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, Cambridge: Polity
Press
Bourdieu, Pierre (2005), The Social Structures of the Economy, Cambridge: Polity Press
Bourdieu, Pierre and Wacquant Lo'icJ. D. (1992), An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology,
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press
Bowden, Brett (2006), 'Civil SOCiety, the State, and the Limits to Global Civil Society',
Global Society 20:2, 155-178
Brassett, James (2009), 'A Pragmatic Approach to the Tobin Tax Campaign: The Politics
of Sentimental Education', European Journal of International Relations 15:3, 447-
476
Brassett, James and Smith, William (2010), 'Deliberation and Global Civil Society:
Agency, Arena, Affect', Review of International Studies 36:2,413-430
Brigg, Morgan and Bleiker, Roland (2008), 'Expanding Ethnographic Insights into Global
Politics', International Political Sociology 2:1,89-90
Brockling, Ulrich, Krasmann, Susanne and Lemke, Thomas (2011), 'From Foucault's
Lectures at the College de France to Studies of Governmentality: An Introduction'
in Brockling, Ulrich, Krasmann, Susanne and Lemke, Thomas (eds),
Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges, New York and Abingdon:
Routledge, 1-33
Broome, Andre (2009), 'When do NGOs Matter? Activist Organisations as a Source of
Change in the International Debt Regime', Global Society 23:1,59-78
Bryant, Raymond L. (2002), 'Non-Governmental Organizations and Governmentality:
"Consuming" Biodiversity and Indigenous People in the Philippines', Political
Studies 50:2,268-292
Burawoy, Michael (1998), 'The Extended Case Method', Sociological Theory 16:1, 4-33
180
Burawoy, Michael (2000a), 'Reaching for the Global' in Michael Burawoy et ai, Global
Ethnography: Forces, Connections and Imaginations in a Postmodern World,
London: University of California Press, 1-40
Burawoy, Michael (2000b), 'Grounding Globalisation' in Michael Burawoy et ai, Global
Ethnography: Forces, Connections and Imaginations in a Postmodern World,
London: University of California Press, 337-350
Burawoy, Michael (2001), 'Manufacturing the Global', Ethnography 2:2, 147-159
Burchell, Graham (1991), 'Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing lithe System of
Natural Liberty''' in Burchell, Graham, Gordon, Colin and Miller, Peter, The
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 119-
150
Carpenter, R. Charli (2007a), 'Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence
and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks', International Studies
Quarterly 51:1, 99-120
Carpenter, R. Charli (2007b), 'Studying Issue (Non)-Adoption in Transnational Advocacy
Networks', International Organization 61:3, 643-667
Chakravartty, Paula (2007), 'Governance Without Politics: Civil Society, Development
and the Postcolonial State', Internationa/Journal of Communication 1,297-317
Chandhoke, Neera (2001), 'The "Civil" and "The Political" in Civil Society',
Democratization 8:2, 1-24
Chandhoke, Neera (2002), 'The Limits of Global Civil Society' in Glasius, Marlies, Kaldor,
Mary and Anheier, Helmut (eds) Global Civil Society 2002, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 35-53
Charnovitz, Steve (2003), 'Transparency and Participation in the World Trade
Organization', Rutgers Law Review 56:4,927-959
Charnovitz, Steve (2005), 'The WTO and Cosmopolitics' in Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich and
Harrison, James (eds), Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency
and Democratic Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 437-445
Chowdry, Geeta and Nair, Sheela (2002), 'Introduction: Power in a postcolonial World:
Race, Gender, and Class in International Relations' in Chowdry, Geeta and Nair,
Sheela (eds), Power, postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race,
Gender and Class, London: Routledge, 1-32
Clifford, James (1986), 'Introduction: Partial Truths' in Clifford, James and Marcus,
George E. (eds), Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics 0/ Ethnography, london:
University of California Press, 1-26
181
Cohn, Carol (1987), 'Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals', Signs
12:4,687-718
Cohn, Carol (2006), 'Motives and Methods: Using Multi-Sited Ethnography to Study US
National Security Discourses' in Ackerly, Brooke A., Stern, Maria and True, Jacqui
(eds), Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 91-107
Colas, Alejandro (2002), International Civil Society: Social Movements in World Politics,
Cambridge: Polity Press
Coleman, Lara Montesinos and Tucker, Karen (forthcoming 2011), 'Between Discipline
and Dissent: Situated Resistance and Global Order', Globalizations 8:4
Coleman, Simon and Collins, Peter (2006), 'Introduction: 'Being ... Where?' in Coleman,
Simon and Collins, Peter (eds), Locating the Field: Space, Place and Context in
Anthropology, Oxford and New York: Berg, 1-21
Coleman, William D. and Wayland, Sarah (2006), 'The Origins of Global Civil Society and
Nonterritorial Governance: Some Empirical Reflections', Global Governance 12:3,
241-261
Collingwood, Vivien (2006), 'Non-Governmental Organisations, Power and Legitimacy in
International Society', Review of International Studies 32:3, 439-454
Comaroff, Jean and Comaroff, John (1992), Ethnography and the Historical Imagination,
Oxford: Westview Press
Comaroff, Jean and Comaroff, John (2003), 'Ethnography on an Awkward Scale:
Postcolonial Anthropology and the Violence of Abstraction', Ethnography 4:2, 147-
179




Convention on Biological Diversity (no date), 'Country Profile - Peru', available on-line:
http://www.cbd.int/countries/profile.shtml?country=peffstatus (last accessed
16.05.11)
Cooley, Alexander and Ron, James (2002), 'The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity
and the Political Economy of Transnational Action', International Security 27:1,5-
39
Correa, Carlos M. (2001), 'Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: Issues and
Options Surrounding the Protection of Traditional Knowledge', Geneva: Quaker
United Nations Office
182
Cox, Robert W. (1999), 'Civil Society at the Turn ofthe Millennium: Prospects for an
Alternative World Order', Review of International Studies 25:1, 3-28
Crang, Mike and Cook, Ian (2007), Doing Ethnographies, London: Sage
Crossley, Nick (2003), 'From Reproduction to Transformation: Social Movement Fields
and the Radical Habitus', Theory, Culture and Society 20:6,43-68
Cruikshank, Barbara (1999), The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other
Subjects, Ithaca: Cornell University Press
Czarniawska, Barbara (2004), Narratives in Social Science Research, London: Sage
Darby, Phillip (2004), 'Pursuing the Political: A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations
International', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33:1, 1-32
Dargie, Charlotte (1998), 'Observation in Political Research', Politics 18:1, 65-71
Das, Veena and Poole, Deborah (2004), 'State and Its Margins: Comparative
Ethnographies' in Das, Veena and Poole, Deborah (eds), An~hropology in the
Margins of the State, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 3-33
Davies, Charlotte Aull (1999), Reflexive Ethnography: A Guide to Researching Self and
Others, London: Routledge
Dean, Mitchell (1996), 'Foucault, Government and the Enfolding of Authority' in Barry,
Andrew, Osborne, Thomas and Rose, Nikolas (eds), Foucault and Political Reason:
Liberalism, Neoliberalism and Rationalities of Government, London: UCLPress,
209-229
Dean, Mitchell (1999), Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, London:
Sage
Death, Carl (forthcoming 2011), 'Counter-Conducts in South Africa: Power, Government
and Dissent at the World Summit', Globalizations 8:4
della Porta, Donatella (2005), 'Multiple Belongings, Tolerant Identities, and the
Construction of "Another Politics": Between the European Social Forum and Local
Social Fora' in della Porta, Donatella and Tarrow, Sidney (eds), Transnational
Protest and Global Activism, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 175-202
della Porta, Donatella and Tarrow, Sidney (200S), 'Transnational Processes and Social
Activism: An Introduction' in della Porta, Donatella and Tarrow, Sidney (eds),
Transnational Protest and Global Activism, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1-17
DeMars, William E. (2005), NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World
Politics, London: Pluto Press
Denscombe, Martyn (2003), The Good Research Guide, Maidenhead: Open University
Press
183
Denzin, Norman K. and Lincoln, Yvonna S. (2000), 'The Discipline and Practice of
Qualitative Research' in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook
of Qualitative Research (Second Edition), London: Sage, 1-28
Dingwerth, Klaus and Pattberg, Philipp (2006), 'Global Governance as a Perspective on
World Politics', Global Governance 12:2, 185-203
Dodgson, Richard (2000), 'Contesting Neoliberal Globalisation at UN Global Conferences:
The Women's Health Movement, United Nations and the International Conference
on Population and Development', Global Society 14:3,443-463
Doherty, Brian (2006), 'Friends of the Earth International: Negotiating a Transnational
Identity', Environmental Politics 15:5,860-880
Drahos, Peter (2004), 'Towards an International Framework for the Protection of
Traditional Group Knowledge and Practice', paper presented at the 'UNCTAD-
Commonwealth Secretariat Workshop on Elements of National Sui Generis
Systems for the Preservation, Protection and Promotion of Traditional Knowledge,
Innovations and Practices and Options for an International Framework', Geneva, 4-
6 February 2004, available on-line:
https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/reports/pdfs/2004Drahos tkframework
UNCTAD.pdf (last accessed 17.05.11)
Drahos, Peter with Braithwaite, John (2002), Information Feudalism: Who Owns the
Knowledge Economy?, London: Earthscan
Duffield, Mark (2001), 'Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid',
Disasters 25:4, 308-320
Dunoff, Jeffrey L. (1998), 'The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO',
journal of International Economic Law 1:3, 433-456
Dunoff, Jeffrey L. (2003), 'Public Participation in the Trade Regime: Of Litigation,
Frustration, Agitation and Legitimation', Rutgers Law Review 56:4,961-970
Outfield, Graham (2000), 'The Public and Private Domains: Intellectual Property Rights in
Traditional Knowledge', Science Communication 21:3, 274-295
Eckersley, Robyn (2007), 'A Green Public Sphere in the WTO?: The Amicus Curiae
Interventions in the Transatlantic Biotech Dispute', European journal of
International Relations 13:3, 329-356
Eckl, Julian (2008), 'Responsible Scholarship After Leaving the Veranda: Normative Issues
Faced by Field Researchers-and Armchair Scientists', International Political
Sociology 2:3, 185-203
Edwards, Michael (2001), 'Introduction' in Edwards, Michael and Gaventa, John (eds.),
Global Citizen Action, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1-14
184
Emerson, Robert M., Fretz, Rachel I., Shaw, linda L. (1995), Writing Ethnographic
Fieldnotes, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press
Eschle, Catherine (2005), 'Constructing 'the Anti-Globalisation Movement' in Eschle,
Catherine and Maiguashca, Bice (eds), Critical Theories, International Relations and
'the Anti-Globalisation Movement': The Politics 0/Global Resistance, London:
Routledge, 17-35
Eschle, Catherine and Maiguashca, Bice (2005), 'Introduction' in Eschle, Catherine and
Maiguashca, Bice (eds), Critical Theories, International Relations and 'the Anti-
Globalisation Movement': The Politics 0/Global Resistance, London: Routledge, 1-
13
Etzioni, Amitai (2004), 'The Capabilities and Limits of the Global Civil Society',
Millennium: Journal 0/ International Studies 33:2, 341-353
Ferguson, James (1990), The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticization and
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Ferguson, James and Gupta, Akhil (2002), 'Spatialising States: Towards an Ethnography
of Neoliberal Governmentality', American Ethnologist 29:4,981-1002
Fife, Wayne (2005), Doing Fieldwork: Ethnographic Methods/or Research in Developing
Countries and Beyond, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan
Fisher, William F. (1997), 'Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices',
Annual Review 0/Anthropology 26, 439-64
Fiorini, Ann M. and Simmons, P. J. (2000), 'What the World Needs Now?' in Fiorini, Ann
(ed), The Third Force: The Rise o/Transnational Civil Society, Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and the Japan Center for International
Exchange, 1-15
Foucault, Michel (1980a), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings
1972-1977 (edited by Colin Gordon), London: Harvester Wheatsheaf
Foucault, Michel (1980b), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (edited by Donald F.
Bouchard), Ithaca: Cornell University Press
Foucault, Michel (1981), 'The Order of Discourse' in Young, Robert (ed), Untying the
Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, Boston, london and Henley: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 48-78
Foucault, Michel (1983), 'The Subject and Power' in Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Rabinow,
Paul, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 208-226
Foucault, Michel (1991a), Discipline and Punish: The Birth 0/ the Prison (translated by
Alan Sheridan), london: Penguin Books
185
Foucault, Michel (1991b), 'Questions of Method' in Burchell, Graham, Gordon, Colin and
Miller, Peter, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 73-86
Foucault, Michel (1997), Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 1 (edited
by Paul Rabinow), London: Penguin Books
Foucault, Michel (2000), Power: Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 volume 3 (edited
by James D. Faubion), London: Penguin Books
Foucault, Michel (2003 [1972]), The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Routledge
Foucault, Michel (2003), Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France 1974-1975, New
York: Picador
Foucault, Michel (2005), The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de
France 1981-1982, New York: Picador
Foucault, Michel (2007), 'The Meshes of Power' in Crampton, Jeremy W. and Elden,
Stuart (eds), Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography, Aldershot,
Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 153-162
Foucault, Michel (2009), Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France
1977-1978, New York: Picador
Freidberg, Susanne (2001), 'On the Trail of the Global Green Bean: Methodological
Considerations in Multi-Site Ethnography', Global Networks 1:4, 353-368
Garsten, Christina (2010), 'Ethnography at the Interface: 'Corporate Social
Responsibility' as an Anthropological Field of Enquiry', in Melhuus, Marit, Mitchell,
Jon P. and Wulff, Helena (eds), Ethnographic Practice in the Present, New York and
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 56-68
Geertz, Clifford (1993 [1973]), The Interpretation of Cultures, London: Fontana Press
Geertz, Clifford (2000a), Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical
Topics, Oxford: Princeton University Press
Geertz, Clifford (2000b), Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology,
New York: Basic Books
Gervais, Daniel J. (2003), 'Spiritual but not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred
Intangible Traditional Knowledge', Cardozo journal of International and
Comparative Law 11, 467-495
Gill, Stephen (2000), 'Toward a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattle as a Moment in
the New Politics of Globalisation', Millennium: journal of International Studies
29:1, 131-140
Gill, Stephen (2003), Power and Resistance in the New World Order, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan
186
Gille, Zsuzsa and 6 Riain, Sean (2002), 'Global Ethnography', Annual Review of Sociology
28,271-295




Gordenker, Leon and Weiss, Thomas G. (1995), 'Pluralising Global Governance:
Analytical Approaches and Dimensions', Third World Quarterly 16:3, 357-387
Gordenker, Leon and Weiss, Thomas G. (1996), 'Pluralizing Global Governance:
Analytical Approaches and Dimensions' in Weiss, Thomas G. and Gordenker, Leon
(eds), NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, London: Lynne Riener, 17-47
Gordon, Colin (1991), 'Governmental Rationality: An Introduction' in Burchell, Graham,
Gordon, Colin and Miller, Peter, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality,
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1-51
Gottweis, Herbert (2003), 'Theoretical Strategies of Poststructuralist Policy Analysis:
Towards an Analytics of Government' in Hajer, Maarten A. and Wagenaar, Hendrik
(eds), Deliberative Policy Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 247-
265
Gotz, Norbert (2008), 'Reframing NGOs: The Identity of an International Relations Non-
Starter, European Journal of International Relations 14:2,231-258
GRAIN and Kalpavriksh (2002), 'Traditional Knowledge of Biodiversity in Asia-Pacific:
Problems of Piracy and Protection', Briefing Paper, available on-line:
http://www.grain.org!briefings files!tk-asia-2002-en.pdf (last accessed
15.05.2011)
Greenwood, Justin (2003), Interest Representation in the European Union, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan
Halbert, Debora J (2005), Resisting Intellectual Property, London: Routledge
Halliday, Fred (2000), 'Getting Real About Seattle', Millennium: Journal of International
Studies 29:1, 123-129
Hammersley, Martyn and Atkinson, Paul (1995), Ethnography: Principles in Practice
(Second Edition), London: Routledge
Hann, Chris (1996), 'Introduction: political Society and Civil Anthropology' in Hann, Chris
and Dunn, Elizabeth (eds), Civil Society: Challenging Western Mode/s, London:
Routledge, 1-26
Hannerz, Ulf (2003), 'Being There ... and There .. and Therel Reflections on Multi-Site
Ethnography', Ethnography 4:2,201-216
187
Hart, Gillian (2006), 'Denaturalizing Dispossession: Critical Ethnography in the Age of
Resurgent Imperialism', Antipode 38:5, 977-1004
Harvey, David (2005), The New Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Hayward, Clarissa Rile (2004), 'Doxa and Deliberation', Critical Review of International
Social and Political Philosophy, 7:1, 1-24
He, Baogang and Murphy, Hannah (2007), 'Global Social Justice at the WTO? The Role of
NGOs in Constructing Global Social Contracts', International Affairs 83:4, 702-727
Hendry, Joy (2003), 'An Ethnographer in the Global Arena: Globography Perhaps?',
Global Networks 3:4, 497-512
Herbert, Steve (2000), 'For Ethnography', Progress in Human Geography 24:4,550-568
Hertel, Shareen (2006), 'New Moves in Transnational Advocacy: Getting Labour and
Economic Rights on the Agenda in Unexpected Ways', Global Governance 12:3,
263-281
Hindess, Barry (1997), 'Politics and Governmentality', Economy and Society 26:2, 257-
272
Hoekman, Bernard M. and Kostecki, Michel M. (2001), The Political Economy of the
World Trading System (Second Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press
Holstein, James A. and Gubrium, Jaber F. (2004), 'The Active Interview' in Silverman,
David (ed), Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, London: Sage, 140-
161
Holzscheiter, Anna (2005), 'Discourse as Capability: Non-State Actors' Capital in Global
Governance', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33:3, 723-746
Hopgood, Stephen (2000), 'Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society: The Inexorable
Hegemony of the Neoliberal Self, Millennium 29:1, 1-25
Hopgood, Stephen (2006), Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International,
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press
Howse, Robert (2003), 'Membership and its Privileges: the WTO, Civil Society, and
the Amicus Brief Controversy', European Law Journal 9: 4, 496-510
Huxley, Margo (2007), 'Geographies of Governmentality' in Crampton, Jeremy W. and
Elden, Stuart (eds), Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography,
Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 185-204
ICTSD(2009), The Global Debate on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and
Developing Countries, Programme on IPRsand Sustainable Development, Issue
Paper No. 22, Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development
188
IIcan, Suzanne and Lacey, Anita (2006), 'Governing through Empowerment: Oxfam's
Global Reform and Trade Campaigns', Globalizations 3:2, 207-225
Inayatullah, Naeem and Blaney, David L. (2004), International Relations and the Problem
of Difference, New York and London: Routledge
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus (2008), 'Can Ethnographic Techniques Tell Us Distinctive
Things About World Politics?', International Political Sociology 2:1,91-93
Jaeger, Hans-Martin (2007), "'Global Civil Society" and the Political Depoliticization of
Global Governance', International Political Sociology 1:3,257-277
Joachim, Jutta (2003), 'Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and
Women's Rights', International Studies Quarterly 47:2, 247-274
Jordan, Lisa and van Tuijl, Peter (2000), 'Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO
Advocacy, World Development 28:12,1051-1065
Joseph, Jonathon (2009), 'Govern mentality of What? Populations, States and
International Organisation', Global Society 23:4, 413-42
Kaldor, Mary (2000), 'Civilising' Globalisation? The Implications of the 'Battle in Seattle',
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29:1, 105-114
Kaldor, Mary (2003a), Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Cambridge: Polity
Kaldor, Mary (2003b), 'The Idea of Global Civil Society', International Affairs 79:3, 583-
593
.Kamat, Sangeeta (2004), 'The Privatisation of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse
in a Neoliberal Era', Review of International Political Economy 11:1, 155-176
Karns, Margaret P. and Mingst, Karen A. (2004), International Organizations: The Politics
and Processes of Global Governance, London: Lynne Riener
Keane, John (2003), Global Civil Society?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Keck, Margaret E. and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998), Activists Beyond Borders, Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press
Kendall, Gavin and Wickham, Gary (2000), Using Foucault's Methods, London: Sage
Khor, Martin (2000), 'Rethinking Liberalisation and Reforming the WTO', Speech
delivered at the World Economic Forum at Davos, switzerland, 28 January 2000.
Available on-line: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/davos2-cn.htm (last accessed
17.05.2011)
Kihwelo, P.-F. (2005), 'Indigenous Knowledge: What Is It? How and Why Do We Protect
It?', Journal of World Intellectual Property 8:3,345-359
189
Klotz, Audie (2002), 'Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti-
Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences', European Journal of International
Relations 8:1, 49-76
Klotz, Audie and Lynch, Cecelia (2007), Strategies for Research in Constructivist
International Relations, London: M. E.Sharpe
Lamy, Pascal (2007), 'Civil Society is Influencing the WTO Agenda', Keynote Address to
the WTO Public Forum on 4 October 2007, available on-line:
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/spple/sppI73e.htm (last accessed
15.05.2011)
Larner, Wendy and Walters, William (2004), 'Introduction. Global Governmentality:
Governing International Spaces' in Larner, Wendy and Walters, William (eds),
Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces, London: Routledge, 1-20
Legg, Stephen (2005), 'Foucault's Population Geographies: Classifications, Biopolitics and
Governmental Spaces', Population, Space and Place 11:3, 137-156
Leistner, Matthias (2004), 'Traditional Knowledge' in von Lewinski, Silke (ed), Indigenous
Knowledge and Intellectual Property: Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge
and Folklore, London: Kluwer Law International, 49-149
Lemke, Thomas (2001), "The Birth of Bio-Politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the
College de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality', Economy and Society 30:2,
190-207
Lemke, Thomas (2002), 'Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique', Rethinking Marxism
14:3,49-64
Levi, Margaret and Murphy, Gillian H. (2006), 'Coalitions of Contention: The Case of the
WTO Protests in Seattle', Political Studies 54:4, 651-670
Lewellen, Ted C. (2003), Political Anthropology: An Introduction, Westport, Connecticut:
Praeger Publishers
Lewis, David and Mosse, David (2006), 'Encountering Order and Disjuncture:
Contemporary Anthropological Perspectives on the Organisation of Development',
Oxford Development Studies 34:1, 1-13
Lidchi, Henrietta (1997), 'The Poetics and Politics of Exhibiting Other Cultures' in Hall,
Stuart (ed), Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices,
London: Sage, 151-208
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (2005a), 'Global Civil Society and Global Governmentality: or, the
Search for Politics and the State amidst the Capillaries of Social Power' in Barnett,
Michael and Duvall, Raymond (eds), Power in Global Governance, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 229-248
190
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (2005b), 'Power, Politics and Global Civil Society', Millennium:
Journal of International Studies 33:3, 747-769
lipschutz, Ronnie D. with Rowe, James K. (2005), Globalization, Governmentalityand
Global Politics: Regulation for the Rest of Us?, london and New York: Routledge
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (2007), 'On the Transformational Potential of Global Civil Society' in
Berenskoetter, Felix and Williams, M. J. (eds), Power in World Politics, london:
Routledge, 225-243
lowenhaupt Tsing, Anna (2002), 'Politics on the Periphery' in Vincent, Joan (ed), The
Anthropology of Politics: A Reader in Ethnography, Theory, and Critique, Oxford:
Blackwell, 325-337
Madison, D. Soyini (2005), Critical Ethnography: Methods, Ethics and Performance,
london: Sage
Magis, Kristen (2010), 'Convergence: Finding Collective Voice in Global Civil Society',
Voluntas 21:3, 317-338
Maiguashca, Bice (2003), 'Governance and Resistance in World Politics: Introduction',
Review of International Studies 29: Supplement Sl, 3-28
Maiguashca, Bice (2006), 'Making Feminist Sense of the "Anti-globalisation Movement''',
Global Society 20:2, 115-136
Mandaville, Peter (2002), 'Reading the State from Elsewhere: Towards an Anthropology
of the Postnational', Review of International Studies, 28:1, 199-207
Marcus, George E. (1995), 'Ethnography in/ofthe World System: The Emergence of
Multi-Sited Ethnography', Annual Review 0/Anthropology 24,95-117
Marcus, George E. (1998), Ethnography through Thick and Thin, Chichester: Princeton
University Press
Marcus, George E. (2010), 'Notes from Within a laboratory for the Reinvention of
Anthropological Method', in Melhuus, Marit, Mitchell, Jon P. and Wulff, Helena
(eds), Ethnographic Practice in the Present, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books,
69-79
Martens, Kerstin (2001), 'Non-Governmental Organisations as Corporatist Mediator? An
Analysis of NGOs in the UNESCOSystem', Global Society 15:4,387-404
Martens, Kerstin (2002), 'Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental
Organizations', voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations 13:3, 271-285
Martens, Kerstin (2006), 'NGOs in the United Nations System: Evaluating Theoretical
Approaches', Journal of International Development 18:5, 691-700
191
Mason, Michael (2004), 'Representing Transnational Environmental Interests: New
Opportunities for Non-Governmental Organisation Access within the World Trade
Organisation ?', Environmental Politics 13:3, 566-589
Mathers, Andrew and Novelli, Mario (2007), 'Researching Resistance to Neoliberal
Globalization: Engaged Ethnography as Solidarity and Praxis', Globalizations 4:2,
229-249
Matthews, Duncan (2007), 'The Role of International NGOs in the Intellectual Property
Policy-Making and Norm-Setting Activities of Multilateral Institutions', Chicago
Kent Law Review 82:3, 1369-1387
May, Christopher (2000), A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The
New Enclosures?, London: Routledge
May, Christopher (2002), 'Unacceptable Costs: The Consequences of Making Knowledge
Property in a Global Society', Global Society 16:2, 123-144
May, Christopher (2005), 'Intellectual Property Rights' in Kelly, Dominic and Grant, Wyn
(eds), The Politics of International Trade in the Twenty-First Century: Actors, Issues
and Regional Dynamics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 164-182
May, Christopher (2006), 'Social Limits to the Commodification of Knowledge: Ten Years
of TRIPs', Journal of Institutional Economics 2:1, 91-108
May, Christopher (2007), 'The Hypocrisy of Forgetfulness: The Contemporary
Significance of Early Innovations in Intellectual Property', Review of International
Political Economy 14:1, 1- 25
May, Christopher and Sell, Susan K. (2006), Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History,
London and Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
MCMichael, Philip (2000), 'Sleepless Since Seattle: What is the WTO About?', Review of
International Political Economy 7: 3, 466-474
McNay, Lois (1994), Foucault: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press
Merlingen, Michael (2003), 'Governmentality: Towards a Foucauldian Framework for the
Study of IGOs', Cooperation and Conflict 38:4,361-384
Merlingen, Michael (2006), 'Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of
Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond', Millennium:
Journal of International Studies 35:1, 181-196
Miller, Gale (2004), 'Building Bridges: The Possibility of Analytical Dialogue between
Ethnography, Conversation Analysis and Foucault' in Silverman, David (ed),
Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, London: Sage, 35-55
Miller, Peter and Rose, Nikolas (1993), 'Governing Economic Life' in Gane, Mike and
Johnson, Terry (eds), Foucault's New Domains, London: Routledge, 75-105
192
Miller, Peter and Rose, Nikolas (1998), 'The Tavistock Programme: The Government of
Subjectivity and Social Life', Sociology 22:2, 171-192
Miller, Peter and Rose, Nikolas (2008), Governing the Present: Administering Economic,
Social and Personal Life, Cambridge: Polity Press
Mills, Sarah (2003), Michel Foucault, London: Routledge
Minority Rights Group International (2007), World Directory 0/ Minorities and Indigenous
Peoples - Peru: Overview, available on-line:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4954ceOb2.html(last accessed 16.05.2011)
Mitchell, Jon P. (2010), 'Introduction' in Melhuus, Marit, Mitchell, Jon P. and Wulff,
Helena (eds), Ethnographic Practice in the Present, New York and Oxford:
Berghahn Books, 1-15
Mitchell, Timothy (2002), Rule 0/ Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, London:
University of California Press
Moore, Henrietta L. (1999), 'Anthropology at the Turn ofthe Century' in Moore,
Henrietta L. (ed), Anthropological Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity, 1- 23
Moore, Henrietta L. (2004), 'Global Anxieties: Concept-Metaphors and Pre-Theoretical
Commitments in Anthropology', Anthropological Theory 4:1, 71-88
Mosse, David (2005a), Cultivating Development: An Ethnography 0/Aid Policy and
Practice, London: Pluto Press
Mosse, David (2005b), 'Global Governance and the Ethnography of International Aid' in
Mosse, David and Lewis, David (eds), The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in
International Development, London: Pluto Press, 1-36
Muppiddi, Himadeep (2005), 'Colonial and Postcolonial Global Governance' in Barnett,
Michael and Duvall, Raymond (eds), Power in Global Governance, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 273-293
Nanz, Patrizia and Steffek, Jens (2004), 'Global Governance, Participation and the Public
Sphere', Government and Opposition 39:2, 314-335
Nelson, Paul and Dorsey, Ellen (2007), 'New Rights Advocacy in a Global Public Domain',
European Journal of International Relations 13:2, 187-216
Neumann, Iver B. (2002), 'Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Caseof
Diplomacy', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31:3, 627-651
Neumann, Iver B. (2007), "'A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand for," or: Why
Diplomats Never Produce Anything New', International Political Sociology 1:2,183-
200
Newman, Janet (2005a), 'Introduction' in Newman, Janet (ed), Remaking Governance:
People, Politics and the Public Sphere, Bristol: The Policy Press, 1-15
193
Newman, Janet (2005b), 'Conclusion' in Newman, Janet (ed), Remaking Governance:
People, Politics and the Public Sphere, Bristol: The Policy Press, 197-213
O'Brien, Robert, Goetz, Anne Marie, Scholte, Jan Aart and Williams, Marc (2000),
Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global
Social Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Odysseos, Louiza (forthcoming 2011), 'Governing Dissent in the Central Kalahari Game
Reserve: "Development", Governmentality and Subjectification amongst
Botswana's Bushmen', Globalizations 8:4
Olesen, Thomas (2005), 'World Politics and Social Movements: The Janus Face of the
Global Democratic Structure', Global Society 19:2, 109-129
Olesen, Thomas (2006), "In the Court of Public Opinion': Transnational Problem
Construction in the HIV/AIDS Medicine Access Campaign, 1998-2001',
International Sociology 21:1, 5-30
O'Reilly, Karen (2005), Ethnographic Methods, London: Routledge
Panfichi, Aldo (con la asistencia de Paulo Munoz) (2002), 'Sociedad Civil y Democracia en
los Andes y el Cono Sur a Inicios del Siglo XXI' in Panfichi, Aldo (coordinador),
Sociedad Civil, Estera Publica y oemocrouzaaon en America Latina: Andes y Cono
Sur, Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Cat61ica del Peru, 13-46
Panfichi, Aldo (2006), 'La Partlclpaclon Ciudadana en el Peru. Disputas, Confluencias y
Tensiones', blog article http://blog.pucp.edu.pe/item/2628 (last accessed
16.05.2011)
Parry, Bronwyn (2002), 'Cultures of Knowledge: Investigating Intellectual Property Rights
and Relations in the Pacific', Antipode 34:4, 679-706
Pasha, Mustapha Kamal and Blaney, David l. (1998), 'Elusive Paradise: The Promise and
Peril of Global Civil Society', Alternatives 23:4, 417-450
Pauwelyn, Joost (2002), 'The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement', International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 51:2, 325-364
Posey, Darrell A. (1999), 'Safeguarding Traditional Resource Rights of Indigenous
Peoples' in Nazarea, Virginia D. (ed), Ethnoecology: Situated Knowledge/Located
Lives, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 217-229
Pouliot, Vincent (2007), "'Sobjectivism": Toward a Constructivist Methodology',
International Studies Quarterly 51:2, 359-384
Pouliot, Vincent (2008), 'The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security
Communities', International Organization 62:2, 257-258
Price, Richard (1998), 'Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land
Mines', International Organization 52:3, 613-644
194
Price, Richard (2003), 'Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics', World
Politics 55:4, 579-606
,Rabotnikof, Nora, Riggirozzi, Maria Pia and Tussie, Diana (coordinadora) (2002),
'Sociedad Civil y Organismos Internacionales: Dilemas y Desaflos de una Nueva
Relaci6n', in Panfichi, Aldo (coordinador), Sociedad Civil, Esfera Publica y
Democratizacion en America Latina: Andes y Cono Sur, Lima: Fondo Editorial de la
Pontificia Universidad Cat61ica del Peru, 47-77
Ragavan, Srividhya (2001), 'Protection of Traditional Knowledge', Minnesota Intellectual
Property Review 2:2, 1-60
Rajotte, Tasmin (2008), 'The Negotiations Web: Complex Connections' in Tansey, Geoff
and Rajotte, Tasmin (eds), The Future Control of Food: A Guide to International
Negotiations and Rules on Intellectual Property, Biodiversity and Food Security,
London: Earthscan, 141-167
Ramos, Leonardo Cesar Souza (2006), 'Civil Society in an Age of Globalization: A Neo-
Gramscian Perspective', Journal of Civil Society 2:2, 143-163
Reimann, Kim D. (2006), 'A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the
Worldwide Growth of NGOs', International Studies Quarterly 50,45-67
Reinalda, Bob (2001), 'Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International
Relations Theory' in Arts, Bas, Noortmann, Math and Reinalda, Bob (eds), Non-
State Actors in International Relations, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 11-40
Reinalda, Bob, Arts, Bas and Noortmann, Math (2001), 'Non-State Actors in International
Relations: Do They Matter?' in Arts, Bas, Noortmann, Math and Reinalda, Bob
(eds), Non-State Actors in International Relations, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate,
1-8
Rose, Nikolas (1991), 'Governing by Numbers: Figuring Out Democracy', Accounting
Organizations and Society 16:7,673-692
Rose, Nikolas (1993), 'Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism',
Economy and Society 22:3, 283-299
Rose, Nikolas (1996), 'The Death of the Social? Re-Figuring the Territory of
Government', Economy and Society 25:3,327-356
Rose, Nikolas (1999), Powers of Freedom: Reframing political Thought, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Rose, Nikolas (2000), 'Community, Citizenship, and the Third Way', American
Behavioural Scientist 43:9, 1395-1411
Rose, Nikolas and Miller, Peter (1992), 'Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics
of Government', British Journal of Sociology, 43:2, 173-205
195
Rossi, Benedetta (2004), 'Revisiting Foucauldian Approaches: Power Dynamics in
Development Projects', Journal of Development Studies 40:6, 1-29
Ruggie, John Gerard (2004), 'Reconstituting the Global Public Domain - Issues, Actors,
and Practices', European Journal of International Relations 10:4,499-531
Rupert, Mark (2003), 'Globalising Common Sense: A Marxian-Gramscian (Re-)Vision of
the Politics of Governance/Resistance', Review of International Studies
29:Supplement 51, 181-198
Rutherford, Stephanie (2007), 'Green Governmentality: Insights and Opportunities in the
Study of Nature's Rule', Progress in Human Geography 31:3,291-307
Sahai, Suman (2004), 'TRIPS and Biodiversity: A Gender Perspective', Gender and
Development 12:2, 58-65
Schatz, Edward (2009), 'Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics' in Schatz,
Edward (ed), Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of
Power, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1-22
Scholte, Jan Aart (2000), 'Cautionary Reflections on Seattle', Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 29:1, 115-121
Scholte, Jan Aart (2002a), 'Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance', Global
Governance 8:3, 281-304
Scholte, Jan Aart (2002b), 'Civil Society and Governance in the Global Polity', in Ougaard,
Morten and Higgot, Richard (eds), Towards a Global Polity, London and New York:
Routledge, 145-165
Scholte, Jan Aart (2004a), 'The WTO and Civil Society' in Hocking, Brian and McGuire,
Steven (eds), Trade Politics (Second Edition), London: Routledge
Scholte, Jan Aart (2004b), 'Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global
Governance', Government and Opposition 39:2, 211-233
Scholte, Jan Aart (2007), 'Civil Society and the Legitimation of Global Governance', CSGR
Working Paper No. 223/07
Scott, James C. (1985), Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance,
New Haven and London: Yale University Press
Seckinelgin, Hakan (2002), 'Civil Society as a Metaphor for Western Liberalism', Global
Society 16:4,357-376
Sell, Susan K. (1998), Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and
Antitrust, New York: State University of New York Press
Sell, Susan and May, Christopher (2001), 'Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement
in the History of Intellectual Property', Review of International Political Economy
8:3, 467-500
196
Sell, Susan K. and Prakash, Aseem (2004), 'Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest
Between Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights', International
Studies Quarterly 48:1,143-175
Sending, Ole Jacob and Neumann, Iver B. (2006), 'Governance to Governmentality:
Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power', International Studies Quarterly 50:3,651-672
Seuba, Xavier (2009), Border Measures Concerning Goods Allegedly Infringing
Intellectual Property Rights: The Seizures of Generic Medicines in Transit, Working
Paper, Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
Seuba, Xavier (2010), Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual
Property Enforcement at the Border, ICTSDProgramme on IPRsand Sustainable
Development, Issue Paper No. 27, Geneva: International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development
Sharma, Aradhana and Gupta, Akhil (2006), 'Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age
of Globalisation' in Sharma, Aradhana and Gupta, Akhil (eds), The Anthropology of
the State: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1-41
Shaw, Karena (2003), 'Whose Knowledge for What Politics?', Review of International
Studies 29:Supplement S1, 199-211
Shawki, Noha (2010), 'Issue Frames and the Political Outcomes of Transnational
Campaigns: A Comparison of the Jubilee 2000 Movement and the Currency
Transaction Tax Campaign', Global Society 24: 2, 203-230
Shiva, Vandana (2000), 'North-South Conflicts in Intellectual Property Rights', Peace
Review 12:4,501-508
Shore, Cris and Wright, Susan (1997), 'Policy: A New Field of Anthropology' in Shore, Cris
and Wright, Susan (eds), Anthropology of Policy: Critical Perspectives on
Governance and Power, London and New York: Routledge, 3-39
Sikkink, Kathryn (2005), 'Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and Insider-
Outsider Coalition' in della Porta, Donatella and Tarrow, Sidney (eds),
Transnational Protest and Global Activism, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 151-
173
Smith, Jackie (2002), 'Bridging Global Divides? Strategic Framing and Solidarity In
Transnational Social Movement Organisations', International Sociology 17:4,505-
528
Smith, Jackie and Bandy, Joe (2005), 'Introduction: Cooperation and Conflict in
Transnational Protest' in Bandy, Joe and Smith, Jackie (eds), Coalitions Across
Borders: Transnational Protest and Neoliberal Order, Oxford: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, 1-17
197
Smith, Jackie and Johnston, Hank (2002), 'Globalization and Resistance: An Introduction'
in Smith, Jackie and Johnston, Hank (eds), Globalization and Resistance:
Transnational Dimensians af Social Movements, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 1-12
Smith, Jackie and Wiest, Dawn (2005), 'The Uneven Geography of Global Civil SOciety:
National and Global Influences on Transnational Association', Social Forces 84: 2,
621-652
Smith, linda Tuhiwai (1999), Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous
Peoples, London: Zed Books
Smythe, Elizabeth and Smith, Peter J. (2006), 'Legitimacy, Transparency and Information
Technology: The World Trade Organisation in an Era of Contentious Trade Politics',
Global Governance 12:1,31-53
Steele, Brent J. and Amoureux, Jacque L. (2005), 'NGOs and Monitoring Genocide: The
Benefits and limits to Human Rights Panopticism', Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 34:2, 403-432
Steffek, Jens and Ehling, Ulrike (2008), 'Civil SOciety Participation at the Margins: The
Case of the WTO', in Steffek, Jens, Kissling, Claudia and Nanz, Patricia (eds), Civil
Society Participation in European and Global Governance: A Cure for the
Democratic Deficit?, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 95-115
Steffek, Jens and Ferretti, Maria Paola (2009), 'Accountability or "Good Decisions"? The
Competing Goals of Civil Society Participation in International Governance', Global
Society 23:1,37-57
Steffek, Jens and Nanz, Patricia (2008), 'Emergent Patterns of Civil Society Participation
in Global and European Governance' in Steffek, Jens, Kissling, Claudia and Nanz,
Patricia (eds), Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance: A
Cure for the Democratic Deficit?, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1-
29
Stone, Diane (2001), 'Think Tanks, Global Lesson-Drawing and Networking Social Policy
Ideas', Global Social Policy 1:3, 338-360
Stone, Diane (2002), 'Introduction: Global Knowledge and Advocacy Networks', Global
Networks 2:1, 1-11
Swartz, Marc J., Turner, Victor W. and Tuden, Arthur, 'Political Anthropology' in Vincent,
Joan (ed), The Anthropology of Politics: A Reader in Ethnography, Theory, and
Critique, Oxford: Blackwell, 102-109
Tansey, Geoff (2002), 'Patenting Our Food Future: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Global Food System', Social Policy and Administration 36:6,575-592
198
Tarrow, Sidney (2001), 'Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in
International Politics', Annual Review of Political Science 4, 1-20
Tarrow, Sidney (2002), 'From Lumping to Splitting: Specifying Globalization and
Resistance' in Smith, Jackie and Johnston, Hank (eds), Globalization and
Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, Oxford: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, 229-249
Tarrow, Sidney (2005), The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Tarrow, Sidney and della Porta, Donatella (2005), 'Conclusion: "Globalisation", Complex
Internationalism, and Transnational Contention in della Porta, Donatella and
Tarrow, Sidney (eds), Transnational Protest and Global Activism, Oxford: Rowman
and Littlefield,227-246
Tarrow, Sidney and McAdam, Doug (2005), 'Scale Shift in Transnational Contention' in
della Porta, Donatella and Tarrow, Sidney (eds), Transnational Protest and Global
Activism, Oxford: Rowman and littlefield, 121-147
Tedlock, Barbara (2000), 'Ethnography and Ethnographic Representation' in Denzin,
Norman K. and lincoln, Yvonna S. (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research
(Second Edition), London: Sage, 455-486
Thornberry, Patrick (2002), Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, Manchester:
Manchester University Press
Tickner, J. Ann (2005), 'What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to
International Relations Methodological Questions', International Studies Quarterly
49:1,1-21
\
Tobin, Brendan and Swiderska, Krystyna (2001), Speaking in Tongues: Indigenous
Participation in the Development of a Sui Generis Regime to Protect Traditional
Knowledge in Peru, London: International Institute for Environment and
Development (liED)
Townsend, Janet G., Porter, Gina and Mawdsley, Emma (2002), 'The Role of the
Transnational Community of Non-Government Organizations: Governance or
Policy Reduction?', Journal of International Development 14:6,829-839
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph (2001), 'The Anthropology of the State in the Age of
Globalization: Close Encounters ofthe Deceptive Kind', Current Anthropology 42:1,
125-138
True, Jaqui and Mintrom, Michael (2001), 'Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion:
The Case of Gender Mainstreaming', International Studies Quarterly 45:1,27-57
Van den Bosche, Peter (2008), 'NGO Involvement in the WTO: A Comparative
Perspective', Journal of International Economic Law 11:4, 717-749
199
Vermeylen, Saskia, Martin, George and Clift, Roland (200B), 'Intellectual Property Rights
Systems and the Assemblage of Local Knowledge Systems', International Journal of
Cultural Property 15:2, 201-221
Vrasti, Wanda (200B), 'The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations',
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37:2, 279-301
Wacquant, tote (2003), 'Ethnografeast: A Progress Report on the Practice and Promise of
Ethnography, Ethnography 4:1, S-14
Wacquant, Lo'ic (200Sa), 'Introduction: Symbolic Power and Democratic Practice' in
Wacquant, tote (ed), Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics, Cambridge: Polity, 1-
9
Wacquant, tote (2005b), 'Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics' in
Wacquant, Lo'ic (ed), Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics, Cambridge: Polity,
10-2B
Walters, William and Haahr, Jens Henrik (2005), Governing Europe: Discourse,
Governmentality and European Integration, London and New York: Routledge
Wedeen, Lisa (2009), 'Ethnography as Interpretive Enterprise' in Schatz, Edward (ed),
Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power, Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 75-93
Wilkinson, Rorden (2002), 'The Contours of Courtship: The WTO and Civil Society' in
Wilkinson, Rorden and Hughes, Steve (eds), Global Governance: Critical
Perspectives, London: Routledge, 193-211
Wilkinson, Rorden (2005), 'The World Trade Organisation and the Regulation of
International Trade' in Kelly, Dominic and Grant, Wyn (eds), The Politics of
International Trade in the Twenty-First Century: Actors, Issues and Regional
DynamiCS, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 13-29
Willetts, Peter (1996), 'Introduction' in Willetts, Peter (ed), 'The Conscience of the
World': The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System,
London: Hurst and Company, 1-14
Williams, Marc (2005), 'Civil Society and the World Trading System' in Kelly, Dominic and
Grant, Wyn (eds), The Politics of International Trade in the Twenty-First Century:
Actors, Issues and Regional Dynamics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 30-46
Willis, Paul and Trondman, Mats (2002), 'Manifesto for Ethnography', Cultural Studies-
Critical Methodologies 2:3, 394-402
Wolfe, Robert (2004), 'Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Where the WTO is Going
After Seattle, Doha and Cancun', Review of International Political Economy 11:3,
574-596
200
Wolford, Wendy (2006), 'The Difference Ethnography CanMake: Understanding Social
Mobilization and Development in the Brazilian Northeast', Qualitative Sociology
29:3, 335-352
World Intellectual Property Organisation (no date), 'Traditional Knowledge, Genetic
Resourcesand Traditional Cultural Expressions/Folklore',
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en(lastaccessed16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (1996), 'Guidelines for Arrangements on Relationswith Non-
Governmental Organizations: Decision adopted by the General Council on 18July
1996', available here: http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/ngoe/guidee.htm
(last accessed16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (2007), World Trade Report 2007, Geneva:WTOPublications
World Trade Organisation (no date), 'Community: Forum',
http://www.wto.org!english/forumse/chate/chate.htm (last accessed
16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (no date), 'Overview: the TRIPSAgreement',
http://www.wto.org!english/tratope/tripse/inteI2e.htm (last accessed
16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (no date), 'Rulesfor Participation in WTOOn-Line Forums',
http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/chate/guidee.htm (last accessed
16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (no date), 'The Work of the TRIPSCouncil'
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/inteI6e.htm) (last accessed
16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (no date), 'The WTO:Secretariat and Budget. Divisions',
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/secree/dive.htm (last accessed
16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (no date), 'TRIPS:Reviews,Article 27.3(b) and Related Issues.
Background and the Current Situation',
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/art273bbackgrounde.htm (last
accessed16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (no date), 'What is the WTO?',
http://www.wto.org!english/thewtoe/whatise/whatise.htm (last accessed
16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (no date), 'WTO legal Texts', available on-line:
http://www.wto.org!english/docse/legale/legale.htm(lastaccessed16.05.11)
World Trade Organisation (no date), 'WTO Public 2009: "Global Problems, Global








Wright, Sarah (2005), 'Knowing Scale: Intelle©tual Property Rights, Knowledge Spaces
and the Production of the Global', Social and Cultural Geography 6:6, 903-921
Yanacopulos, Helen (2005a), 'The Strategies that Bind: NGO Coalitions and their
Influence', Global Networks 5:1,93-110
Yanacopulos, Helen (200Sb), 'Patterns of Governance: The Rise of Transnational
Coalitions of NGOs', Global Society 19:3,247-266
Yanow, Dvora (2003), 'Accessing Local Knowledge' in Hajer, Maarten A. and Wagenaar,
Hendrik (eds), Deliberative Policy Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
228-246
Yanow, Dvora (2006), 'Thinking Interpretively: Philosophical Presuppositions and the
Human Sciences', in Yanow, Dvora and Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine (eds),
Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn,
london: M. E. Sharpe, 5-26
Yanow, Dvora (2009), 'Dear Author, Dear Reader: The Third Hermeneutic in Writing and
Reviewing Ethnography' in Schatz, Edward (ed), Political Ethnography: What
Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power, Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 275-302
Yashar, Deborah J. (2005), Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous
Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Yashar, Deborah J. (2007), 'Resistance and Identity Politics in an Age of Globalization',
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 610,160-181
Young, Iris Marion (2000), Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Young, Robert (1981), introduction to Foucault, Michel, 'The Order of Discourse' in
Young, Robert (ed), Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, Boston, London




I am grateful to individuals working in the following organisations for generously sharing
their time, expertise, ideas and experiences throughout the course of this study. All
interpretations of events, accounts and social processes presented in this thesis are my
own, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of these organisations or the
individuals interviewed.
Acci6n Internacional por la Salud
lima, Peru
Asociaci6n lnteretnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP)(Interethnic
Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest)
lima, Peru
Asociaci6n para la Naturaleza y el Desarrollo Sostenible (ANDES) (Association for Nature
and Sustainable Development)
Cusco, Peru
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)
Geneva, Switzerland
Centro de Culturas Indfgenas del Peru (CHIRAPAQ) (Centre for Peruvian Indigenous
Cultures)
lima, Peru





Comisi6n Nacional contra la Biopiraterfa (National Commission Against Biopiracy)
Lima, Peru
Confederaci6n Nacional de Comunidades del Peru Afectadas por la Minerfa (CONACAMI)
(National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining)
Lima, Peru
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Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS)Geneva Resource Centre
Geneva, Switzerland
Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR) (Law, Environment and Natural
Resources)
Lima, Peru
DESCO,Centro de Estudios y Promoci6n del Desarrollo (Centre for the Study and
Promotion of Development)
Lima, Peru
European Commission Permanent Delegation to the International Organisations in
Geneva
Geneva, Switzerland
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP)
Geneva, Switzerland
Instituto de Investigaci6n de la Amazonia Peruana (IIAP) (Research Institute for the
Peruvian Amazon)
Iquitos, Peru
Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protecci6n de la Propiedad
Intelectual (lNDECOPI) (National Institute for the Defense of Competition and the
Protection of Intellectual Property)
Iquitos and Lima, Peru
Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indlgenas, Amaz6nicos y Afroperuano
(INDEPA) (National Institute for the Development ofthe Indigenous, Amazonian and
Afroperuvian Peoples)
Lima, Peru
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)
Geneva, Switzerland
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Lima, Peru
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Geneva, Switzerland
Organlzaclon de Pueblos Indfgenas del Oriente (ORPIO) (Organisation for Indigenous
Peoples of the East)
Iquitos, Peru
Oxfam International
Geneva, Switzerland and lima, Peru
Pazy Esperanza (Peace and Hope)
Lima, Peru
Permanent Mission of Brazil
Geneva, Switzerland
Permanent Mission of India
Geneva, Switzerland
Permanent Mission of Peru
Geneva, Switzerland
Pro Biodiversidad de los Andes (PROBIOANDES) (Pro Biodiversity ofthe Andes)
lima, Peru




Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO)
Geneva, Switzerland
Red Peruana por una Globalizaci6n can Equidad (redGE) (Peruvian Network for Equitable
Globalisation)
lima, Peru
Secretarfa General de la Comunidad Andina (General Secretariat of the Andean
Community)
lima, Peru
Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental






3D Trade, Human Rights, Equitable Economy
Geneva, Switzerland
Universidad Nacional del Altiplano
Puno, Peru






List of Events Attended
WTO Public Forum 2007
4 - 5 October 2007, Geneva, Switzerland
The GloballP Enforcement Debate: New Economic Perspectives and Policy Challenges
17 July 2008
WTO Public Forum 2008
24 - 25 September 2008, Geneva, Switzerland
Taller Internacional sobre la Implementaci6n del Protocolo de Bioseguridad a Prop6sito
de la Ordenanza Regional 010 - 2007 - CR/GRC.CUSCOy Taller de Biopiraterla
(International Workshop on the the Implementation of a Biosecurity Protocol in Relation
to Regional Ordenance 010 - 2007 - CR/GRC.CUSCOand Workshop on Biopiracy)
21- 23 April 2009, Cusco, Peru
IV Cumbre Continental de Pueblos y Nacionalidades Indigenas del Abya Yala (IV
Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities of Abya Yala)
29 - 31 May 2009, Puno, Peru
WTO Public Forum 2009
28 - 30 September 2009, Geneva, Switzerland
Geneva Trade and Development Symposium
30 November - 2 December 2009, Geneva, Switzerland
WTO Public Forum 2010
15 -17 September 2010, Geneva, Switzerland
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